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# Community Policing through Local Collective Action in Tanzania: *Sungusungu* to *Ulinzi Shirikishi*

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May 2013

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Summary

Community policing (*polisi jamii*) was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006 as part of an ongoing police reform programme. In addition to attempting to improve communication between police and the public, the police have promoted *ulinzi shirikishi* (participatory security), whereby citizens are encouraged to form neighbourhood policing institutions to prevent and detect crime. This thesis presents the findings of research conducted in the city of Mwanza that explored the extent to which community policing has improved residents' perceptions of local security and constitutes a form of policing which is responsive, accountable and sustainable. Whilst *ulinzi shirikishi* is widely credited with having improved local safety, it has proved difficult to sustain collective action through community policing and the costs and benefits of participation have been unequally distributed across 'communities'. These outcomes should be understood in terms of the context of how local development is organised and understood in Tanzania. Firstly, existing local governance institutions lack transparency and meaningful accountability mechanisms and are highly dependent upon personal preferences and capacity. Secondly, local development is politicised and liable to become subject to inter-party competition. Thirdly, historical understandings of 'participation' in Tanzania tend to emphasise obligation and material contributions rather than popular influence over initiatives, however this is increasingly being contested in today's multiparty context. The apparent shortcomings of community policing are not necessarily inconsistent with police objectives for the reform, which often prioritise cost-effective crime prevention rather than the reorientation and 'democratisation' of policing envisaged by advocates of community policing.

## Acknowledgements

I would firstly like to thank my supervisors, Richard Crook and Naomi Hossain, for their valuable insights and guidance and kind support. In addition, fellows and students at the Institute of Development Studies have provided helpful comments and advice at various stages of the PhD process.

The PhD was funded by the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), a research consortium funded by the Department for International Development and Irish Aid. In addition to the PhD studentship, I also benefitted from attending consortium meetings, participating in scoping research carried out in Tanzania and the opportunity to attend conferences in the UK and South Africa, as well as the advice of APPP affiliated researchers, and in particular Tim Kelsall.

The research process would have been much more difficult and less enjoyable without the assistance of Steve John Shipula. I am very grateful for both his excellent skills as an interpreter and his friendship. Thanks are also due to Simeon Mwampashi and Silas Shipula, who assisted with interpretation at various stages of the fieldwork.

Chris Peter Maina, Sufian Bukurura and Anna Mtani, all provided extremely helpful advice in the early stages of the fieldwork. George Kakoti was kind enough to share a draft of his masters thesis with me, which was invaluable in understanding the history of *sungusungu* in urban areas.

I am grateful to Katie McKeown, Jacob McKnight and especially John Giblin, who read earlier drafts of parts of the thesis.

The Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology granted permission to carry out the research.

Finally, I am extremely grateful to all those who participated in the research. Senior and local police officers, local government officials, residents of the three case sites and others were incredibly generous with their time and very supportive of the project.

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## List of Acronyms

ABG	African Barrick Gold
ACP	Assistant Commissioner of Police
ALAT	Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BMU	Beach Management Unit
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CFS	Centre for the Future State
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasi na Maendeleo
CHRI	Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
CP	Community policing
CUF	Civic United Front
DDT	District Development Trust
DFID	Department for International Development
FFU	Field Force Unit
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
ICLEI	International Centre for Local Environmental Initiatives
JKT	<i>Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa</i>
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Centre
MCC	Mwanza City Council
MEO	<i>Mtaa</i> Executive Officer
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCD	Officer Commanding District
OCS	Officer Commanding Station
PMORALG	Prime Minister's Office –Regional Administration and Local Government
RB	Report book number (allocated by police to reported crimes)
RC	Regional Commissioner
SACP	Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police
SSP	Senior Superintendent of Police
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TCL	Ten-cell leader
TI-Kenya	Transparency International Kenya
TPF	Tanzania Police Force
TSH	Tanzanian Shillings
TYL	TANU Youth League
UN	United Nations
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USD	United States Dollar
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WEO	Ward Executive Officer

## Glossary of Kiswahili Terms

<i>Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (JKT)</i>	National service (literally Nation Building Army)
<i>(Jeshi la) Mgambo</i>	People's Militia
<i>Kamanda (pl. makamanda)</i>	Commander (of <i>sungusungu / ulinzi shirikishi</i> )
<i>Kamanda Mkuu</i>	Top commander (of <i>sungusungu / ulinzi shirikishi</i> )
<i>Kata</i>	Ward (local government administrative division)
<i>Kaya</i>	Household. To be distinguished from <i>nyumba</i> (see below)
<i>Kibaka (pl. vibaka)</i>	Petty criminal
<i>Kijana (pl. vijana)</i>	Young person (usually refers to male)
<i>Kijiwe (pl. vijawe)</i>	Meeting place of (unemployed) young men. Literally 'small stone'
<i>Kujitegemea</i>	Self-reliance (ideological element of Tanzanian socialism)
<i>Makamanda (sing. kamanda)</i>	Commanders (of <i>sungusungu / ulinzi shirikishi</i> )
<i>Majambazi</i>	Criminals, typically associated with serious crime and use of weapons and violence
<i>Mtaa</i>	Street/sub-ward. Lowest level of local government in urban areas
<i>Nguku</i>	Division of <i>sungusungu</i> . Literally 'baboons'
<i>Ntemi</i>	Chief (from Kisukuma). Most senior leader of <i>sungusungu</i>
<i>Polisi jamii</i>	Community policing. Used throughout the thesis to refer to the community policing policy as a whole, in order to distinguish this from the local policing activities promoted as part of this policy, which are referred to here as <i>ulinzi shirikishi</i>
<i>Polisi kata</i>	Ward police officer
<i>Sungusungu</i>	Vigilante movement that emerged in the 1980s in Sukuma and Nyamwezi occupied areas of Tanzania
<i>Ujamaa</i>	The ideology of Tanzanian socialism. Literally 'familyhood'
<i>Ulinzi</i>	Security
<i>Ulinzi shirikishi</i>	Community policing / participatory security. Used throughout the thesis to refer to the local security arrangements promoted as part of community policing reforms
<i>Vibaka (sing. kibaka)</i>	Petty criminals
<i>Vijana (sing. kijana)</i>	Young people (usually refers to males)
<i>Vijiwe (sing. kijiwe)</i>	Meeting places of (unemployed) young men. Literally 'small stones'
<i>Wajumbe</i>	Members (of <i>mtaa</i> government)

## Chapter 1: Introduction

Community policing (hereafter CP) was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006. Expressed in Kiswahili as *polisi jamii* or *ulinzi shirikishi*, CP as understood in Tanzania refers to both improving relationships and communication between the police and citizens, and encouraging 'communities' to take responsibility for neighbourhood security. Police encourage citizens to cooperate with them by reporting crimes and providing intelligence, and also to perform local policing duties by organising night patrols to prevent crime, apprehending suspected offenders and resolving local disputes. The strategy is thus intended to improve police capacity to prevent crime by more effectively gathering and using local knowledge, and to be a means of supplementing the extremely limited resources and manpower of the Tanzania Police Force (TPF).

According to the Inspector General of Police (IGP), who has demonstrated a strong personal commitment to CP, the diverse benefits that can be expected as a result of the policy include:

...preventing and reducing crime as well as fear of crime; reducing disorder and anti-social behaviors; increasing feelings of safety; improving police-community relationships as well as improving police-community accountability. Other benefits are reducing corruption in the police service, enhancing respect of human rights and increasing the community's capacity to deal with local problems and changes (sic) police officers' attitudes and behavior towards policing...The Police Force will be oriented towards meeting the needs of civilians and institution (sic) of democratic society...

(Mwema 2008: 9)

The rhetoric of CP that has been adopted and its association with improved police service and democratisation reflect contemporary international consensus around CP as an essential element of police reform. However, attempts to mobilise citizens to participate in local security provision, and other forms of 'self-help', have a long history in Tanzania. CP in Tanzania has been largely internally driven and devised, in contrast to neighbouring countries where donors and NGOs have played a larger role.

CP in Tanzania also evokes Tanzanian ‘traditions’, and particularly that of *sungusungu* village defence groups, which were formed in response to cattle raiding in the 1980s and subsequently promoted around the country.

This thesis explores the implementation of CP in the city of Mwanza, in northwest Tanzania, and contributes to a growing literature on CP and other forms of non-state or ‘hybrid’ security provision in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa). Research which explores how such forms of policing actually operate, and who they benefit, is important at a time when it is increasingly accepted that the state police do not, and possibly should not, exercise a monopoly on security provision. The research is also pertinent to wider debates about the relative roles of states and organised citizens in providing public goods and services.

The main objective of the research was to consider the extent to which CP entailed an improvement in security and policing from the perspective of ‘end-users’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012), and in this case residents of three selected sites in the city of Mwanza. This entailed disaggregating ‘communities’ in order to consider for whom CP provided security and from what (Luckham 2007). The thesis explains these outcomes in terms of the particular historical trajectories of CP and other forms of ‘self-help’ in Tanzania, the politics of local development and the objectives and capacity of the state police in forming partnerships with communities.

This introductory chapter outlines the rationale for undertaking this research. Firstly, CP is currently promoted globally as a means of both improving the effectiveness of crime prevention, and making police more accountable and responsive to citizens. However, until recently there has been little analysis of how CP and other forms of policing ‘best practice’ derived in Western contexts have been implemented in Africa. Existing literature suggests that they are shaped by localised historical and cultural contexts and local and national power relations, and thus often have very different outcomes from those envisaged by proponents of CP.

Secondly, there appears to be an emerging consensus that African states, and particularly those emerging from conflict, cannot on their own provide adequate security to citizens, and that ‘hybrid’ forms of security provision, which incorporate ‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors may offer pragmatic and normative advantages. However, the claims made for ‘multi-layered’ (OECD 2007) approaches to security governance demand empirical exploration.

Thirdly, the research contributes to critical perspectives on the claims made for citizen 'participation' in development. CP as practised in Tanzania has been implemented at the local level in ways that are very similar to other forms of participatory development. Critical insights from the large literature on participation in its various forms, and historical experiences of 'self-help' in Tanzania, were crucial to understanding the way in which CP has been understood and practised in Tanzania and whose interests it has served.

The final sections provide definitions of 'security' and 'policing' as used in the thesis and outline the structure of the thesis.

### **1.1 Community policing in Africa**

Tanzania is one of many African countries to have adopted CP as part of broader police reforms. Having been the 'buzzword' (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 1) of Anglo-American policing since the 1980s, CP has been 'exported' from the west to aid recipient countries by donors, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private consultancy firms (Brogden 2004).

CP is very difficult to define with any precision. Typical organisational forms associated with CP reforms include neighbourhood watch and police-community forums, however the term has been used to describe a 'truly bewildering' variety of programmes (Skolnick & Bayley 1988: 2; see also Ellison 2007: 207-208). The concept might broadly be said to refer to 'a style and strategy of policing that appears to reflect local community needs' (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 2). This implies accountability, transparency and responsiveness to a community, although it remains unclear how this is to be achieved. The lack of consensus about what CP actually entails has not prevented it from becoming 'the almost unchallenged definition of good and democratic policing' (Marenin 2009a: vii). The World Development Report for 2011, for example, includes 'programs that support bottom-up state-society relations in insecure areas', of which it considers CP to be an example, among its top five principles for programme design to bring about institutional change and confidence building in countries affected by conflict and violence (World Bank 2011: 18).

More practically, many African governments have welcomed CP as a possible solution to rising crime rates which have not been reduced through more traditional, reactive forms of policing, and as a means to improve police legitimacy (Brogden & Nijhar

2005: 162-164). Espousing CP may sometimes offer potential career advancement for individual senior officers, political capital, or access to external resources (Ellison 2007: 214-215; Hills 2012b). The popularity of the concept is such that police forces in states with political regimes as diverse as those of Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have claimed to be implementing CP (Hills 2008: 215-216).

In practice, CP has often entailed adoption of generalised international models, with little consideration of local context (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 3).<sup>1</sup> As Ellison (2007: 213) notes, promotion of CP has been predicated upon the assumption that best practice derived elsewhere 'can simply be transplanted to another jurisdiction without due regard for history, politics, culture, economic differentials, the historical relationship of police to public, questions of police legitimacy, state repression, appropriateness and sustainability.' Although until relatively recently, there was little assessment of the outcomes of implementing CP in African countries other than South Africa (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 3),<sup>2</sup> a growing literature on cases including Kenya (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2002), Sierra Leone (Baker 2008a), Mozambique (Kyed 2010) and Nigeria (Hills 2012b) demonstrates the extent to which CP is 'mediated by localized cultural and historical repertoires' (Pratten & Sen 2008: 19), as well as political and economic interests (Kyed 2009; Hills 2012b). The introduction of institutional forms associated with CP, such as neighbourhood watch or police-community forums, has not necessarily 'democratised' policing, but has frequently reflected authoritarian models of policing and existing inequalities, amounting to what Ruteere and Pommerolle (2002) term 'decentralized repression'.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2 Engaging with non-state security providers<sup>4</sup>

The Tanzanian experience of CP is also pertinent in the context of calls for Security Sector Reform (SSR) to take greater account of the wide range of actors engaged in providing security in Africa, rather than pursuing a state-centric approach. Although CP in Tanzania has been led by police, 'communities' are expected to play a more active role in policing than is typically envisaged in Anglo-American CP programmes,

<sup>1</sup> CP is not unique in this regard. Donor-supported police reforms in developing countries are often devised with little knowledge of policing practices in the recipient country and are predicated upon the implantation of institutions which may have little relevance to historical, political and economic conditions (Hinton & Newburn 2009: 1-3).

<sup>2</sup> For South Africa, see for example: Pelser (1999); Gordon (2001); Schärf (2001); Brogden (2002) Shaw (2002); Bénit-Gbaffou (2008); Minnaar (2009).

<sup>3</sup> See also Steinberg (2011) for an illuminating analysis of the similarities between Apartheid-era policing and the way in which 'crime prevention' has been implemented in South Africa.

<sup>4</sup> The term 'non-state' is used here to denote security providers other than the state police and military, although it is recognised that the divisions between 'state' and 'non-state' are frequently blurred, and that 'non-state providers' do not constitute a coherent category.

similar to Baker's (2009a: 373) 'African model' of CP (discussed further in the following chapter). Rather than the public assisting the police to provide a better service, emphasis is placed on 'local groups doing much of the everyday policing with the assistance or at least the consent of the police' (ibid.).

The police forces of African states typically do not exert a monopoly over security provision, being largely absent from vast areas, and often perceived as illegitimate instruments of regime domination or as self-interested and predatory. This does not imply that African states are barely policed. Policing may be undertaken by a wide range of actors, connected to varying degrees to the state (Baker 2008b).<sup>5</sup> It is recognised that governance can occur in the absence of government (Menkhaus 2007), and that policing may be carried out by a range of 'twilight institutions', which 'are not the state but they exercise public authority' (Lund 2006a: 673). Analyses of 'hybrid' political orders emphasise the extent to which state authority co-exists with multiple forms of public authority based on diverse logics (Boege *et al.* 2009).

Reductions in state funding of public services and trends towards privatisation associated with neo-liberalism have created new opportunities and incentives for the emergence of diverse policing providers (Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 138; Pratten & Sen 2008: 2). However, many fine-grained studies have demonstrated the extent to which local or 'everyday policing' (Buur & Jensen 2004) is not only a response to state failure to provide security, but reflects 'its own local and national historical and cultural logics' (Pratten 2008: 5).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the novelty of plural policing in Africa, or of attempts to co-opt alternative actors, should not be overstated. As outlined with regard to Tanzania in Chapter 3, the inability of state police forces to operate across entire territories has resulted in various attempts to involve organised citizens in policing, whether through the structures of indirect rule, ruling party institutions or the co-optation of vigilantes.

The diversity of security providers in Africa and the apparent incapacity of African states, particularly those emerging from conflict, to provide security for all citizens have led to calls to rethink the state-centric focus of SSR and donor-supported police reforms. Academics and policymakers have begun to explore the potential to engage with 'non-state' or 'informal' actors (e.g. Baker & Scheye 2007; OECD 2007; Albrecht &

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<sup>5</sup> This is not unique to Africa. Whether conceptualised as 'multilateralisation' (Bayley & Shearing 2001), 'pluralisation' (Jones & Newburn 1998), or 'plural networked policing' (Loader 2000) there is now widespread academic consensus around the notion that the state is not the only, or necessarily the dominant, provider of policing.

<sup>6</sup> See for example: Lund (2001); Buur & Jensen (2004); Buur (2006); Heald (2006); Pratten (2006); Kyed (2007); Pratten & Sen (2007); Jensen (2008); Titeca (2009).



Kyed 2010; Bagayoko 2012). There is 'an emergent policy orthodoxy that policing is a multi-layered activity requiring police to co-operate with informal providers' (Hills 2012a: 2). The pragmatic and normative reasons advanced for looking beyond the state are discussed further in the following chapter. Briefly, non-state institutions are typically assumed to be more accessible to citizens, in terms of proximity, language used and methods, to have greater popular legitimacy, to be responsive to local demands, and to offer a cost-effective means of establishing security. It is also recognised that some of the commonly observed problems with non-state policing, such as use of corporal punishment, torture and persecution of marginalised groups, may not be any more likely to blight non-state delivery than they do the state police, and there is no *a priori* reason to assume that non-state providers are less amenable to reform (Baker & Scheye 2007: 517).

It is valuable to move beyond seeing deviations from a 'western' model of the state as inherently problematic, and to recognise that there are multiple potential routes to achieving effective public authority capable of providing goods and services (CFS 2010). However, it is not clear that recognition of 'hybridity' offers a clear alternative to Weberian assumptions about the pre-eminent role of the state in providing security. Attempts to engage locally authoritative institutions in providing public security raise a number of important empirical questions, including the extent to which local order might be confused for local legitimacy or acceptability, and how complex relationships with external actors and interests affect local accountability (Meagher 2012). These appear particularly pressing given the potential for non-state policing to be violent, predatory and discriminatory, and the extent to which local security provision may be co-opted to serve the ends of powerful external actors.

### **1.3 'Participatory security' in Tanzania**

This case study of CP in Tanzania is also pertinent to broader debates about service delivery in developing countries, and in particular the promotion of 'participation' in local development. As noted above, CP as understood in Tanzania does not only refer to reforms to the practices and orientation of the state police, but also places responsibility on citizens to organise for their own security. The way in which CP is both implemented and discussed is very similar to other forms of participatory or 'community-based' development, which are central to the provision of a range of collective goods and services at the local level.

Participation, like CP, is an elastic term, which has spawned varied manifestations, yet has achieved the status of 'development orthodoxy' (Cornwall 2006: 62). By involving 'communities' in the planning and implementation of local development strategies, it is hoped that outcomes will be closer to popular demands, more effective and more sustainable, and that citizens might be empowered to better engage with democratic political processes. More critical perspectives, however, emphasise the importance of history, political context and existing inequalities to outcomes as argued above with regard to CP. Three particularly important critiques, which relate to the assumptions frequently made by development practitioners, and advocates of CP, about 'communities', are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. In summary, whilst citizen engagement with service delivery can be highly beneficial and can positively reconfigure relationships between citizens and governments, the context in which participation takes place is important, in terms of the legal and institutional frameworks in place, existing power relations and histories of social mobilisation in the country concerned. Thus importing 'best practice' models does not guarantee positive outcomes (Citizenship DRC 2011).

#### **1.4 Community policing in historical perspective**

As noted in the opening section of this chapter, mobilising citizens in the interests of local security is not a new strategy in Tanzania. Self-help, or participatory development, also has a long history in the country, from colonial era attempts to generate cost effective improvements to local infrastructure, through Nyerere's ideology of *kujitegemea* (self-reliance) to the ubiquity of community-based strategies in donor-led development projects today. Throughout the thesis contemporary practices are situated within their historical context in order to highlight the influence of historical understandings of participation, development and security, and the organisation of state-society relations in Tanzania on how CP is practised today, and to assess the extent to which CP forms a new and distinct approach. Furthermore, experiences of *sungusungu* 'vigilantism' form an important source of reference in how CP, and participation in CP, is understood today. Whilst there are observable continuities in local governance, the intensification of party political competition at the local level in urban Mwanza is challenging established ways of doing things, and CP is also shaped by new contests over what citizens can be expected to contribute towards local and national development.

### 1.5 Definition of key terms: policing and the governance of security

Following Luckham & Kirk (2012), a dual-sided definition of security is adopted, which reflects both demand and supply side aspects of security production. Firstly: 'security is a process of political and social ordering, maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power' (ibid.: 10). However, it is also 'an entitlement of citizens, and more widely of human beings, to protection from violence and other forms of existential risk' (ibid.). This analysis of the impact of CP on local security in Mwanza thus explores the perceptions of those who are ostensibly served by local policing institutions regarding the extent to which they are protected through CP, but also how CP is shaped by existing and changing power relations, which determine how order is constructed.

Policing is defined here, following Johnston (1999: 178), as 'a purposive strategy involving the initiation of techniques which are intended to offer guarantees of security to subjects.' Whilst this might include preventing or removing threats to the safety of citizens, for example through crime prevention, the dual-sided definition of security adopted above suggests that policing is also a highly political endeavour. Policing can uphold a universally beneficial 'general order', but also seeks to protect 'specific order', determined by particular dominant interests (Marenin 1982). The relationship between state policing and political competition in Tanzania is explored in Chapter 3. This definition deliberately does not specify which types of actors engage in policing. Throughout this thesis, 'police' is used to refer to the Tanzania Police Force (TPF) and its officers. However, policing does not refer only to the police and their activities, or to the enforcement of state laws.

Policing is understood here as a form of governance, comprising processes whereby various actors are involved in the production of security, with varying degrees of success. Governance can be defined as 'the processes through which individuals and state officials interact to express their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, work out their differences and cooperate to produce public goods and services' (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 2005: 200). These processes might be determined by highly formalised and codified rules, or remain largely informal, and could occur largely within or outside of the institutions of the state.

## 1.6 Summary of the objectives of the thesis

The thesis provides a detailed and historically contextualised account of the implementation of CP in the Tanzanian city of Mwanza, which contributes to empirical knowledge about citizens' experiences of security and policing. This is valuable at a time when the feasibility and desirability of a state monopoly on security provision in Africa is increasingly being questioned, yet the modalities of how governments or international actors might engage with 'non-state' actors and the implications of doing so remain unclear. The thesis thus contributes to broader debates about the respective roles of 'communities' and states in providing security and other collective goods and services, and the conditions under which community-based development might produce more equitable, responsive and sustainable outcomes. This case study of CP also illustrates the local level manifestations of processes of political liberalisation in Tanzania, and shifting understandings of the role of citizens in bringing about local development.

## 1.7 Thesis outline

Chapter 2 provides a more detailed overview of the promotion of CP and other forms of citizen participation in local service delivery by governments and international donors. Three key critiques of community-based approaches to development are discussed, which are pertinent to CP as it has been implemented in Tanzania and inform supplementary research questions that shape the analysis presented in subsequent chapters. These general critiques are illustrated through a brief account of the history of policies promoting self-help in Tanzania, and the contemporary resonance of historical understandings of participation. A theoretical framework is elaborated which informs the remainder of the thesis.

Chapter 3 provides a history of policing in Tanzania since the start of British administration in 1919 and outlines contemporary CP reforms in greater detail. The chapter emphasises the extent to which CP is part of a long history of mobilisation of citizens for local security, and in particular, ruling party co-optation of *sungusungu* vigilante groups in the 1980s.

In Chapter 4 the research design and methods of data collection used are outlined, including the rationale behind conducting the research in Mwanza and the selection of three cases within the city. These cases are introduced in more detail in Chapter 5,

which provides a history of *sungusungu* in urban Mwanza and an overview of contemporary CP arrangements in the three sites.

Chapter 6 analyses how CP operates in Mwanza in terms of: the impact of CP on popular perceptions of local security; the durability of local CP institutions; for whom and from what CP institutions provide security; and the extent to which CP is responsive to local needs. These outcomes are explained in Chapter 7 by situating CP within the historical trajectories of self-help and policing in Tanzania and the ongoing transition away from the one-party state. Chapter 7 also investigates how co-production of security through CP has worked in practice and the effect of partnership between police and communities on local collective action.

The main research findings are synthesised in Chapter 8 and possible future research directions are explored.

## **Chapter 2: States and Communities in the Provision of Public Security**

The main objective of the research was to explore the extent to which CP improved security and policing from the perspective of members of the ‘communities’ who are encouraged to practice CP. The literature reviewed in this chapter informed three sub-questions:

1. How well do CP institutions initiate and sustain collective action?
2. How are the costs and benefits of participation in CP distributed within communities and between communities and the police?
3. For whom does CP provide security and from what?

The central contention of CP is that the public should play a more active role in ensuring their own security, as the police alone are not able to adequately bear this responsibility (Skolnick & Bayley 1988: 3). It is clear that in the short term most African states will be unable to provide security equally for all citizens within their territories. CP is thus intended to institutionalise ‘co-production’, whereby policing is provided ‘through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions’ (Joshi & Moore 2004: 40). This chapter explores the implications of co-producing local security for both ‘communities’ and the police, before stating the theoretical framework that informs the thesis.

The first section outlines the processes underlying the ‘de-statisation’ (Olivier de Sardan 2009: 3) of the provision of many collective goods and services in Africa, including security and policing, and in particular the emergence of a consensus around community ‘participation’ as an essential component of developmental governance. Although long considered a privileged element of statehood, security provision has not been immune from these trends. It is increasingly accepted that governments are unable to exercise a monopoly on security provision within their territories and that there are pragmatic and normative reasons for incorporating a range of actors into the governance of security. The chapter explores the promotion by governments and international actors of community participation in local security provision through ‘community policing’ and other forms of partnership with ‘non-state’ security providers.

However, more critical perspectives on participatory development illuminate some problematic assumptions that often inform community-based development strategies and that are highly pertinent to CP as practised in Tanzania. Firstly, projects predicated upon participation frequently underestimate the difficulties in organising neighbourhood collective action and may impose institutional models that are not conducive to local cooperation. Secondly, 'communities' are not homogeneous and are characterised by differentials of power and status. This affects who is able to benefit from participation and from the service provided. Thirdly, participation can entail considerable costs, which may be borne largely by the relatively poor or otherwise disadvantaged. These general critiques are illustrated through a brief history of 'self-help' in Tanzania, which has often been compulsory and state-directed, rather than reflecting 'bottom-up' community empowerment.

The final section reviews existing evidence on the capacity and willingness of African police forces to cooperate with communities, and potentially to mitigate the problems of relying upon self-help security initiatives, and suggests that CP strategies must address existing collective action problems that limit cooperation between police and citizens.

## **2.1 De-statisation of service delivery in Tanzania**

When Tanzania gained independence in 1961, dominant perspectives in development theory emphasised the importance of a strong state as an agent of national development, casting alternative bases for organisation, such as ethnic solidarity or community, as potentially retrogressive (Ferguson 2006: 94-95). However, by the late 1980s the state was being reframed as an obstacle to development, and it was argued that either private enterprise or 'civil society' were better placed to provide public goods and services. Three broad trends in public sector reform, reflecting divergent ideological positions, have contributed to the diversification of service providers in developing countries. *Pluralisation*, associated with New Public Management reforms, has been advocated as a means of enabling users to exercise 'choice', whilst an increased recognition of the importance of making service providers accountable to users (e.g. World Bank 2003) has led to a focus on *decentralisation* and *institutionalised participation* (Joshi 2007). The diversity of actors now involved in producing collective goods and services is such that it can be argued that 'there is no longer any public service in Africa whose deliverance does not include the greater or lesser involvement

of the four following instances: the state administrative services, the development administrations (NGOs and international agencies), the “community-type” organisations... and private operators’ (Blundo & Le Meur 2009: 15).

In Tanzania, these trends have contributed to a significant alteration in the local governance landscape, from what had been ‘one of Africa’s furthest-going forms of statism’ (Kiondo 1994: 38). In 1986, economic crisis and internal and external pressures obliged then President Mwinyi to implement structural adjustment policies that liberalised trade and reduced government expenditure on social services. Whilst many services were privatised, new institutions were also formed as people sought to improve their quality of life through collective endeavours, including *sungusungu* defence groups, urban hometown development associations and organised groups of parents who lobbied for the right to establish private secondary schools (Tripp 1997: 12-13; see also Kiondo 1994).

Subsequently, governance has been further ‘shifted from center to satellite through a combination of decentralization policies and the promotion of civil society’ (Green 2010a: 16). A donor funded programme of local government reform with an emphasis on decentralisation was introduced in 1998, which aims to make service delivery more equitable, accountable and responsive to local needs and enshrines citizen participation in development planning (PMORALG 2004; see also Green 2010b). The number of NGOs and other civil society organisations operating in Tanzania has increased rapidly since the mid-1980s (see Kiondo 1994; Mercer 1999). The proliferation of ‘community-based organisations’ (CBOs), for example, has been ‘phenomenal’ (Dill 2010a: 25), to the extent that in 2010 over half of the *mitaa* (the smallest administrative unit in urban Tanzania) in Dar es Salaam had some form of community body engaged in attempts to improve infrastructure or provide other collective goods (ibid.). ‘Participation’ of service users is an ubiquitous component of development projects in the country and forms a central premise of the way in which many collective goods are provided in Tanzania, including infrastructure upgrading (Cadstedt 2006), management of natural resources including water (Cleaver & Toner 2006; Brockington 2008; Lange 2008; Dill 2010b), public health interventions (Marsland 2006) and waste management (Myers 2005). Since 2006, CP institutions have also been introduced in many areas, adding to the range of participatory community institutions intended to provide goods and services at the local level.



## 2.2 Participatory development

Involving communities in the planning and implementation of local development strategies is not a new idea, having been a key tenet of a range of approaches to local development, including colonial promotion of 'self-help' in the 1950s (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 5-9; see also Cornwall 2006). The long history of participation in local development, or 'nation building', in Tanzania is discussed below (2.4). More recent approaches to participation emerged from a critique of attempts to impose standardised and 'top down' programmes which did not address local needs and realities and privileged 'professional' or 'expert' knowledge over that of the poor (Chambers 1995: 30). These radical contentions have been absorbed by more 'mainstream' development actors, to the extent that by the 1990s participation had become 'development orthodoxy...[seen as] an essential ingredient in getting development interventions and policies right' (Cornwall 2006: 62). Broadly, participation is concerned with 'the exercise of popular agency in relation to development' (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 3). In ideal terms this could be 'an empowering process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to take command, to gain in confidence, and to make their own decisions' (Chambers 1995: 30).

From the recognition that development aid should be more responsive to the needs of the poor, local participation has to some extent 'acquired a life of its own' (Mansuri & Rao 2013: 15). Participation is an 'infinitely malleable term' (Cornwall 2006: 63), and a wide range of institutional forms have been adopted in order to encourage community engagement with service delivery, including CBOs (e.g. Dill 2010a), social funds, participatory rural appraisals (Chambers 1997), user committees (e.g. Manor 2004), 'public-public partnerships' in service delivery (e.g. Dill 2010b) and participatory planning and budgeting processes (e.g. Heller 2001; Baiocchi 2001; Wampler 2007). Participation is promoted both a means of improving development outcomes and as an end in itself, which should empower participants to improve their own lives (Nelson & Wright 1995). 'Heroic claims' (Cleaver 1999: 597) are often made for the potential of participatory projects. Firstly, involving the 'community' in service delivery is expected to make outcomes closer to what local populations want and to improve sustainability and cost-effectiveness by capitalising upon community resources (e.g. Dongier *et al.* 2003). At the same time, participation has been cast as a means of empowering the disadvantaged as part of processes of democratisation and the implementation of 'good governance' (Cornwall 2006: 77-78). By giving the poor greater opportunities to exercise 'voice', localised service delivery is assumed to be

more responsive to popular demands and to result in more equitable distribution of public resources and reduced opportunities for corruption (see Mansuri and Rao 2013: 15-16).

### 2.2.1 Participation in local security provision through community policing

CP approaches emerged largely within Anglo-American criminology and sought to address perceived shortcomings of policing in these contexts. However, CP shares considerable similarities with participatory development in terms of an ostensible desire to move away from 'top down' policing strategies which marginalised local concerns, as well as in the assumptions made about the positive impact the process of participating in CP will have upon individuals and communities. In Tanzania, CP is translated as *ulinzi shirikishi*, or participatory security,<sup>7</sup> employing the terminology of participation applied to other participatory methods (*mbinu shirikishi*) and projects. The ways in which citizens are expected to participate in policing in Tanzania are somewhat different from CP as developed in the Anglo-American contexts in which it originated, as discussed below, having similar institutional manifestations to participatory development in other sectors such as infrastructure upgrading and local sanitation.

Much like 'participation', CP has become an extremely elastic term which has been applied to a wide variety of activities undertaken by both state police and 'communities', being 'widely endorsed, though at the same time widely seen to be close to meaningless' (Tilley 2008: 377). Despite the lack of consensus around what the concept entails, CP has become the 'unchallenged definition of democratic policing' (Marenin 2009a: vii) and is often presented as synonymous with good policing in reports and evaluations (Ellison 2007: 209). As outlined in the previous chapter, CP has proved highly popular amongst both donors supporting police reforms in Africa and aid recipient police forces (Hills 2008: 215).

CP as conceived in Anglo-American contexts is typically focused upon improving the performance of the state police, for example by increasing their accountability and responsiveness to the public and improving crime prevention capacity through capitalising upon local knowledge. In many sub-Saharan African countries, however, reflecting the extreme resource shortages facing police and their tenuous monopoly on

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<sup>7</sup> According to the TPF website, CP was initially translated as *polisi jamii*, but has subsequently been re-translated as *ulinzi shirikishi*, which is now the preferred translation. See: <http://www.policeforce.go.tz/index.php/community-policing> (accessed 13 January 2013).

service provision, an alternative model of police-community partnership has been pursued, whereby: 'The focus...is not on local groups assisting the police to do a better job. Instead, the focus is on (or shifts to) local groups doing much of the everyday policing with the assistance or at least the consent of the police (Baker 2009a: 373).<sup>8</sup>

Based on examples drawn from the United Kingdom and the United States of America, Tilley (2008: 373), writing in the *Handbook of Policing*, argues, that 'Community policing stresses policing *with* and *for* the community rather than policing *of* the community. It aspires to improve the quality of life in communities.' However, in many African contexts, including Tanzania, whilst CP strategies do attempt to improve the image of the police and their relationship with citizens, CP often approximates policing *by* the community.<sup>9</sup> Such 'society-led', 'informal' or 'self-policing' models have been praised as offering a means of making the rhetoric of CP more relevant to African populations (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009). Others have highlighted the likelihood that partnerships established between communities and the police are unlikely to be sustained if dominated by the police (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2002; Baker 2009b: 83). The *sungusungu* of Tanzania and Kenya, which in places operate relatively independently of state police and the judiciary, enforcing their own local laws, have been described as 'arguably the most successful form of community policing in Eastern Africa' (Heald 2007: 2).

A related trend is apparent in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR),<sup>10</sup> where academics and donors are increasingly reacting against a former state-centric bias to support engagement with alternative 'local' security providers (e.g. Baker & Scheye 2007; Albrecht & Kyed 2010; Bagayoko 2012). The OECD, for example, has advocated a 'multi-layered' approach to SSR which 'would divide international assistance between the state as a regulator, but only a minority provider, of security, and 'non-state justice and security service providers, given their position as the primary purveyors of day-to-day service delivery' (OECD 2007: 7). The idea that the police and donors should attempt to form partnerships with alternative actors is increasingly accepted, even if in

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<sup>8</sup> See, for example: Brogden (2002: 176) on neighbourhood watch in South Africa's Western Cape; Brogen (2005: 89) on the adaptation of CP in Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia; Baker (2009a) on Liberia and Sudan.

<sup>9</sup> The Kenyan Police Commissioner in 1997 described CP as involving 'recruiting civilians as reserve officers and the construction of police offices and residential houses on a *harambee* [self-help] basis' (quoted in Ruteere and Pommerolle: 594-595). The Mozambican Ministry of the Interior states that: 'Community policing means the direct involvement of citizens in the security system and policing, giving them responsibility to take part in making the community a secure ordered and harmonious place' (quoted in Kyed 2009: 357).

<sup>10</sup> For an overview of the emergence of SSR as a development concern see Albrecht and Buur (2009).

practice the modalities of how to incorporate other actors may remain somewhat unclear (Albrecht & Buur 2009).

As is the case with other forms of participation, CP is promoted as both a means and an end in itself (Nelson & Wright 1995). Advocates of 'bottom up' forms of CP argue that capitalising on local knowledge will improve the effectiveness of policing (Baker 2008c: 568; Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 5). As communities are best placed to identify the problems that affect them and how they should be resolved, they should thus be involved in planning and implementing locally defined solutions (e.g. Saferworld 2008: 4). Involving communities is also expected to improve efficiency (Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 5; Bagayoko 2012: 7), and this is particularly appealing in post-conflict contexts where the costs of restructuring discredited state police forces may be prohibitive (Baker 2010a: 214). Localised policing is also expected to be cheaper for end users than other alternatives (Baker 2012: 288).

In addition, community based policing is assumed to have normative advantages, being deemed closer to popular desires, operating in accordance with local norms, and possessing greater local legitimacy and popularity than state police forces (e.g. Baker 2008c: 568; Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 4; Bagayoko 2012: 7). It has also been argued that locally organised policing could improve accountability by virtue of being 'closer' to those policed, who are thus better able to monitor performance and implement sanctions if necessary (Baker 2010a: 216). CP is often associated with democratising security provision, through improved accountability relationships between police and citizens, and enhancing deliberative democracy due to the increased engagement of citizens with governance (Wood and Shearing 2006; see for example Saferworld 2008; Kyed 2009: 354). CP has also been assumed to have positive benefits in itself aside from any impact on the quality of service delivery, envisaged as a means of enhancing social cohesion (e.g. Saferworld 2008; Kyed 2009: 358). Saferworld (2008: 5), for example, in their report on establishing CP in Kenya, list amongst the benefits of CP that it: 'encourages networking, constructive social relations and greater cohesion within the community'.

Due to shortages of resources and personnel, the participation of communities, however defined, in policing may be the only way to ensure that all citizens have access to some form of security provision. Furthermore, historical experiences of state policing in Africa, which has often been oriented towards service of the regime rather than the public (Hills 2000), may make a 'community' alternative highly appealing to citizens. The logic for sharing responsibility for local security through a form of

‘institutionalised co-production’ is explained by both the ‘governance’ and ‘logistical’ drivers identified by Joshi and Moore (2004: 41). Governance drivers refer to situations whereby government lacks adequate capacity to provide services efficiently. The Tanzanian police force is significantly under-resourced with a very low police to population ratio (see 3.3.4). Shortages of human and other resources form part of the rationale for adopting CP, which is envisaged as a low cost policing strategy. Logistical drivers refer to the nature of the service in question. With regard to policing, there are logistical imperatives for the police to work with local residents whose knowledge of the local environment and crime situation is valuable. The police cannot hope to accrue such a level of local expertise. They also depend on citizens to report crimes. However, critical perspectives on participatory development, as well as the existing evidence on implementation of CP in other African countries, suggests that some of the more normative claims made about the potential benefits of CP require interrogation.

### **2.3 Critical perspectives on participatory development**

Various forms of citizen participation in and engagement with service delivery have been shown to have a positive developmental impact and reconfigure state-society relations in a range of ways, including increasing capacity for local collective action, making states more responsive and accountable, and improving access to services (Gaventa & Barrett 2010). However, there are also ‘risks of citizen engagement’ (ibid.: 47), and positive outcomes may require enabling conditions related to the form taken by participation and the political context in which it takes place. Recognising the wide range of practices and institutions that have been described in terms of both participation and CP, this section focuses on ‘strong’ understandings of participation, which aim to fundamentally alter how a service is delivered through the formation of partnerships with organised citizens, rather than weaker versions which might entail only one-off consultation (Loizos & Clayton 1997, cited in Brett 2003: 5). Firstly, participation requires communities to overcome collective action problems, which may be exacerbated by imposed institutional forms that do not take into account local realities. Secondly, the way in which participation in CP and other initiatives is organised may reflect and entrench existing power relations. Finally, although CP and other forms of self-help are envisaged as low cost governance solutions, they may impose considerable costs on those who are expected to participate. Central to all issues discussed below is the extent to which CP and other participatory strategies have relied upon assumptions about ‘communities’, often conflated with geographic neighbourhoods, which are rarely fulfilled in reality.

### 2.3.1 Participation and collective action

Participation in the production of public goods or services requires citizens to cooperate in pursuit of shared gains. The collective action problems this entails are often not sufficiently considered by development practitioners, who 'excel in perpetuating the myth that communities are capable of anything, that all that is required is sufficient mobilization and the latent and unlimited capacities of the community will be unleashed in the interests of development' (Cleaver 1999: 604). Similarly, literature discussing the plurality of actors involved in policing Africa often emphasises the *incentives* for the initiation of forms of non-state policing, such as the absence or illegitimacy of state provision, opportunities for political or financial gain and the desire to uphold particular social orders. This is in contrast to analyses of CP in Western Europe and North America, which emphasise the difficulty of initiating and sustaining community cooperation (e.g. Laycock and Tilley 1995; Herbert 2006). These contrasting assumptions are exemplified by Wisler & Onwudiwe's (2007) distinction between CP in 'Western democracies' as a 'top down' policy whereby police dominate strategies and CP is largely 'a policy in search of a community' and African contexts where CP is 'we may argue without too much exaggeration...a community in search of a state' (ibid.: 4). In practice, however, there may be a trade-off between the apparent benefits of local policing, and the difficulty in sustaining community-based policing predicated upon voluntarism (Baker 2009: 80-1).

Development can be framed as a collective action problem that requires the resolution of obstacles to cooperation at local and national levels (Booth 2012). A collective action problem occurs when in order to attain a goal that is mutually beneficial, multiple actors must decide to take a personally costly action (Medina 2007: 23). In the case of CP, the collectively beneficial objective concerned is the security of the neighbourhood. Security can be understood as a public good, which yields 'non-subtractive benefits that can be enjoyed jointly by many people who are hard to exclude from obtaining these benefits' (Ostrom 2005: 23). Individuals know that they cannot be excluded from enjoyment of the collective benefits produced by CP, such as safer streets, regardless of whether they contribute to the production of the good. They thus have an incentive to 'free-ride' on the inputs of others whilst avoiding incurring costs themselves (Olson 1965). In practice, however, groups of individuals do manage to organise cooperation through institutions, broadly defined as 'the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions' (Ostrom 2005: 3). Institutions facilitate collective action by altering the incentives facing individuals to encourage cooperation and generating shared expectations about how others will behave in

collective action situations (North 1990). This requires rules or norms, that are mutually understood and predictably enforced, whether by designated authoritative agents or by individuals themselves (Ostrom 2005).

Collective action problems can be exacerbated by the imposition of structures derived from idealised versions of western institutions, referred to by Evans (2004) as 'institutional monocropping'. This can lead to contradictions between new formalised rules and existing practices and power relations, rendering new structures ineffectual (ibid.: 33). The history of the promotion of *sungusungu* in Tanzania is illustrative (see also 3.2.3). Where participation in *sungusungu* was compelled in the 1990s and introduced according to a standardised government model, groups were not highly sustainable and there were low rates of compliance and cooperation amongst members (Mwaikusa 1995: 171). Efforts that subverted existing forms of public authority were generally unsuccessful (Fleisher 2000b; Heald 2002). In contrast, more successful examples of local 'self-help' tend to reflect local institutional histories and to invoke locally relevant social expectations and obligations (Shivakumar 2005; Cammack *et al.* 2009; Dill 2009; Evans 2009; Hall and Lamont 2009; Swidler 2009; Booth 2011: 17-19). Drawing on Douglas (1973, 1987) and Giddens (1984), Cleaver (2002) elaborates the concept of 'institutional bricolage' whereby 'mechanisms for collective action are borrowed or constructed from existing institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships' (ibid.: 16). This is done consciously in order to reduce the cognitive effort of responding to change but also unconsciously as the adaptation of older practices can imbue newer arrangements with the legitimacy of 'tradition' (see also Cleaver 2000). As summarised by Lund (2006b: 692), 'The point seems to be that new acts of public authority seem to fare well when they can 'piggy-back' on familiar idioms.'

### **2.3.2 The myth of community: for whom does CP provide security, and from what?<sup>11</sup>**

The claims made for the beneficial impact of participation in 'community-led' development are often predicated upon the 'myth of community' (Gujit & Shah 1998), which obscures the existence of hierarchies and social divisions within neighbourhoods and the extent to which 'global development concepts mould and are moulded by existing social and political relationships' (Mosse 1995: 144). The outcomes of a local development project, for example the proportion of residents able to obtain

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<sup>11</sup> This question is informed by Luckham (2007).

access to clean water, are not determined solely by institutions established for this purpose, such as a water users' association. Rather outcomes are mediated by 'a multiplicity of institutions of varying degrees of formality and transparency' (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 209), which affect who can participate and how the costs and benefits of doing so are distributed. Development projects can provide opportunities for the renegotiation of status hierarchies as they institutionalise power in new ways (Mosse 1995: 155), offering the potential for 'empowerment' of the historically disadvantaged, but also often enabling existing elites to consolidate their positions of power and increase personal access to resources.

Existing evidence suggests that participatory development has often been implemented in ways which generate new forms of social exclusion, advantaging mainly those who possess the time, resources and skills required to meet the expectations of external actors about the form participation should take. For example the formalisation of participation through CBOs in Dar es Salaam has privileged those able to write funding proposals and pay membership fees (Dill 2009). Those who are disadvantaged by gendered or other social relations within communities may face additional constraints to participation, for example feeling unable to contribute to public meetings, meaning that their needs are not articulated (Mosse 1995). Thus in practice:

The character of the institutional channels available within political systems, and of the resources required to participate at ever higher levels (education and time in particular) means that much of what is considered 'participatory' is more a process whereby large numbers of people are *represented* by a relatively small group of participants.

(Hickey & Mohan 2004: 19)

Representational participation does not guarantee that the outcomes of participatory development will be equitable. In the absence of effective accountability mechanisms, those who are able to become recognised as representatives of the community may be able to monopolise group or individual gains of any development initiative at the expense of collective gains (Platteau & Abraham 2002). Monitoring by a supportive state may be required to prevent the 'capture' of decision-making processes and material gains by local elites (Mansuri & Rao 2013).



Rather than reflecting a romanticised collective solidarity the emergence of 'community' initiatives may be closely related to individual or group economic and political aspirations (Ayee & Crook 2003). Kiondo (1994: 61), for example found in an overview of community-based development groups in Dar es Salaam that most appeared to be 'collective extensions of personal economic survival activities'. People may aspire to make individual gains which are deemed to offer a better return on investment and to be less vulnerable than the collective projects envisaged by development projects (Green 2000: 80-83; see also Mercer 2002).

The differential gains that members of communities typically make from participatory development projects that take place within contexts of inequality, may mean that participation which is deemed successful in meeting programme outcomes might be predicated upon coercion and hierarchy (Cleaver & Toner 2006). In a context of local conflict the domination, or perceived domination, of an associational structure by one particular faction may preclude a venture being seen as a common asset and instead generate resentment from other sectors (Olivier de Sardan 2009: 19). Empowering 'the community' may thus entail disempowering those who are marginalised by dominant cultural practices (Cleaver 1999: 605).

Scholarly analysis of CP interventions in Europe and America has frequently found that those who are likely to participate in partnerships with the police are those who are already sufficiently happy with current policing practices to do so, not the disaffected poor or marginalised minorities (Tilley 2008: 394-395). CP valorises local knowledge produced through often non-representative processes, meaning that the actions and opinions of the minority who wish to, or are able to, participate are used to legitimate policing practices that affect an entire geographical population (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 54).

Analysis of state-initiated CP in Africa is little different, suggesting that almost universally, CP has assisted police 'in co-opting local business and political elites, thus reinforcing social inequalities' (Brogden 2004: 635). Baker (2009: 82) found in his overview of non-state policing in post-conflict Africa that typically 'forums are dominated by educated, politically active, and locally influential people, often older men'. Similarly, Ruteere and Pommerolle (2002) argue that CP reforms in Nairobi came to reflect 'an intersection of traditional patriarchal orders as well as economic dominance that detracts from the democratic intentions of the project and in a sense entrenches the *status quo*' (ibid.: 601). In so doing, CP and other forms of state-endorsed

local policing have enabled the formation of alliances between police and co-opted local elites in order to control the 'dangerous classes' (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 161).

As emphasised by the dual-sided definition of security provided in the previous chapter (1.5) security is not a neutral and self-evident term. Having the ability to designate what or who is criminal or constitutes a threat to the community is closely linked to contestation of local power relations and forms a way through which community is itself constructed and maintained (Buur & Jensen 2004; Jensen 2008). Richly detailed case studies have demonstrated the extent to which various forms of 'community-based' policing both reflect and constitute localised (and sometimes supra-local) competition over power and resources (e.g. Buur 2006; Jensen 2008; Titeca 2009). Any attempt to empower 'communities' to police themselves, must thus take into account the fact that 'security' and 'community' are both themselves subject to contestation. The poor human rights records and violent methods of many non-state security providers in Africa make the dilemmas discussed above particularly troubling for donors and others involved in the promotion of CP as a means of 'democratising' security provision. As Brogden & Nijhar (2005: 234-235) observe, 'community policing' is to some extent an oxymoron: 'it is and will always be, whatever its whimsical reference to a notional community, committed to the key practice of suppressing the activities and practices of one group on behalf of another, if in more discursive and subtle form' (ibid.: 234).

### **2.3.3 Participation as a burden on the poor: how are the costs and benefits of participation distributed?**

In addition to the normative claims made for popular participation in development, there are clear pragmatic benefits to involving 'communities' in provision of goods and services. Participation can be an economically appealing proposition (Rahnema 1992: 118-119). This was particularly evident in the 1980s and early 1990s as many African countries adopted structural adjustment programmes and:

the notion of 'self-reliance', and with it of 'participation', had begun to be rearticulated as neo-liberalism took hold of the development mainstream. No longer the passive recipients of development assistance, 'beneficiaries' were to be active participants in implementation, and in meeting the costs of development.

Cornwall (2006: 71)

Participation may thus take an instrumental form, viewed by the 'top' as a means of enhancing efficiency and saving money, but experienced by those at the 'bottom' as an imposition of costs (White 1996: 7-8) and potentially as a form of 'participatory corvée' (Ribot 1995: 1596).

Although often assumed to be a low-cost solution (e.g. Baker 2009a: 385), participation can impose considerable costs on 'communities', which may compromise the service provided. People may prefer not to participate to the degree expected of them when any potential benefits are deemed to be outweighed by likely costs, whether in terms of time, resources or the potential for disruption of social relations (Eyben and Ladbury 1995: 197). Even when citizens are able to overcome collective action problems to establish participatory development initiatives, material constraints can still prevent these from adequately providing public services (Cleaver 1999: 604). Community self-help can lead to inequalities between geographic areas (Tripp 2003). Thus in their overview of evaluations of the sustainability of participatory projects, Mansuri and Rao (2003: 18) conclude that the continuing importance of external inputs in sustaining projects means that, 'the need for a well-functioning state apparatus does not disappear with community involvement.'

Finally, as discussed above, participatory development projects take place within a context of existing hierarchies and social divisions which affect how the benefits and costs of participation are distributed within communities. Those who are poor or otherwise disadvantaged are often liable to bear costs disproportionate to their ability to do so (Mayoux 1995: 241; Ribot 1995), as became evident in the Tanzanian case presented here.

## **2.4 Self-help and the state in Tanzania in historical perspective**

CP forms part of a long history of mobilisation of popular self-help for development in Tanzania. The history of the institutionalisation of participation in Tanzanian development, briefly recounted here, is illustrative of the malleability of the notion of 'participation' noted above, and the extent to which it may be subject to multiple and sometimes contradictory interpretations. It also illustrates the difficulty in analysing 'local' forms of participation in isolation from the wider structures of power and political competition in which they are embedded.

Self-help, referring to small development projects that were intended to be initiated and carried out by communities themselves, formed part of the official development strategy articulated for newly independent Tanganyika<sup>12</sup> in the 1960s. Before this, the concept had been employed by both mission societies and the colonial administration, as a means of cost-effective rural development. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)<sup>13</sup> had also promoted self-help during the nationalist struggle in an attempt to mobilise the population around a rejection of colonial models of development and as a way of providing services where these were lacking (Jennings 2003: 166). Self-help appealed to the new government as a means of gradually inducing developmental change based on consensus, in contrast to the coercive colonial models that had fuelled nationalist sentiment, which also required only minimal government expenditure (ibid.).

The importance of self-help was reinforced by the emphasis placed by Nyerere on self-reliance (*kujitegemea*) in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which set out the principles of Tanzanian socialism, or *ujamaa*. Self-reliance at the local level reflected the ‘minimalist orientation’ of *ujamaa* (Green 2010a: 24), whereby ‘lower tiers of administration had to provide their own resources for conforming to the project of national development’ (ibid.).

Bringing about ‘development’ (*maendeleo*) was central to the claims to legitimacy of the new nationalist regime, as elsewhere in Africa, and development was placed at the heart of discourses of nationhood (Jennings 2007). Participation in development was thus an act of ‘nation-building’ and was framed as an obligation of citizenship: ‘A “citizen” was one who shared these developmental aims and objectives, participated actively in projects, and accepted the responsibilities of self-reliance and community advancement’ (ibid.: 71). The demands of citizenship were particularly heavy for young people, who were mobilised by their ‘nationalist elders’ for nation-building activities (Burgess 2005: xvii). ‘Traditional’ forms of communal labour and mutual assistance were also evoked as a means to legitimate the unpaid labour and low levels of government spending on local development that self-help entailed (Lal 2012: 216-217).

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<sup>12</sup> Tanganyika is the former name for what is now mainland Tanzania. The United Republic of Tanzania was formed in 1964 through the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

<sup>13</sup> TANU was the political party at the forefront of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika and won a landslide victory in the 1960 election, leading the country to independence in 1961. In 1977, TANU merged with Zanzibar’s Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) (CCM), which has remained in power to date.

Many local leaders were initially enthusiastic about self-help, and localised development projects, such as mending roads and constructing dispensaries, increased during the early 1960s. Much of the early participation in self-help entailed local collective action outside of official development plans, due to the utility of self-help as a means to secure resources for a particular area: once presented with the results of popular labour it was difficult for the government to avoid paying the subsequent costs, for example a teacher's salary (Jennings 2003: 168-172). Increasingly, however, local development was made subject to the direction of the party and administration. Self-help outside of the state became a concern for government, partly due to the limited funds available to maintain services once infrastructure was put in place, but also due to the potential for self-help to become a focus of opposition to the government, which had been exploited by TANU itself during the late colonial period (ibid.: 174). There was also an imperative to reconcile popular participation and local priorities with overarching national development strategies and the expertise vested in government, and 'this tension was resolved in favor of the state's authority in development' (Schneider 2004: 347).

The party and administration exercised increased control over local development efforts through the creation of District and Regional Development Committees, which made decisions regarding planning and funding of local initiatives (Jennings 2003: 179-181). Development policy was rarely based on local forms of organisation or ways of doing things (Tripp 1997: 69). Rather: 'The social order stressed innovation imposed from above, and people waited for changes to come; they had little incentive to innovate for themselves' (Coulson 1982: 223).

The top-down nature of development planning was linked to broader processes, whereby autonomous forms of organisation outside of the ruling party were increasingly no longer tolerated. Tanzania became a *de jure* one party state in 1965 and local government organisations were abolished in 1967. Potential sources of independent political activity, such as trade unions, co-operatives and advocacy organisations, were brought under the auspices of the party or dissolved (Kiondo 1993). Although government ideology continued to emphasise the importance of popular participation, this was to occur only through party institutions rather than locally autonomous organisations (Tripp 1992: 228-229).

Participating in self-help increasingly became an obligation and an expectation, reinforced not only by understandings of citizenship as entailing active participation in the building of the nation (Jennings 2007), but through legal measures as well. In 1969

the Ward Development Committees Act granted the committees power to compel participation in self-help, and to impose fines for failure to do so, as well as removing decision-making further from the village. Henceforth:

Self-help had become little more than compulsory labour.  
Participation had become a matter of legal requirement, no  
longer one of pride, community spirit and local custom.

(Jennings 2003:182)

Government officials tended to view themselves as agents of 'modernity', in juxtaposition to the 'underdeveloped', 'backward' and 'traditional' masses (Schneider 2007: 28). These paternalistic views informed the often coercive and authoritarian way in which development was implemented (Schneider 2004: 357). Local courts enforced government orders to work on communal farms and other developmental directives, for example imposing fines on parents who refused to let their daughters attend school and farmers who did not use fertiliser (Coulson 1982: 221). Interactions between state officials and citizens over communal labour could be fraught, and Shivji (1990: 50) characterises the experience of self-help as 'a long nightmare of harassment, beating, extortion of bribes etc. from ordinary citizens by the organs and officials of the state.' The villagisation campaign of the 1970s, which entailed the forced resettlement of millions of rural citizens into *ujamaa* villages, exemplifies the highly authoritarian way in which development was to be attained in Tanzania (Scott 1998; Schneider 2004).

As Nyerere had himself anticipated (Schneider 2004), it proved difficult to sustain participation in and popular enthusiasm for self-help dictated from above (Pratt 1979: 205; Caplan 1992; Schneider 2007: 25; Landau 2008: 45). The expectations of citizens and the state about the respective roles of the population and the government in local development differed:

The state's perception of self-help was one of state-led and state-directed efforts by local communities in the implementation of schemes designed to fit in with, and promote, the objectives of the state. It was a way to effect change and modernisation in a context of minimal resources. For the peasantry, self-help implied not state-led development, but rather state-supported: the role of government was to provide the materials, funds and technical advice required to

meet the needs and wishes of the individual community.  
(Jennings 2003: 182. See also Caplan 1992: 108-110)

In contrast to the low levels of enthusiasm for participation in formal, party-mandated organisations, a rich associational life existed in urban areas, best documented in Dar es Salaam. For example, women's rotating saving groups (*upato*) and other informal associations flourished, in contrast to party led organisations, which sought to impose predetermined organisational models and did not reflect women's own objectives for collaborating (Tripp 1992: 231-234).

Since the 1980s, as a result of an economic crisis which severely compromised state capacity for service provision, as well as subsequent political liberalisation and privatisation of parts of the state apparatus, new 'community' organisations, and 'non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) have proliferated (Kiondo 1993; Tripp 1997; Mercer 1999). Development has been 'globalized' in Tanzania, and popular participation is now promoted through standardised institutional templates (Green 2003; Dill 2010a). However, internationalised narratives of participation and its empowering and democratising effects have co-existed with rather more instrumental (White 1996: 7-8) understandings of what participation is for, reflecting the historical development of self-help in Tanzania (Marsland 2006). This version of participation views citizens as '*obliged* to contribute their labour and resources in a community effort to "build the nation" (*kujenga taifa*)' (ibid.: 66, emphasis in original). Rather than providing input into policy and priorities of development projects, citizens are often involved largely as providers of resources, such as labour, information or money. Rabé and Kamanzi (2012: 26-27), for example, in a study of 15 sub-ward and village governments found that leaders typically considered citizen participation to entail making financial contributions to enable the implementation of decisions made by local government leaders at district or village level, rather than having input into the decision making process. Consequently many residents associated participation with compulsory contributions of money or labour towards ends that did not necessarily reflect their interests. Similarly, Chaliga (2008: 10-11) found, from a study of village and *mtaa* level governance institutions across 6 districts, that where citizens were involved in local development efforts, this tended to be only partial, for example as sources of information.

In a context of scarce government resources, the legitimising rhetoric of participation may serve the government's more pressing objective, which is 'to co-opt the NGO sector into social service provision' (Mercer 1999: 251). Local institutions, such as

CBOs, are often envisaged as a means of assisting government, particularly in mobilising local resources (Dill 2009: 730). The contribution of labour or resources towards local development projects is still often enforced by legal instruments and failure to participate can result in fines or imprisonment (Green 2010a: 25, 2010b: 1241).

Additional continuities are apparent in the attitude of government officials towards 'beneficiaries' of development, and the extent to which local initiatives are dependent upon support and funding from above, which determines the activities that can be carried out. As in the past, government officials often see themselves as responsible for telling rural populations how to develop (Green 2010a: 26), and participation 'has often come to mean teaching the community to act in the way that ... experts require them to' (Marsland 2006: 68). Communities are expected to recognise their responsibilities, rather than contribute to the development of new ideas and ways of doing things (*ibid.*; Green 2010b: 1246). Since political liberalisation, development planning and decision making on local priorities at the village and *mtaa* (sub-ward) level has remained largely 'top down', despite ongoing local government reforms (Chaliga 2008; Green 2010a; Norman and Massoi 2010; Rabé and Kamanzi 2012). Due to resource constraints, ideas which are formulated at the village level may be very unlikely to be implemented due to the difficulty in securing limited funding from higher tiers of government, and thus directives from above still determine local policies (Green 2010a: 26). Obtaining funding is dependent upon being recognised as a legitimate actor by government and donors, which encourages adherence to particular institutional forms, and diverts activities towards donor preferences, rather than the matters which initially motivated participation (Dill 2009: 731).

Self-help that appears to be too autonomous of government structures may be obstructed. The legal framework governing the formation of associations remains fairly restrictive, and civil society organisations are castigated for any activity deemed to be too 'political' (Dill 2010a: 40-41). The pursuit of development itself in Tanzania remains 'very political' (Jennings 2001), and where parallel participatory institutions appear to threaten the ability of government actors to gain credit for developmental gains, with associated enhanced electoral prospects, they are liable to be obstructed (Marsland 2006; Lange 2008).

In summary, popular participation in local development in Tanzania has typically been mandated by top-down directives and determined by government objectives. Participation has often been framed as an obligation for citizens to contribute labour or resources, rather than a means for citizens to influence local development strategies.



International narratives of participation and models of community-based development that are ubiquitous in local development arenas today, co-exist with these older understandings that often distort outcomes away from stated objectives of empowerment or innovation.

## **2.5 Communities and the police in community policing**

There are clear advantages for the police in engaging the public as co-producers of security, including reduced workload and more effective crime prevention leading to safer working conditions. However, co-production also implies responsibilities for the police, who are obliged 'to devise appropriate ways of associating the public with law enforcement and the maintenance of order' (Skolnick & Bayley 1988: 3). The critical perspectives on the production of public goods through community-based development outlined above suggest that the state police retain a crucial role in monitoring and supporting local service delivery in order to ensure it is equitable and sustainable, and compliant with the law and with protection of human rights. Loader & Walker (2006) thus argue for a form of 'anchored pluralism', whereby the state retains an important role as a regulator of alternative security providers in the interests of 'civilizing security'. In theory, communities and the police might develop 'synergistic' relationships, whereby 'engaged public agencies and mobilized communities enhance each other's capacity to deliver collective goods' (Evans 2002b: 21). However, the existing evidence regarding the capacity and willingness of African police forces to engage with and support citizen participation in the interests of more effective and accountable policing, reviewed below, does not inspire optimism. Furthermore, CP strategies must resolve collective action problems at the local level between police officers and the public. Despite the theoretical benefits of cooperation between communities and the police, this does not necessarily constitute an easier option for police forces, and may in fact require additional capacity (Baker 2010b: 608). Indeed, how states and other organised groups might be able to work together to provide public goods and services constitutes 'one of the more intractable problems in African governance' (Tripp 2003: 131).

Ostrom (1990: 1082) identifies necessary conditions for co-production to constitute an advantage over governance involving only one agency. Firstly, the inputs provided by various collective actors should be complementary rather than substitutable. For example, the police might have more equipment and access to specialised professional knowledge than community-based institutions, but need the informational advantage

offered by partnerships with local residents. State support for, and oversight of, local policing institutions might be a means of making voluntarism more sustainable, addressing inequalities between and within communities and ensuring that particular social groups or individuals are not disadvantaged (Tripp 2003: 136-145). Baker (2009b: 83), for example, argues that interactions between community-based policing organisations and the state police through forums or other structures:

...have the potential to offer people the advantages of local anticrime groups but with external state supervision that can restrain or eradicate the defects. They offer the possibility of empowering local people with a policing group that is accessible (in terms of language, procedures, finance) and yet is under obligation to conform to state determined standards. In other words, it offers (in theory) the opportunity to be freed from the worst abuses of autonomous local policing groups, such as their use of threats of violence, their unequal treatment, and their summary justice.

However, Ostrom (1990: 1082) identifies two additional conditions that appear to be somewhat problematic in this case: 'participants need to be able to build credible commitment to one another so that if one side increases input, the other will continue at the same or higher levels'; and incentives are important to encourage inputs from both officials and citizens. In African contexts, where police forces are typically poorly resourced and motivated and there is a long legacy of very negative relationships between public and the police, it may be difficult to meet these criteria. Crucially, co-production of collective goods rests on 'robust state agencies oriented toward delivering collective goods' (Evans 2002: 21), and it is not clear that African police forces have the necessary capacity or will to form partnerships with the public which are conducive to more effective and accountable policing.

In practice, co-production has often proved to disproportionately advantage one party, and to be closer to forms of instrumental participation discussed above (White 1996: 7-8). The lack of resources and capacity which makes working with alternative actors appealing to some state police forces may mean that police are not able to exercise oversight of partners or provide support sufficient to enable communities to provide local security, which requires equipment and training. Conversely, police may be unwilling to accept local inputs and seek to dominate interactions with the public, privileging their own professional expertise over the knowledge of 'amateurs' (e.g.

Baker 2010b: 607). The extent to which African police forces prioritise collective goods production is questionable, as despite political liberalisation and implementation of police reforms, they typically remain politicised and regime oriented (Hills 2008: 215-216). Co-production has sometimes produced policing that reflects the more negative features of state provided services, such as abuse of human rights or the persecution of marginalised groups (e.g. Ruteere & Pommerolle 2002; Kyed 2008). These issues are discussed further with regard to the Tanzanian case in the following chapter.

At the local level, the need to build credible and predictable commitments between parties and to generate incentives for cooperation suggests that CP requires institutional reforms that might enable police and communities to overcome collective action problems (Kahan 2002).<sup>14</sup> Obstacles faced in this regard are likely to be highly intractable in many African contexts whereby the history of police-public relations is characterized by mutual distrust (Andvig & Barasa 2011: 96). The extent to which this has been the case in Tanzania is discussed further in the following chapter. In many situations, the police and law-abiding community residents have a shared interest in improving local security by preventing or investigating crime, which can best be obtained through cooperation. The police, for example, stand to benefit from safer working conditions, reduced workload and perhaps vocational rewards. In detecting local crime, they rely upon information obtained from citizens, and sometimes on more active citizen participation such as patrolling and citizen arrests. In practice, however, in many situations, it is not in the interests of individual citizens or police officers in Tanzania to contribute towards a collective effort to improve security. For example, from a citizen perspective, reporting crime entails costs and is potentially risky, as officers are widely thought to solicit bribes from those accused in return for information about their accuser. Police, who are poorly paid and equipped, face considerable personal risk in responding to crime and have little incentive to form long-standing and mutually beneficial relationships with 'communities' when they are subject to frequent and unpredictable transfers between districts and departments. Historically police in Tanzania have been deliberately deployed in areas distant from their homes in order to *prevent* them from forming alliances with local communities (Plyler 2007: 232). Interactions between police and the public can appear highly unpredictable. The success of CP will thus in part depend on the extent to which reforms institutionalise new incentives for cooperation and reduce perceived

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<sup>14</sup> Although the state police is a bureaucratic, hierarchical organisation in which officers are ostensibly guided by orders from their superiors, in practice officers in many African police forces retain considerable discretion in their daily interactions with the public and are subject to limited monitoring, and performance is thus rarely rewarded or punished from within the force. It is thus reasonable to consider the police and citizens as part of the same collective action situation (Andvig & Barasa 2011: 97).

associated risks. The mechanisms that have been introduced to this end in Tanzania, such as attempts to improve communication between citizens and police, are outlined in the following chapter (3.4).

## **2.6 Theoretical framework**

Building on the literature reviewed in this chapter, this thesis adopts a theoretical framework constructed around three propositions: an 'agnostic and non-normative' (Lund 2006a: 678-679) approach to governance; the recognition that development is a collective action problem; and the historically and politically contingent nature of 'community', 'policing' and 'participation'. This section clarifies the tenets of the approach taken with reference to the literature explored above, and highlights how these theoretical assumptions relate to the research questions adopted.

### **2.6.1 Open-minded approaches to governance**

This thesis proceeds from a recognition of the diversity of actors involved in the governance of African states, and the often 'unorthodox' nature of many of the institutional configurations through which collective goods and services are provided (Joshi & Moore 2004; Blundo & Le Meur 2009; CFS 2010). In this context the state may not be the only, or indeed the dominant provider of public goods, including security, and indeed the desirability or feasibility of a state monopoly may be questionable in some circumstances (Baker & Scheye 2007). However, no assumptions are made regarding the intrinsic characteristics of either 'state' or 'informal' or 'non-state' actors: 'these need first to be understood within a specific context, and then evaluated for positive and negative consequences' (CFS 2010: 11). Rather than essentialising state-based or other forms of governance it is recognised that the boundaries between the two can be blurred, for example through the 'informal privatisation' of ostensibly 'public' services (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2001), the assumption of the symbols and accoutrements of the state by alternative actors (Lund 2006b) and shared cultures of governance that bring into question the utility of categories such as 'state' and 'civil society' (Green 2010a). Therefore this thesis presents a detailed empirical account of CP as practised in Mwanza and explores the differences between the practices of 'public' and 'community' policing and the complex relationships between them.

### 2.6.2 Development as a collective action problem<sup>15</sup>

A dual-sided definition of security was adopted in the introductory chapter, which addressed both supply and demand side perspectives: ‘security is a process of social and political ordering, maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power’, and ‘security is an entitlement of citizens, and more widely of human beings, to protection from violence and other forms of existential risk’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 10).

The second aspect describes a public good. A state of security yields ‘non-subtractive benefits that can be enjoyed jointly by many people who are hard to exclude from obtaining these benefits’ (Ostrom 2005: 23). Policing is one way through which security might be produced. However, organising local policing entails considerable collective action problems, whereby many actors must decide to take an action that is costly in order to increase the likelihood of outcomes, in this case improved security, that are in the interests of all members of their ‘community’ (Medina 2007: 23). In the absence of externally imposed sanctions, rational, self-interested individuals might be expected not to cooperate, knowing that they cannot be excluded from enjoyment of the collective gains even if they do not make a personal contribution (Olson 1965).

In practice, however, individuals frequently do cooperate when they anticipate that others will do the same. Institutions, defined as ‘the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions’ (Ostrom 2005: 3) facilitate collective action by altering the incentive structures facing individuals (North 1990). This thesis explores the extent to which CP reforms have institutionalised collective action in the interests of neighbourhood security, which implies the development of mutually understood and predictably enforced rules or norms which incentivise cooperative action and generate shared expectations about the likely behaviour of others in a given situation (Ostrom 2005). These conditions are conducive to the development of norms of trust and reciprocity, which are central to explaining why individuals participate in costly collective action (Ostrom 1998). In the case of CP, this might mean, for example monitoring and sanctioning non-participation in patrols, which enables individuals to be reasonably confident that their inputs are reciprocated by other residents, and disincentivises free-riding on the inputs of others. The responsibilities of individuals and penalties for non-compliance might be stipulated by

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<sup>15</sup> This phrase is taken from the synthesis report of the African Power and Politics Programme (Booth 2012), which informs the perspective outlined in the following section.

formal rules adopted to organise CP, or ‘practical norms’ that prescribe and legitimise certain behaviour (Olivier de Sardan 2008).

As discussed in the following section, however, it is recognised that institutional designs introduced through CP operate in a specific context, and are ‘mediated through localized cultural and historical repertoires’ (Pratten & Sen 2008: 19). Single purpose institutions designed to produce public goods exist amongst a ‘multiplicity of institutions of varying degrees of formality and transparency’ (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 209), which affect how a community is defined, the terms of access to new institutionalised spaces and how rules are formed (ibid.: Mosse 2005). Imposing uniform institutional templates as a solution to local problems may therefore not have the desired effects (Evans 2004).

### **2.6.3 The politically and historically contingent nature of ‘community’, ‘policing’ and ‘participation’**

How security is defined, and by implication determining what or who is a threat to security, is a highly political practice, and by claiming to protect and secure communities, actors are themselves participating in the construction and maintenance of the ‘community’ (Buur & Jensen 2004). In addition to addressing the impact of CP on security in terms of crime prevention and residents’ perceptions of risk, the thesis therefore also explores the more ‘specific order’ (Marenin 1982) CP upholds, and whose interests it serves.

The ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998) is rejected in favour of recognition of the diverse political, socio-economic, gendered and generational interests that constitute geographical communities. The thesis explores how existing power relationships within ‘communities’ have determined the distribution of the costs and benefits of participation in CP and how the purposes of ‘participation’ and ‘policing’ are understood. Participation is not assumed to be an altruistic contribution to collective objectives, but may instead reflect personal economic or political strategies, or be the result of coercion (e.g. Mercer 2002; Ayee & Crook 2003; Cleaver & Toner 2006). Obstacles to participation are also taken into account, and their impact on how community interests are represented through participatory processes (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 19).

The differential impacts and experiences of CP within communities are explored by situating local policing within the broader context of local governance in Tanzania,

exploring the historical construction of ‘policing’ and ‘participation’ and adopting an ‘end-user approach’, which privileges ‘the perspectives and experience of those at the receiving end of security arrangements’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 5).

## 2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, perspectives on the participation of organised citizens in the provision of collective goods and services through CP and other forms of participatory development were explored. Whilst the potential benefits of co-producing security were recognised, three important critical perspectives on community-based development were elaborated, which informed three supplementary research questions:

1. How well do CP institutions initiate and sustain collective action?
2. How are the costs and benefits of participation in CP distributed within communities and between communities and the police?
3. For whom does CP provide security and from what?

The pertinence of interrogating meanings of ‘participation’ and its objectives and the complex relationships between localised developmental initiatives and state action were explored in the Tanzanian context through a brief account of the trajectory of self help in Tanzania, which will be revisited in subsequent chapters, which emphasised enduring patterns in the governance of local development.

Section 2.5 considered the role of the police as a co-producer of public security, and suggested that there are likely to be considerable obstacles to establishing synergistic partnerships between state police forces and communities, however defined, due to lack of will and capacity on the part of the police and the questionable commitment of many African police forces to providing collective goods. Furthermore, citizens and police face collective action problems, which must be addressed if CP is to lead to productive cooperation between police and communities that enhances public security and improves local policing. The following chapter provides more detail regarding the character of state policing in Tanzania and past experiences of attempts to mobilise citizens to provide local security.

The final section drew on the literature reviewed in this chapter to outline the theoretical framework that informed the thesis. The methodological framework constructed to address these concerns is outlined in Chapter 4.



### Chapter 3: Community Policing in Tanzania in Historical Perspective

This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of policing in Tanzania, from the colonial period to the present. There are notable continuities in police practice and in how the public experience state policing, which have been little altered by firstly the end of British colonial administration in 1961 or, more recently, the liberalisation of the political system and the end of the one party state. The police have typically been oriented towards serving the regime in power rather than providing a public service. Corruption, police brutality and lack of police discipline have resulted in largely negative public perceptions of police and their ability, and willingness, to prevent crime. Sections of the urban population have experienced state policing largely in terms of attempts to control their movements and livelihood strategies, and in expulsion from urban areas. Finally, acute shortages of personnel and resources have affected the Tanzania Police Force since the colonial period, meaning that the state police have remained largely absent from sizeable parts of the country. The contemporary police reform programme is designed to address these challenges, but at the same time exhibits one additional continuity with successive Tanzanian administrations. In recognition of the limited geographical coverage of the state police force, governments have regularly authorised alternative policing providers, through, for example, the empowerment of Native Authorities and Special Constables, the co-optation of *sungusungu* vigilantes and today the promotion of *ulinzi shirikishi*. Such strategies have been conveniently consistent with a range of apparently diverse ideological positions over time, from colonial era philosophies of indirect rule, to Nyerere's African socialism and self-reliance, and finally the contemporary globalised rhetoric of CP, which is used to justify giving 'communities' responsibility for local security today.

This chapter firstly provides an overview of colonial policing in Tanzania and subsequent continuities since the country gained independence in 1961. These legacies have important implications for the operation of the TPF today and its relationship with the public. The emergence and subsequent co-optation of *sungusungu* vigilante groups in the 1980s is treated in some detail as *sungusungu* has been evoked by reformers as an indigenous 'tradition' of CP and a model for contemporary *ulinzi shirikishi* in urban areas. This account and the specific history of *sungusungu* in urban

Mwanza, discussed in Chapter 5 (5.4) demonstrate the extent to which *sungusungu*, rather than being a 'traditional' response to insecurity, has also been a means of ruling party mobilisation and coercion, which has become problematic in a multi-party context. The final section addresses police performance since political liberalisation in the early 1990s and outlines the policies adopted under the banner of CP.

### 3.1 Colonial Policing in Tanganyika<sup>16</sup>

#### 3.1.1 Policing Before 1945

Policing in British colonial territories in Africa was determined by the broader imperatives of sustaining the colonial endeavour. The police were thus 'political in character; the prevention and detection of crime came a poor second' (Baker 2008b: 55). The police presence was fairly small and largely confined to areas of European settlement or those of particular economic interest to the coloniser (Killingray 1986: 414). For much of the colonial period, police efforts were focused on preventing 'crimes' that posed a threat to the colonial administration or European owned property, whilst supporting the colonial order by collecting taxes, patrolling borders and assisting in the conscription of labour and the suppression of illegal strikes (ibid.: 425-426).

The Tanganyika Police and Prisons Service was established in 1919, following the British assumption of control over the territory under a United Nations (UN) mandate. However, like other British colonies, Tanganyika remained 'thinly policed' (Killingray 1986: 414). The size of the police force remained at approximately 1,800 officers prior to the Second World War, rising to only 6,143 by 1961 when Tanganyika gained independence (Burton 2003: 68). Rural areas without significant economic value were thus largely left to the Native Authorities established under the system of indirect rule.<sup>17</sup> Native Authority police performed duties including responding to crime, tax collection and enforcing the judgements of Native Courts (Rodney 1973, cited in Shivji 2001: 7; Killingray 1986: 427).

Whilst the colonial police had a more visible coercive presence in urban areas, it was common for parts of towns occupied by African residents to remain 'virtually untouched' by colonial policing (Killingray 1986: 415). In Dar es Salaam, the colonial

<sup>16</sup> Tanganyika is the former name for what is now mainland Tanzania. The United Republic of Tanzania was formed in 1964 through the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

<sup>17</sup> On indirect rule in Tanganyika see: Austen (1967); Graham (1976); Iliffe (1979: chapter 10); Willis (1993); Spear (2005). As elsewhere, implementing indirect rule frequently entailed the 'creation of tribes', rather than enshrining pre-existing legitimate forms of local authority (Iliffe 1979: 318-341).

capital of Tanganyika, a lack of resources resulted in a low ratio of police officers to the urban population throughout the colonial period. The distribution of policing resources was significantly skewed in the favour of predominately European and to a lesser extent Indian areas. The police were largely absent from sizeable areas of the city inhabited mainly by Africans. The degree of authority the police could exercise over African urban residents thus remained much lower than that desired by police and the colonial administration (Burton 2003: 65-66, 71-74).

In this context informal modes of policing are likely to have been important. Voluntary associations, amongst which ethnic associations linking urban residents with their rural 'homes' were prominent, were engaged in providing both social welfare and some measure of social control (Killingray 1986: 418). However, little is known about the history of urban forms of self-policing or vigilantism in Tanzania during the colonial period (Brennan 2008: 104).

### **3.1.2 Policing After 1945**

The period following the Second World War saw the emergence of a 'modern' police force in Tanganyika, with improved organisation and increased manpower (Burton 2003: 74). The more interventionist strategies of the 'second colonial occupation' (Low & Lonsdale 1976) required a more professional and expanded police force (Burton 2003: 66-67). At the same time there was a sharp increase in detected crime in Tanganyika following the war, which highlighted the necessity of having a more capable and better-equipped police force (ibid.: 74-75). Improvements also reflected the desires of colonial governments to improve their capacity to counter potential threats to their authority (Anderson & Killingray 1991: 12).

From the late 1940s, the government attempted to attract more educated individuals to the police force, leading to a growing proportion of literate officers able to perform practices such as recording statements. From 1949, literacy in either Swahili or English was required and salaries were increased (Burton 2003: 68, 74-75). New crime prevention strategies, including undercover operations and dog patrols had some impact in Dar es Salaam, where the number of police stations was also increased (Burton 2003: 74-78).

Greater cooperation between the police and the administration, including town headmen and elders, and between police and civilians was encouraged after the war. A

system of voluntary Special Constables, similar to systems existing in other British colonies (Killingray 1986: 432), had been in place since the 1930s, but was reinvigorated in 1951. In 1955 the auxiliary policing body began to accept African volunteers (Burton 2003: 78-79). The Special Constabulary was a permanent body mobilised as needed. Special Constables were praised by senior police for providing assistance with regular police patrols, participation in 'spiv' raids and action against 'hooligans' (see below) and supporting many other routine police duties (Annual Reports of the Tanganyika Police Force 1951-61).

Despite these efforts, in 1955, Sir Charles Jeffries (1955: 116), Deputy Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, described the Tanganyika Police as being, 'a force which is still in process of adapting itself to modern requirements.' Half of the rank and file remained illiterate. Even in comparatively heavily policed Dar es Salaam, African residential areas were neglected and senior police officers acknowledged their inability to deal with crime in the city (Burton 2003: 79-83). In the Annual Report for 1959 (Tanganyika Police Force 1959: 3) it was noted that: 'The force is responsible for the policing of the Territory as a whole, but is, in practice, largely restricted by its size to the capital and other urban areas.'

### **3.1.3 Police-public relations during the colonial period**

The modernisation of colonial police forces following the Second World War may have improved the ability of the police to perform their duties effectively to some extent, however 'the nature of those duties remained coercive rather than consensual' (Anderson & Killingray 1991: 12). Colonial police officers were generally stationed in areas to which they were not local, having been recruited from ethnic groups deemed particularly suitable for martial roles. The strategy of 'policing strangers by strangers' (Deflem 1994: 58) had a negative impact on police-public relations as police were often viewed as aliens, compounded by the housing of police in police lines rather than among local communities (Killingray 1986: 424).

Consistent with this, official policy in Tanganyika was to limit the number of police recruits serving in their home areas and men from neighbouring British colonies formed a substantial component of the Tanganyikan force (Burton 2003: 70-71). There was also a bias towards certain ethnic groups within the country, predicated upon beliefs about their suitability for police work. In the early years of British administration the Sukuma, Nyamwezi and Kuria from the northern half of the

country, were heavily over-represented in the force, and remained so until the late colonial period (Burton 2003: 69-70). In 1952, just six of Tanganyika's many ethno-linguistic groups represented 87% of the police force (Saudin 2002: 3, cited in CHRI 2006: 3). The perception of the police in Dar es Salaam thus appears to have been similar to that of an 'occupying force' (Burton 2003: 83). Furthermore, it is apparent that 'the Tanganyikan force was neither the most disciplined nor the best behaved of policing bodies' (ibid.). Senior police and the public frequently bemoaned corruption, neglect of duty and the use of excessive force and the general public were often reluctant to assist police in inquiries. In the 1950s, in the context of increasing nationalist sentiment and greater police intervention in urban residents' daily lives, police-public relations worsened to the extent that there were frequent assaults on police officers in Dar es Salaam (Burton 2003: 83-87).

In rural areas of Africa under British colonial administration, the poorly trained and equipped Native Authority police 'had a low reputation almost everywhere' (Anderson & Killingray 1991: 8), frequently operating as an instrument of exploitative chiefly power (Killingray 1986: 417-418). Executive and judicial powers were fused in the office of the chief, which forms a key component of Mamdani's (1996) argument for indirect rule as 'decentralised despotism'.<sup>18</sup> Although indirect rule was ostensibly premised upon discovering the 'true' or legitimate rulers of rural African communities, this proved rather difficult in practice. The northwest of Tanganyika, where Mwanza is located, was considered a 'model' in terms of implementation of indirect rule, as a pre-existing form of chiefly authority had been easily identifiable. However, even here the form taken by chiefly authority and who was entitled to exercise it was subject to frequent contestation (Austen 1967: 604-605).

### 3.2 Policing independent Tanzania

Contemporary African police systems have evolved directly from those inherited at independence. There have been no revolutionary and few unprecedented developments in policing since the 1950s, and the distinctive features of national organization remain much the same as at independence.

(Hills 2000: 27)

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<sup>18</sup> However, see Schneider (2006) for a critique of Mamdani's thesis in relation to Tanzania.

The orientation of colonial police forces towards upholding the ruling regime was typically little altered following independence, as African governments realised the utility of control of the police in asserting their control over newly independent states (Marenin 2009b: 249). TANU had opposed increases to the police budget prior to 1961, but after assuming power over independent Tanganyika, the party quickly came to appreciate the importance of the police as an agent of state coercion (Burton 2003: 90-91). Thus, TANU 'inherited the police force as it was and removed only the racial bias in its content' (Kapinga 1990: 42). Public confidence in the police, and the criminal justice system, remained low, due to widespread petty corruption. Coulson (1982: 221), for example, observed that in the 1970s the easiest way to defend a case was to pay the police officer to lose a case file, to the extent that: 'it became hardly worth while prosecuting for burglary or assault, unless the unfortunate offender was nearly destitute.'

From 1964 onwards the Police Force was closely tied to TANU, which became the only legal political party in 1965. Party institutions were also encouraged to carry out policing functions. Like its colonial predecessor, the TPF struggles with severe resource and personnel shortages and remains virtually absent from large areas of the country, precipitating attempts to mobilise citizens for local defence through the People's Militia, *Sungusungu* and the National Service. Political liberalisation in the 1990s has had little impact on the operation of the police and their orientation towards regime interests, and has done little to improve negative popular perceptions of the police.

### **3.2.1 Politicisation of the police in the one party state**

In 1964 an army mutiny, which obliged then President Nyerere to call upon British assistance for the restoration of order, served to illustrate the importance of ensuring the loyalty of the military and the police. The Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded and replaced by a new national army, largely recruited from the TANU Youth League (TYL). Membership of the party was made compulsory for the military and new recruits were subject to vetting by the TYL (Brennan 2006: 235), and obliged to undergo cultural and political training (Tungaraza 1998: 291-292). A former prohibition on police membership of TANU was reversed, precipitating mass enrolment. By the middle of 1964 police and civil servants were being coerced into joining the party (Brennan 2006: 235) and Regional Police Commissioners (RPCs) became members of the party's Regional Executive Committees (Bienen 1965: 45).

The politicisation of the police was not unique and the administration was similarly drawn within the party. In 1962 politically appointed Regional Commissioners who also became *ex officio* Regional Party Secretaries replaced Provincial Commissioners. This system was subsequently extended to the district level and commissioners were appointed largely on the basis of loyalty and service to TANU (Tordoff 1965: 66-67). Thus, 'party and administration spoke with one voice' (Heald 2006: 278).

The police were frequently used to suppress potential opposition to the ruling party and played a key role in consolidating the one party state through the enforcement of legislation limiting political competition. This was facilitated by the retention of colonial era legislation including the Deportation Ordinance (1921) and subsequent additions such as the Preventative Detention Act (1962) (CHRI 2006; Shivji 2001: 6-7), which has been used to detain those whom the police do not have sufficient evidence to charge in court or as a means of 'sheer harassment' (Shivji 1990: 55).

The independent government continued to use police motorised units, established by the colonial government in 1950 in response to fears of popular unrest and nationalist opposition, now renamed the Field Force Unit (FFU), to suppress protest, often violently. The FFU played an extensive role during the forced re-settlement of villagers during the 'villagisation' campaigns of the 1970s, and has been used to suppress workers' and student protests and carry out brutal crackdowns on non payment of tax (Ingle 1982: 202-203; Shivji 1990).

Political opinion was also policed by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 'a quasi-secret organization designed to collect information on citizens' behaviour and attitudes' (Landau: 2008: 52-53). Although rumours may have overstated the penetration of the CID's intelligence network, arrests were frequent enough to discourage public dissent against the party (ibid.).

In addition to attempting to unite the police and the party, TANU assumed policing functions through the TYL and a network of 'ten-cell leaders'. The ruling party also promoted popular mobilisation for 'self defence' under party auspices through the People's Militia and *sungusungu*.

#### ***TANU Youth League (TYL)***

The TYL was formed in 1956, and in urban areas was largely composed of otherwise unemployed recruits with limited opportunities to accrue economic gains or social

status through other means (Brennan 2006: 229). In addition to enforcing discipline at party gatherings, the TYL acted as a form of 'shadow police force' across Dar es Salaam (Brennan 2008: 104), organising night patrols, searching motor vehicles and on occasion conducting arrests, leading the colonial administration to pejoratively refer to the party youth as 'vigilantes' (Burgess n.d., cited in Brennan 2006: 229-230).

After independence, the TYL continued to carry out policing, enforcing boycotts of South African goods and arresting people for petty crimes, in addition to harassing the limited political opposition. The TYL also became active in intelligence gathering, influenced by the increasingly important patron-client relations between youth and powerful TANU figures in the early years of the TANU government (Brennan 2006: 232-234). The TYL supported the activities of the state police by collecting taxes, guarding borders and manning roadblocks and Special Constables were recruited from the Youth League (Bienen 1965: 45).

### *Ten-cell leaders*

The TANU *nyumba-kumi* (ten-cell) system, adapted from Maoist China, was introduced in Dar es Salaam in 1964 and subsequently extended across the country. A leader was to be elected for each cell, comprised of roughly ten houses, to increase mass participation in TANU and the extension of the party throughout society (Levine 1972). In addition to collecting party dues and mobilising the population in communal development efforts, the ten-cell leaders performed a law and order function, assuming responsibility for liaison with police and courts, responding to crime, collecting taxes, summoning people to work on development projects and registering newcomers (O'Barr 1971, cited in Campbell 2009: 171; Levine 1972). According to by-laws, ten-cell leaders were required to gather detailed information about other residents, and citizens were obliged to provide notification of any guests received and births, marriages and deaths in the family (Shivji 1990: 49). In Dar es Salaam they were specifically intended to aid the City Council to eradicate 'hooliganism, idleness, lawlessness and delinquency' (Bienen 1965: 46). The ten-cell leader was thus expected to become, 'the eyes of the nation...[He] must expose dangerous characters like thieves and other infiltrators who may poison our nation and put its safety at stake' (second Vice-President, quoted in Levine 1972: 330). The security and intelligence function of the ten-cell system was also particularly evident in border areas (Bienen 1970: 358). In addition to providing intelligence, ten-cell leaders assumed an important dispute resolution role, particularly in areas where the nearest police posts or courts were



distant, and it was common for a case to be taken to the cell leader before it could be referred to the police (Levine 1972: 330).

However, the ten-cell system did not result in a uniform system of local governance, and the form taken by cells, functions performed and effectiveness were highly variable across the country (Levine 1972: 330). In practice ten-cell leaders often had difficulty in persuading people to participate in obligatory communal labour (Caplan 1992: 108). Those elected may have been chosen on the basis of attributes other than their commitment to the party, having some form of 'traditional' or seniority-based authority, or a relatively high level of formal education (Miller 1968: 194; Ingle 1982: 174-175), and were sometimes not even party members (Levine 1972: 331). The ten-cell leaders were required to negotiate between the demands of the party and higher tiers of government, which emphasised extraction and mobilisation, and the desires of their neighbours, amongst whom they were obliged to live, and the latter often prevailed (Ingle 1972: 210-212). Returns from taxes collected by ten-cell leaders were typically poor and they were relieved of responsibility for tax collection in 1970 (ibid.: 172-173). Shivji (1990: 49) thus observes that had the official regulations pertaining to ten-cell structures been upheld, 'the situation could easily be described as bordering on a police state'. In practice, 'thanks to the notorious inefficiency of the state's bureaucratic machinery' (ibid.), this was rarely the case. Nevertheless, the powers given to ten-cell leaders enabled less systematic harassment and humiliation of other residents, particularly in rural areas (ibid.).

### ***People's Militia (Jeshi la Mgambo)***

The People's Militia (*Jeshi la Mgambo*) was instituted in 1965 in an attempt to end the army's monopoly on military training, thus ensuring that 'the party was on an equal security footing with the state' (Brennan 2006: 235). Militia were established in villages throughout the country and both men and women were trained in the use of weapons for local defence. Following four months of training by the army, volunteers formed part of a reserve army (Shivji 1990: 14-15), which would play an important role during the war with Uganda in 1978-9 (Tungaraza 1998: 302-303). The government was keen to stress the voluntarism essential to the People's Militia, as well as its 'traditional' nature through use of the name *Jeshi la Mgambo*, referring to an apparently traditional assembly in case of emergency. However the groups operated largely under the auspices of the party (Tungaraza 1998: 300-303).

Whilst initially envisaged as a reserve army, the militia assumed a range of domestic functions including enforcing participation in communal development efforts across the country and policing the implementation of villagisation campaigns of the 1970s (Lal 2010: 5). In urban areas by the late 1970s it was common for a police patrol group to comprise one police officer, supported by two national service recruits<sup>19</sup> and two militia members (Shaidi 1989: 256), who were, like the police, frequently 'heavily armed, trigger-happy and reckless with their arms' (Shivji 1990: 67).

Participation in local self-defence, through either the militia or the TYL, became identified as a key responsibility of the nation's (male) youth. For example, Nyerere told assembled young people in 1968 that in order to perpetuate the national revolution, 'you have two important weapons – the plough for better and higher production, and the gun for the defence of the nation' (quoted in Lal 2010: 6).

*Mgambo* is still in operation today, although membership is much more restricted. Volunteers are trained by the army over a four to six month period. The principal motivation for joining appears to be the potential to obtain employment with one of the many commercial security companies now operating across the country or to be retained as a permanent employee by the government, for example as a guard for council property.<sup>20</sup>

### 3.2.3 Co-optation of Sungusungu

In contrast to the People's Militia and the TYL, which were formed by the ruling party as vehicles for popular mobilisation, the impetus for *sungusungu* came from organised rural citizens themselves. However, despite strong opposition from police and the judiciary, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)<sup>21</sup> was able to co-opt these local organisations to some extent and rather than constituting a threat to the state, *sungusungu* have become closely linked to government, and party, administrative structures and state-sponsored versions of *sungusungu* were promoted around the country in the early 1990s.

<sup>19</sup> The National Service was established in 1963, partly as a means to forestall discontent among TYL members who found themselves unemployed once the nationalist struggle was over (Tungaraza 1998: 299). The body was intended to participate in social and economic development as well as supporting national defence. In 1966 participation was made compulsory for all high school leavers and recruits were gradually incorporated into domestic policing duties (Shaidi 1989: 256).

<sup>20</sup> Interviews: PSCs 1,2 & 3; District Militia Advisor, Nyamagana 1.3.11.

<sup>21</sup> CCM was formed in 1977 through the merger of TANU and Zanzibar's ASP. CCM has remained in power in Tanzania since the reintroduction of multi-party competition.

*Sungusungu amongst the Sukuma and Nyamwezi*

During the early 1980s Tanzania experienced a wave of violent crime unprecedented in recent history. Severe drought in parts of the country, an international oil crisis and an economic downturn contributed to severe shortages, which coincided with the return of troops from Tanzania's war with Uganda and an associated influx of weapons. In towns commercial and residential properties were subject to armed raids, and in rural areas cattle theft was rampant (Heald 2002: 1). Government attempts to respond to the problem of cattle theft through special police units and the imposition of collective punishments on areas in which suspected thieves were resident proved largely ineffective and police were often suspected of being complicit in raids (Heald 2002: 2). In this context, a localised response to high levels of cattle theft spread rapidly across the Sukuma and Nyamwezi<sup>22</sup> inhabited areas of Tanzania in the form of *sungusungu*,<sup>23</sup> which appeared to have much greater success in apprehending cattle thieves and returning stolen property. Masanja (1992) dates the emergence of *sungusungu* to early 1982. Although the exact origin of the practice has been traced to different precise locations (see Abrahams 1987: 183), it is generally agreed that *sungusungu* was first in operation amongst Sukuma residents of Kahama District, Shinyanga Region. By 1987 Abrahams (1987: 183) observed that similar institutions were common across Nyamwezi and Sukuma inhabited areas in the Regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora. Although organised at the village level without coordination from above, these were 'remarkably uniform' (Heald 2002: 6), reflecting older patterns of local organisation amongst the Sukuma and Nyamwezi.

The village leadership of *sungusungu* comprised the *ntemi* (chief) and his deputy, the *mtware*.<sup>24</sup> These titles are taken from structures of chieftainship abolished by the Tanzanian government in 1962. In addition a secretary, a *kamanda mkuu* (chief commander) and a council of elders were selected to assist the leaders. Those nominated to assume leadership roles were subject to popular confirmation through a public vote and then underwent inauguration or enthronement (*kutemya*) by an *ntemi*

<sup>22</sup> The Sukuma and Nyamwezi are closely related ethno-linguistic groups historically resident in an area approximating contemporary Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora Regions. The Sukuma and Nyamwezi numbered between four and five million in the late 1980s, comprising a fifth of the Tanzanian population. (Abrahams 1989: 356).

<sup>23</sup> The name *sungusungu* is commonly said to be derived from the name given to a type of black biting ant (e.g. Heald 2002: 4). However, it has also been claimed that the name is derived from the Kisukuma word for poison, *busungu*, referring to the poison tipped arrows used by the *sungusungu* (Hangaya 1989: 1; Masanja 1992: 204; Bukurura 1996: 265 fn. 3). Although the name *sungusungu* is now used across Tanzania, it was historically more common for the term *basalama*, or people of peace, to be used amongst the Sukuma and Nyamwezi (Heald 2002: 4).

<sup>24</sup> Alternative spellings include *ntwale* or *mtwale*. *Mtwale* is used here following the spelling adopted when the post was revived in one of the case sites (C).

invited from a village in which *sungusungu* was already established. As part of this process village residents were required to compile a list of those suspected to be thieves, and those identified were tried and punished as described below (see Bukurura 1994a: 4-8). It was deemed important that the leadership of *sungusungu*, and particularly the *ntemi*, should be knowledgeable regarding divination and the use of medicine (ibid.: 4). Divination was important to *sungusungu* methods, both in locating wrongdoers and determining appropriate measures to be taken following their apprehension (ibid.: 3) and was sometimes employed in arbitration of local disputes (Abrahams 1987: 188). Medicine was needed to enhance the skills of *sungusungu* and to offer protection from the superior weapons of thieves (Hangaya 1989: 62; see also Jangu 2012: 186-327 on Mwanza Region).

Although the *sungusungu* committees were typically comprised of older male village residents (Bukurura 1994a: 21), all villagers were obliged to be present at the inauguration of *sungusungu* and to participate in associated rituals and song. Villagers were also required to participate by secretly providing names of neighbours they suspected of theft, and all able-bodied men could be called upon to participate in the recovery of stolen cattle, armed with bows and, often poisoned, arrows (Masanja 1992).<sup>25</sup> Residents contributed a small amount of money to a *sungusungu* fund, which was used to provide food and supplies for those sent to apprehend thieves, and was subsequently replenished through fines paid by offenders (Bukurura 1994a: 12).

*Sungusungu* groups appear initially to have been locally very popular and to have been perceived to have had a significant impact on rates of violent crime, having both a deterrent effect and some success in apprehending thieves and recovering large numbers of cattle (Abrahams 1987: 187). *Sungusungu* also played a role in dispute resolution within villages, sometimes trying cases in which the police had decided against prosecution or a court conviction had not been achieved due to shortage of evidence (Abrahams 1987: 188). Charges were not laid before the accused, rather the entire village population was expected to cooperate in ostracising the individual and their family until they were ready to confess their misdeeds to the *sungusungu* committee. The repentant offender was then asked to name a fine they deemed to be sufficient to atone for their wrongdoing, increasing their offer incrementally until the *sungusungu* demonstrated through clapping their hands that it was acceptable (ibid.: 189).

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<sup>25</sup> The *sungusungu* were largely used only 'traditional' weapons, despite facing cattle rustlers with guns (Abrahams & Bukurura 1992: 94).

Those accused who would not confess to an offence were subject to torture and punishment, which sometimes resulted in death (Abrahams & Bukurura 1992: 94). In the words of one former secretary of a *sungusungu* organisation operating in urban Mwanza:

They did their investigation with a stick....You would be beaten first, then you had to surrender. That's it.<sup>26</sup>

Respondents in Mwanza claimed that when a suspect was particularly recalcitrant, the 'Field Force Unit' of *sungusungu*,<sup>27</sup> named after the feared police unit of the same name, would be deployed. These members disguised themselves with sisal fibres and feathers in order to conceal their identity to avoid reprisals. The fear generated by *sungusungu*'s methods became clear during interviews conducted in Mwanza, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (5.4).

The formation of *sungusungu* may to some extent have constituted 'a vote of no confidence in the state's ability to provide security' (Abrahams 1987: 186). However, it is clear that conditions of insecurity are not a sufficient condition for the emergence of collective initiatives for self-protection. As discussed in the previous chapter, establishing forms of 'community' based policing poses considerable collective action problems. Abrahams (1987) thus situates *sungusungu*'s formation within a history of Sukuma and Nyamwezi collective action outside of state structures with which the organisation of *sungusungu* demonstrated considerable parallels, such as threshing teams and the *basumba batale*,<sup>28</sup> which have 'provided a continuing model and a source of practical experience for villagers who wish to organize their own affairs' (Abrahams 1987: 193-194).

In addition, vigilantism not only constitutes a reaction to state inability to provide security. Rather, localised policing also reflects cultural imperatives to protect or punish which may diverge from the dictates of state law (Pratten 2008: 3-4). In the case of *sungusungu*, localised gendered and generational cleavages were reflected in the organisation of *sungusungu* and its activities (Abrahams & Bukurura 1992: 99). Some

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<sup>26</sup> Interview WEO-C 16.8.11. The methods of data collection used are explained in the following chapter, and a more detailed account of the history of *sungusungu* in urban Mwanza, based on interviews, follows in Chapter 5.

<sup>27</sup> These members were also known collectively as the *nguku* (baboons).

<sup>28</sup> Literally translated as 'great youths' (Abrahams 1989: 360), the *basumba batale* were the leaders of male youth organisations (*elika*), which were drawn on by chiefs when collective labour or warriors were required. For these services the *basumba batale* negotiated a portion of the chief's tribute. The *elika* also served as a means of maintaining social order by enforcing behavioural codes for members (Liebenow 1956: 450).

early reflections on *sungusungu* presented a somewhat idealised picture of a ‘people’s organisation’ (Masanja 1992) or a peasant based movement of ‘popular resistance’ against an alien and oppressive state (Campbell 1989). However, it is clear that *sungusungu* did not always represent the village as a whole, but rather defined and punished ‘criminal’ activities in accordance with the morality of the most powerful within the community (Buur & Jensen 2008: 146), in this case senior male residents.

Whilst the initial objective of *sungusungu* appears to have been the recovery of stolen cattle, they were also known as *bashosha bakima*, or those who recover women, referring to the retrieval of women who had left their husbands or had eloped, thereby depriving their parents of bridewealth payments (Bukurura 1994a: 21-23). Some women appealed to the state for protection from *sungusungu* by lodging court cases alleging their forcible return to their spouses (Bisimba 2002: 87). *Sungusungu* also tried and punished suspected witches, usually older single women (Bukurura 1994b; Mesaki 2009). One former secretary of *sungusungu* explained that it was essential for the *ntemi* to be a man. He attributed this partly to what he termed the prevailing patriarchal system, but also as, ‘they knew that witches are women and if they had a female *ntemi* she would defend other women’.<sup>29</sup>

Some women were able to play a role in *sungusungu*, although it appears this was largely confined to the arrest and punishment of female suspects. Abrahams (1987: 184) observed that in some villages unmarried women took part in *sungusungu* and had their own *makamanda* (commanders). This was the case in all three case sites, as discussed further in Chapter 5 (5.4). Unusually, in Pansiansi Ward in Mwanza city, a woman attained the post of *ntemi*.

*Sungusungu* also reproduced typical male generational roles, which emphasised the importance of the wisdom of elders and their powers of divination, and the labour of the young (Bukurura 1994a: 25). *Sungusungu* may have been to some extent a means of dealing with inter-generational tensions through instituting organised community service for younger men (Abrahams 1989: 361-362).

### *State responses to sungusungu*

The initial response of police and the judiciary to *sungusungu* was extremely negative. Not only were the local organisations assuming powers that were legally reserved for

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<sup>29</sup> Interview WEO-C 16.8.11.

state agents, they frequently violated state law in terms of their methods of interrogation and punishment. Furthermore, it has been suggested that by assuming law and order functions *sungusungu* reduced the opportunities for other actors to solicit corrupt payments from victims and perpetrators of crime (Heald 2002: 7). There were occasional violent confrontations between police and *sungusungu*, which sometimes resulted in fatalities (Bukurura 1993). Many participants in *sungusungu* were prosecuted and spent time incarcerated (Abrahams & Bukurura 1994: 95). Popular mistrust in the police and their hostile reaction to local law enforcement meant that *sungusungu* largely 'regarded the police as their enemies' (Bukurura 1993: 131). *Sungusungu* reportedly sometimes arrested and punished policemen and magistrates who were suspected of colluding with thieves or engaging in corrupt activities (ibid.: 133). The judiciary were also largely opposed to *sungusungu* and in 1987 the High Court ruled *sungusungu* to be unconstitutional and illegal (Widner 2001: 377).

In contrast, the ruling party, and thus the administration, was quick to recognise the possible value of *sungusungu*. As early as 1982 President Nyerere praised *sungusungu*, describing them as a revolutionary movement deserving of support and stated that they should be equipped with weapons whilst urging the release of all those who had been arrested (Masanja 1992: 204). In 1982 he granted an amnesty to some of those convicted (Bukurura 1996: footnote 10), and subsequently continued to pardon *sungusungu* convicted in specific cases as well as issuing a general amnesty in 1989 (Mwaikusa 1995: 172-173). *Sungusungu* was consistent with the ideology of Tanzanian socialism and its emphasis on self-reliance (Abrahams 1987: 189-190), and with the TANU party guidelines adopted in 1971, which state that 'the basis of development of defence and security in Tanzania is in the Tanzanian themselves and in particular every patriotic Tanzanian. The country has no ability to employ a big force to manage defence and security affairs' (TANU 1971).

In 1983 the government went so far as to order the deployment of *sungusungu* from rural areas in the towns of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora (Campbell 1989: 46), in order to eradicate 'racketeers, loiterers and prostitutes' (quoted in Shaidi 1989: 258). In some cases the viability of *sungusungu* came to depend upon the support of the local administration to forestall threats of prosecution (Heald 2002: 9).

Contestation over *sungusungu* between different parts of the state apparatus is illustrated by a dispute that occurred in Rukwa Region in the mid-1980s, reported to Brockington (2001: 9-10). Suspected thieves convicted by *sungusungu* complained to the Regional and District Lawyers, police and the judiciary about the confiscation of their

cattle by *sungusungu*, who had been working in collaboration with local CCM branches. The FFU was dispatched to return cattle that had been seized and to arrest *sungusungu* leaders. In response, cattle owners formed a committee to enlist the support of retired President Nyerere, who remained chairman of CCM. Nyerere himself arbitrated between the party and *sungusungu*, and the organs of the state criminal justice system. He found in favour of *sungusungu* and ordered another FFU unit to ensure that cattle were again seized from suspected thieves.

In 1989, the People's Militia Act was amended to incorporate *sungusungu*, marking a formal recognition of their role in preventing crime, although the legal framework has remained relatively unclear. The Act bestows powers equivalent to those exercised by a police constable on any 'organised group operating with the authority and under the aegis of government...for the protection of the sovereignty of the United Republic or for the protection of the people or the property of the United Republic by whatever name known whether *Wasalama*, *Sungusungu*, or any other...' (People's Militia Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1989). Although the Act also gives the Home Secretary the authority to make regulations governing *sungusungu* activities, this has not been done.

*Sungusungu* was not only ideologically appealing to CCM. The utility of an additional local security provider was highly apparent at a time when the ratio of police and judicial officers to population were estimated as 1: 10,000 and 1: 17,000 respectively (Daily News 30<sup>th</sup> May 1989 and Nyalali 1990: 16, cited in Bukurura 1996: 263). Lange *et al.* (2000: 6) argue that the government's acceptance of *sungusungu* marked 'a new era' in government attitudes towards civil society more broadly: '...the government had come to realize that with the conditions of structural adjustment, the non-governmental sector would have to play a vital role in the delivery of services and a variety of organizations soon entered the space left open by the withdrawal of the state.' Thus, embracing *sungusungu* 'happily chimed with both necessity and ideology' (Heald 2002: 9).

### *State-sponsored sungusungu*

Following the amendment of the People's Militia Act in 1989 to incorporate *sungusungu*, the government began to promote the formation of local security organisations modelled on *sungusungu* around the country. These efforts formed part of a broader government anti-crime drive, spearheaded by then minister for home affairs, Augustine Mrema, which targeted a wide range of offences including public



corruption, foreign currency violations and tax avoidance as well as violent crime (Kakoti 1998: 58-59). Whilst the strategy appears to have had a considerable impact on crime rates, the new *sungusungu* did not always enjoy local popularity. Rather, 'organized by local administrations, demanding compulsory service from members of the community – most especially in the form of assistance with night patrols – it became another instrument of state coercion' (Heald 2006: 273).

In urban areas, participation in neighbourhood patrols was made mandatory for all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 60 (Kakoti 1998: 6). Although no statutory provision was made, a series of public announcements by Mrema made it clear that participation was not optional (Kakoti 1998: 59-60). Those evading patrol duties or refusing to pay a fine imposed by *sungusungu* were prosecuted and sometimes jailed (Kinemo 1993, cited in Kakoti 1998: 61). At the same time, residents were encouraged to contribute cash, materials or labour to build local police posts (Kakoti 1998: 57-58), and rewards were offered to incentivise citizens to share information with the police (Mallya 1994: 75).

Ten-cell leaders were central to the operation of the *sungusungu* system in urban areas. They provided information about residents eligible to participate, organised timetables for patrolling and were responsible for reporting shirkers to the police (Kakoti 1998: 61). Minister Mrema also attempted to introduce the compilation of lists of suspected local criminals, similar to that employed during *sungusungu* inaugurations outlined above. Residents of an area were encouraged to confidentially record the names of those they thought to be involved in crime, and those whose names were frequently mentioned were invited to police stations in order for their fingerprints to be recorded for use in future police investigations (Mallya 1994: 75).

Where *sungusungu* was already in existence, they became increasingly tied to the party and administration. Hangaya (1989: 37-38) reports that secretaries of *sungusungu* were asked to take the place of absent village secretaries and the rank and file *sungusungu* participants were deployed to collect the development levy. There are also reports of *sungusungu* being utilised to enforce participation in communal work initiatives and nation-building projects (Shivji 1990: 17), police public meetings (Heald 2002: 9-10) and pursue tax defaulters (Abrahams 1987: 91). *Sungusungu* representatives were included in District Security Committees, chaired by the District Commissioner (Grawert 2009: 397). In this context, *sungusungu* did not always remain a popular movement, and citizens sometimes experienced harassment and corruption similar to that associated with other branches of the state security apparatus (Shivji 1990: 99-101).

During 1991-92, at the peak of *sungusungu* operations around the country, a 60% reduction in crime rates was reported, and notably reported armed robbery declined by 72% (Safer Cities 2000: 4; see also Mwaikusa 1995: 166-167 on Dar es Salaam). However, the compulsory nature of participation made *sungusungu* highly unpopular in urban areas and night patrols proved unsustainable (Mwaikusa 1995: 171). Complaints were also reported in the largely government controlled media of harassment of civilians by *sungusungu* and false arrests. The risks involved in patrolling were also contentious (Kakoti 1998: 63). In some cases the principle that all should participate regardless of social position was eroded, as the relatively wealthy were able to avoid the inconvenience of patrolling by paying others to take their place (ibid.: 64). Ultimately, most of the groups established as a result of government orders were short-lived, due to difficulty in sustaining compliance or internal conflict between members (Mwaikusa 1995: 171).

The extent to which participation in *sungusungu* became compulsory and coercive was consistent with government promotion of 'self help' initiatives more broadly, which were typically implemented in a 'top down' manner, with citizens given little opportunity to shape development objectives (see 2.4), leading Mwaikusa (1995: 170) to describe the Minister for Home Affairs' insistence on mandatory participation as 'typically Tanzanian'. A parallel thus emerges between state-sponsored forms of *sungusungu* and the failure of other coercive state led development directives under *Ujamaa* (Heald 2002: 25). Abrahams & Bukurura (1994: 97), for example, note the contrast between the rapid spread of *sungusungu* among the Sukuma and Nyamwezi and limited popular support for and participation in the party-led People's Militia.

### *The decline of state-sponsored sungusungu*

Mrema was removed from the post of Minister of Home Affairs in 1994. Without his energetic leadership the practice of patrolling in urban areas, which had never been codified in law, declined rapidly and by 1996 *sungusungu* was no longer functioning in Dar es Salaam (Kakoti 1998: 65; Heald 2002: 8). Following the adoption of a multiparty system in 1992, the strong association of *sungusungu* with CCM became problematic in some areas and gave citizens an opportunity to refuse to participate in what could be seen as a ruling party scheme (Safer Cities 2000: iv). The brutality exercised by *sungusungu* also made them unpopular in many areas.<sup>30</sup> Criticism of *sungusungu*

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<sup>30</sup> Interview Professor Chris Peter Maina 23.3.11.

increased in areas where newly permitted opposition parties were gaining popularity (Grawert 2009: 320-321). The extent to which *sungusungu* was perceived to be associated with the ruling party in urban areas is illustrated by the difficulties faced in subsequent attempts to revive *sungusungu* in Dar es Salaam under a UN HABITAT sponsored scheme, discussed below. In areas with substantial support for opposition parties, coordinators were obliged to formulate alternative names for local security schemes as many refused to be associated with *sungusungu* (Safer Cities 2000: v). The decline of *sungusungu* in urban Mwanza is discussed further in the Chapter 5.

### *Sungusungu since 1995*

*Sungusungu* continued to operate in many areas, particularly in the Lake Zone and areas with high levels of Sukuma and Nyamwezi migration. Whilst permitted to decline elsewhere, *sungusungu* was promoted by the government amongst the Kuria resident in the north of the country near the Kenyan border, as a response to high rates of violent cattle raiding (Fleisher 2000a; Heald 2002, 2006). Here *sungusungu* became closely linked to existing locally authoritative institutions and has been credited with bringing about a considerable improvement in local security and providing a popular and legitimate form of policing (Heald 2006).

*Sungusungu* organisations have typically remained closely linked to local administrative structures, in some cases incorporated into village security committees and made subject to guidelines aimed at preventing their prosecution (Heald 2002: 8-9). Nkonya (2008: 132), for example, notes that *sungusungu* in Bariadi District, Shinyanga Region, were obliged to seek approval from the village government before ostracism could be implemented. Linkages to wider administrative structures have led *sungusungu* to assume rule enforcement roles across a range of sectors beyond criminal justice, including the management of natural resources such as water (Nkonya 2008), land (URT 2006a) and fisheries (Medard *et al.* 2002; Wilson 2002).

Some of the elements of *sungusungu* that were least palatable to the state criminal justice agencies have declined in importance over time. Divination and magic are no longer central to their strategies (Jangu 2012: 220-222), and witchcraft is typically no longer a key concern (Heald 2002: 8).

An additional change relates to the increasing commercialisation of *sungusungu* activities in some areas, which has become necessary as *sungusungu* workload has increased and activities have become more regular, to the extent that some *sungusungu*

groups ‘turned their operations into a business’, making money by imposing heavy fines or charging fees to their clients (Mwaikusa 1995: 175).

Although *sungusungu* no longer exercise the same systematic use of torture, there are reports of violent treatment of those accused of crime (e.g. Department of State 2011, 2012; LHRC 2007: 23). However, as will be discussed further below, *sungusungu* are not necessarily more likely to be guilty in this regard than the state police.

Politicians have continued to promote formation of *sungusungu* institutions to deal with high levels of crime in both urban and rural areas (e.g. Lawi 2003; David & Wantaigwa 2010) and have urged mobilisation of *sungusungu* in response to particular threats, including the killing of people with albinism in Mwanza Region (Muyomba 2009).<sup>31</sup> *Sungusungu* have also been incorporated into NGO programmes including raising awareness about gender-based violence (Highland *et al.* 2007) and community-based forest restoration (IUCN 2002).

The largest intervention seeking to mobilise citizens through a revival of *sungusungu* was led by the UN HABITAT supported Safer Cities Programme introduced in Dar es Salaam in 1997 (Safer Cities 2000). Aiming to design an intervention that was ‘in accordance with local traditions and the political context’ (Assiago n.d.: 6), Safer Cities sought to introduce ‘community policing’ based on *sungusungu* or ten-cell traditions within each *mtaa*. The new *sungusungu* conducted night patrols as earlier variants had, but in some cases also included an income-generating element designed to prevent vulnerable young people from engaging in crime, whereby unemployed young men were employed as guards through community contributions and encouraged to pursue other business opportunities (see Mtani 2007). The extent to which these groups were sustained before more recent police-led efforts to establish *ulinzi shirikishi* is difficult to establish and probably highly variable between sub-wards. As noted above, the refusal of opposition party supporters to adopt the name ‘*sungusungu*’ for their neighbourhood watch activities suggests the problems of attempting to present *sungusungu* as a ‘tradition’ around which consensus might be found. Particularly in urban areas, state-sponsored *sungusungu* was closely associated with the ruling party and participation was sustained through coercion.

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<sup>31</sup> People with albinism are vulnerable to attack due to beliefs that their body parts can bring good fortune (see for example Bryceson *et al.* 2010).

### 3.2.4 Urban undesirables from the colonial period to the present

Throughout the colonial and post-independence periods, policing of urban areas of Tanzania has reflected the preoccupation of successive administrations with the 'problem' of the urban unemployed. This merits discussion here due to the extent to which similar concerns over the occupation of urban space by 'idle youth' shape CP practices in contemporary Mwanza, and generate alliances between police and those (typically senior) residents who occupy leadership positions in local government institutions.

Dar es Salaam experienced rapid population growth from the late 1930s onwards, for which neither the urban infrastructure nor economy were well equipped. By the late 1940s, a growing number of 'intermittently employed Africans, many of them young' (Burton 2005: 113) were thought to bear significant responsibility for the increasing rates of crime. In Dar es Salaam as elsewhere, crime in urban areas was also linked to 'detrribalisation' in the colonial imagination, whereby recent migrants were liable to be led astray in the absence of village mechanisms of social control (Lewis 2000: 78; Burton 2005: 19-21; Fourchard 2011: 525-528). The relative freedom and opportunity enjoyed by young people in an urban environment caused anxiety to the colonial administration and senior African urban residents (Burton 2001).

In the early 1940s the municipal police began extensive 'repatriation' campaigns, targeting *wahuni* (hooligans),<sup>32</sup> or all 'unemployed, underemployed, and nefariously employed Africans' (Burton 2005: 4). By the 1950s such operations were regularly initiated by police in Dar es Salaam in cooperation with African local government officials (Burton 2005: ch. 12). The removal and repatriation of 'spivs' and other 'undesirables' from Mwanza town is noted in the annual reports of Provincial Commissioners from the mid-1950s, and in 1959, for example, 343 people were expelled to rural areas (Tanganyika Police Force 1959).

Colonial laws intended to deal with such undesirables have been retained (see Burton 2005: 276) and periodic expulsions of modern day *wahuni* continued into the post-colonial period. Young unmarried women in urban areas have also been a source of considerable official anxiety, often accused of engaging in prostitution (Brennan 2006: 404). Since the late 1960s the government has periodically 'repatriated' unemployed urban residents to rural areas. As in the past, however, those expelled from cities have usually returned rapidly (Shaidi 1984: 84; Tripp 1997: 140-144; Tungaraza 1998: 307).

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<sup>32</sup> For an extended discussion of the term *wahuni* see Burton (2005: 4-6).

Although since the 1980s mass removal of sectors of the urban population has ceased and the government has developed greater tolerance for informal economic activities, the un- and under-employed, and particularly young people, remain subject to harassment by police and urban administrations (Burton 2005: 276).

The most recent International Labour Organization survey in Tanzania (2006) found youth unemployment to be at 24.4% in urban areas of mainland Tanzania (cited in International Labour Office 2010: 2). Former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa has described the problem of unemployment amongst young people in Tanzania as a 'time bomb' (Tanzania Daily News 2012a). In urban areas around Tanzania groups of unemployed young men are very visible in public spaces as they gather at their *vijiwe*.<sup>33</sup> The assumption that it is these young men who will be tempted by criminal activities is common, including for example within Dar es Salaam's UN HABITAT sponsored 'Safer Cities' initiative which promoted the formation of *sungusungu* groups in the city from 2000. These groups were intended to perform preventative patrols, but also constituted an attempt to provide unemployed young people with some income to forestall criminality (Mtani 2007: 76).

Young people living on the streets are particularly vulnerable to victimisation by police who associate their life circumstances with criminality, including occasional forced removal from urban areas (Anderson & Stavrou 2000: 48; Kamala *et al.* 2001; Lugalla & Kibassa 2003; interview Kuleana Centre for Children's Rights 3.11.10; Buske 2011). Petty traders and young men who 'loiter' in public spaces are also frequently harassed by police and municipal Auxiliary Police (e.g. Tripp 1997: 150; Klipin 2003, cited in Van der Spuy & Röntsch 2008: 65; Burton 2005: 279; Carabain 2008; Lumanyika 2010 on Mwanza).

### 3.3 Policing democratisation and democratising policing

In 1992 the Tanzanian constitution was altered to permit multiple political parties and a general election was held in 1995. CCM retained the presidency and a parliamentary majority on the mainland as it has done in subsequent elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010. Since the reinstatement of multiparty competition it has been made illegal for police officers to join a political party. However, there have been few other changes in the legal and regulatory structure of the police force, rather 'the legal regime and the underlying conceptual basis, principles and practices of the police have remained

<sup>33</sup> *Vijiwe* literally means 'small stones' but can be translated as 'jobless corner' (e.g. Mtani 2007: 76; Reuster-Jahn & Kießling 2006: 7). See Reuster-Jahn & Kießling (2006: 7) for further discussion of the term.

virtually intact' (Shivji 2001: 8-9). Popular opinion has remained largely negative, informed by frequent reports of police brutality, experiences of corruption and the partisan policing of protest and elections. As has been the case since the colonial period, the ability of the police to respond to crime is limited by the very low police to population ratio and the lack of available financial resources to improve infrastructure or the morale and wellbeing of officers. The extent to which the police were 'left behind' by political liberalisation<sup>34</sup> and the obvious appeal of an apparently low cost means of augmenting police capacity, in combination with a surge in violent crime, led to the adoption of CP in 2006.

In the absence of reliable and comparable statistics, it is difficult to place crime levels in Tanzania in comparative perspective, however the results of the fourth round of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2008, suggest that fear of crime in Tanzania is close to the average for sub-Saharan Africa, but considerably lower than in neighbouring Kenya. 37% of Tanzanians reported having felt fear of crime in their own home over the past year (Afrobarometer 2009), compared to 39.8% of all respondents in the countries included in the survey,<sup>35</sup> and 60%, of Kenyans (cited in Andvig & Barasa 2011: 27). 27.2% of Tanzanians claimed they had been burgled during the past year. This was a somewhat lower proportion than in Kenya (33%) and Uganda (46%) (Afrobarometer 2008a, 2008b). However, in 2012, 43% of those surveyed in Tanzania claimed that they or a member of their family had been physically attacked during 2010, representing an astonishing increase from 6% in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2012a). This was also a much higher proportion than gave this response in neighbouring Kenya (12%), Malawi (9%) and Uganda (12%) (Afrobarometer 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). The percentage of Tanzanians who had been burgled during the past year also increased to 35% (Afrobarometer 2012a).

### **3.3.1 Partisan policing in a multi-party system**

The police have the potential to significantly affect political life:

...by determining who can participate in politics by their discretion over arrest and detention. They may be given explicit authority to check and/or restrain political activities, and they

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<sup>34</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

<sup>35</sup> These were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

certainly regulate public conduct in the form of meetings, parades, and demonstrations.

(Hills 1996: 273)

In Tanzania, despite the introduction of a multiparty system, the police have largely continued to act as an instrument for the preservation of government interests. This forms part of the rationale for ongoing reforms.<sup>36</sup> However, key aspects of the legal framework governing the police that are conducive to politicised policing are yet to be altered.

Although as noted above, it is now illegal for police officers to join a political party, the IGP is a presidential appointee who has no fixed term (CHRI 2006: 22). The president also appoints Regional and District Commissioners who chair security committees within their jurisdiction and have the power to order arrest and detention.

Existing legislation gives police considerable discretion to interfere with political activity. The rules relating to public gatherings are extremely complicated and opposition parties are frequently accused of minor infringements (Hoffman & Robinson 2006: 132). Opposition party members commonly complain of the selective enforcement of campaign regulations in both national and local elections (Ewald 2011: 237-242). Opposition presidential candidates have frequently been arrested in the periods preceding elections, although only one case against a candidate has ever been brought to trial (Hoffman & Robinson 2006: 134). During the campaigns prior to the 2010 general election and subsequent by-elections, several parliamentary candidates standing for the Chama Cha Demokrasi na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)<sup>37</sup> were arrested and subsequently released (Kaijage 2011). Election monitors have reported police partisanship favouring the ruling party during every general election since the return to multiparty competition in 1995 (EU 2010: 23, 28; Makulilo 2011: 251). Criticism of the role played by police during elections has been particularly strong in Zanzibar, which has historically been an opposition stronghold. Police were strongly implicated in election related violence in 2000 (FIDH & LHRC 2001; CHRI 2006: note 61) and clashed again with civilians in 2005 (UNPO 2005).

Since the 2010 election accusations of police partiality have been levelled by CHADEMA's leadership due to the way in which opposition party demonstrations

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<sup>36</sup> Interviews: ACP K 25.3.11; SACPLK 18.10.11.

<sup>37</sup> CHADEMA became the largest opposition party on the mainland following the 2010 general elections.



and gatherings have been policed (Machira 2011; Mkinga 2012). Planned demonstrations have frequently been prohibited at short notice and police response to subsequent protests has resulted in fatalities in Morogoro (Citizen correspondents 2012), Iringa (Sanga 2012) and Arusha, where three people died during a CHADEMA protest after permission for a rally had been granted and then revoked (LHRC 2012: 18). Police were also accused by two newly elected Mwanza Region members of parliament (MPs) of having colluded in an attack in which the MPs were seriously injured and of failing to offer protection from the attackers (Domasa 2012). The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)<sup>38</sup> (2012: 26) annual report for 2011 thus argues that:

The situation on the ground shows that the police force in Tanzania is not free from political control. It is the view of the LHRC that the Tanzania Police Force must have a greater autonomy from political control for it to be accountable and responsible to the people it serves. However, this cannot be achieved if the force keeps on receiving orders from political quarters. The police force does not seem to be independent because it lacks not only the facilities but also the resources. This makes it vulnerable and dependent to (sic) external forces.

### **3.3.2 Police corruption**

The police are consistently ranked Tanzania's most corrupt public institution in national surveys (e.g. LHRC 2012: 204; 206-207; TI-Kenya 2012). 92% of respondents to the Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2012 claimed that some or all police officers were corrupt (Afrobarometer 2012a). The traffic police are typically viewed as particularly problematic (URT 2009a).

Common complaints affect both those reporting crime and those apprehended. Payment may be demanded before a reported case is dealt with and it is widely suspected that apprehended suspects are able to secure their release from custody by paying officers (e.g. URT 2003: 88-89). The ability to extract rent from policing generates incentives that determine which 'crimes' the police focus their efforts upon. Fleisher (2000a: 221), for example, reports that in Tarime District in Mara Region, 'the real bread and butter of police work consists of arresting people involved in bar fights,

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<sup>38</sup> The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) is an independent body based in Dar es Salaam that conducts research, advocacy and civic education around human rights and produces an annual human rights report.

or caught cultivating *bangi* ('bhang'), or distilling *gongo* [illicit locally brewed spirit]... minor infractions commonly referred to by local people as 'mistakes' – and extorting bribes from them to let them go.' In addition, citizens may be arrested on false pretences in the hope that they will pay police for their release (CHRI 2006: 16). Police are also widely suspected of colluding with thieves (e.g. Fleisher 2000b).

Lack of confidence in the police is compounded by perceptions of corruption within the judiciary, which also ranks highly in surveys of citizens' experiences of corruption (e.g. URT 2009b: 29; TI-Kenya 2012).

All of the complaints noted above were also widely repeated in the three case sites, as discussed in Chapter 6. Whilst it is possible that some perceptions of corruption are a result of misunderstandings of evidence requirements and bail laws, popular expectations of police malpractice are important in shaping the strategies pursued by victims of crime and their willingness to cooperate with police as required by new CP strategies.

### **3.3.3 Police brutality and extra-judicial killings**

The poor record of the Tanzanian police in treatment of suspects is well documented in human rights reports and the UN recently named the TPF the tenth worst offender globally with regard to police killings of civilians (LHRC 2013: 20). The LHRC reports that 246 citizens were killed by the security forces between 2003 and 2012 (ibid.). This included 25 deaths in 2011, the year in which the majority of this research was conducted (ibid.: 21). In addition to the fatalities caused by police response to party political protests noted above, conflict over natural resource extraction has led to casualties. In 2011, for example, five people were shot and killed at African Barrick Gold's (ABG) North Mara mine reportedly after police who had been colluding with thieves turned on their co-conspirators when senior officers arrived (LHRC 2012: 20-21). The police were subsequently accused of attempting to cover up the incident by stealing the bodies of those killed from the mortuary (ibid.: 27).

Police are often quick to resort to use of weapons and it is rare for alleged perpetrators of armed robberies to be apprehended or to appear in court as police are likely to shoot suspects on sight (CHRI 2006: 17). It is revealing that following the establishment of the Ministry of Safety and Security in 2006, discussed below, one of the new minister's first steps was to introduce a 'shoot to kill' policy for police, which resulted in five deaths in

its first week of operation (BBC 2006), reflecting the Prime Minister's 2003 promise that in order to combat 'gangsters', 'wherever possible, excessive force will be used' (Lawi 2003). Human rights organisations and the media have also documented many cases of police brutality towards those arrested and the use of torture to extract confessions (CHRI 2006: 15).

Perceived impunity for police killings led the LHRC to refer Tanzania to the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings in October 2012, following reported attempts by the Minister for Home Affairs to support a police cover up of events leading to the death of a journalist during a CHADEMA protest in September 2012 (Athumani 2012).

### **3.3.4 Shortages of funding and personnel**

The police to population ratio in Tanzania is extremely low, being one officer per 1156 citizens at the beginning of 2013, compared to the UN recommended 1:450 (Kaijage 2013).<sup>39</sup> Although, the current figure of 38,847 officers (ibid.) represents a considerable increase from 29,057 officers in 2008 (TPF 2008a), it remains difficult to attract potential recruits as rates of pay are low and the hours worked make it difficult for police to supplement their income through other activities, as is the norm for other public servants (ibid.: 36). The 2009 police annual report (TPF 2009: 26) acknowledges the challenge posed by an: 'Unmotivated workforce resulting in poor morale since TPF personnel are unable to meet professional and family commitments due to poor remuneration and poor conditions of service.' Furthermore, those who live in police barracks face appalling conditions, many living in 'dilapidated or almost condemned houses' (TPF 2008a: 37). It was only in 2010 that a scheme for compensation of police officers injured or killed in the course of duty was introduced (TPF 2010a: 12).

Limited mobility due to a lack of funds to buy vehicles or fuel for vehicles makes it difficult for police to respond to incidents in a timely fashion and restricts the geographical coverage of the police force. According to a 2004 survey of experience of victimisation in Tanzania, for example, one third of rural respondents had never seen a uniformed police officer in their local area (Stavrou & O'Riordan 2005: vii). It is not

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<sup>39</sup> North American and Western European countries typically have more than three officers per thousand citizens (Baker 2006: 56). According to estimates based on information provided by national police forces to Bruce Baker for the year 2007, the Tanzanian ratio (1 officer for every 1370 citizens) was considerably lower than the West African countries of Liberia (1: 857), Nigeria (1: 722) and Sierra Leone (1: 612). However, Tanzania compared relatively favourably with the neighbouring countries of Rwanda (1: 1380) and Uganda (1: 1880).

only in areas far from regional capitals in which the police might be seen as largely absent, however, as sprawling cities with often inaccessible and poorly lit informal settlements also pose considerable problems for the police (The Citizen 2010).

The wealthy are increasingly choosing to meet their security requirements by hiring one of the many commercial firms that have emerged since the liberalisation of the security industry in the 1980s. In 2010 it was estimated that over 495 private security companies were operating in the country (Shadrack 2011: 6) and during that year alone 176 new companies were registered with the police, mainly in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza (TPF 2010a: 45). In 2012, the Secretary General of the Tanzania Security Industry Association claimed that there were over two million people employed by commercial security providers (Wa Simbeye 2012). The private security sector lacks a comprehensive legal framework (ibid.), however conditions for registration specify that the director of the company must demonstrate experience in the security sector, typically as a police officer or soldier. This makes establishing a security firm a lucrative retirement option for former police and army officers. Three former IGPs, for example, are now managing large commercial security providers (Shadrack 2011: 36). For the vast majority, employing a security guard is not financially feasible, and so instead CP is envisaged as a means to compensate for police absence from poor residential areas.

### **3.4 Community policing (*polisi jamii/ulinzi shirikishi*)**

The only solution to prevent crimes is for everyone to engage in the initiative of community policing because security is not solely the role for the police.<sup>40</sup>

Community policing was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006 following the appointment of a new Inspector General of Police, Said Mwema, who had previously headed INTERPOL's eastern Africa regional bureau. CP forms one part of an ambitious ten year police reform programme, the aims of which include: reform of the legal and regulatory framework governing the police; improvement to infrastructure including police accommodation; increased capacity to use ICT within the force; better

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<sup>40</sup> S. Kova, Police Commander Dar es Salaam special policing zone, quoted in Kazoka (2011a).

human resource management and ‘involving the community in policing’ (*ushirikishaji jamii katika ulinzi na usalama*) (TPF 2010b).

The reforms were initiated in the context of increasing rates of violent crime, particularly in urban areas, over the preceding decade of economic and political liberalisation (Myers 2005: 63; TPF 2010b: 11-12). In January 2006 it had been decided to remove the police from the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Home Affairs and to establish a Ministry for Safety and Security (*Wazira wa Usalama wa Raia*), responsible solely for the police. By 2008, however, the police were returned to the Ministry for Home Affairs and the police annual report for this year claimed that ‘The crime waves involving bank robberies, armed robberies, car jacking which was (sic) rampant in (sic) few years ago has (sic) been relatively curbed’ (TPF 2008a: 40).

Tanzania is unusual in the region for the extent to which the reform, including its CP elements, has been internally driven (contra Brogden 2004; Saferworld 2008 on CP in Kenya; Hinton & Newburn 2009a). The reform is largely ‘home grown’,<sup>41</sup> being the product of an extensive consultative process within the country, involving police officers, the prison service and other organisations such as religious groups, regarding opinions on the current performance of the police and challenges they faced (S. Haji, in Scher 2009b). Although the design process did entail consideration of experience in other countries, the resulting reform template is deemed to be ‘very indigenously Tanzanian’ (ibid.).

There is no legislation specific to CP, however legal justification for the role of local government in establishing local security initiatives is derived from the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982, which established local authorities. The act mandates local government authorities to ‘maintain and facilitate the maintenance of peace, order and good government’ and to take all actions necessary ‘for the suppression of crime, the maintenance of peace and good order and the protection of public and private property lawfully acquired’ (cited in TPF 2007a: 22-23). At the local level, community crime prevention activities may be covered by by-laws.

CP has three interrelated official objectives: ‘increased capacity of the community to deal with local crimes; improved police-community relationships; and increased capacity in preventing and solving crime as the planned outcomes of the interventions’ (TPF 2009: 66). Recognising the limited capacity of the poorly resourced police to deal

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<sup>41</sup> Interview SACP LK 18.10.11.

with crime and the importance of access to local knowledge, through CP the police have sought to 'sensitise' the public as to their responsibilities with regard to local crime prevention and to move towards 'sharing responsibility for policing between the police and the public' (TPF 2010b: 2).

The policies adopted to implement CP in Tanzania are outlined in the following section, with a focus on the promotion of voluntary local policing institutions referred to as *ulinzi shirikishi*.

### **3.4.1 Improving the public image of the police and gathering intelligence**

Recognising the lack of public confidence in the police, attempts have been made to improve the public image of the police and to enhance communication between police officers and citizens in order to improve intelligence gathering for crime prevention and detection.

Educational programmes devoted to explaining *polisi jamii* and the work of the police more broadly have been produced for radio and television and further outreach has been conducted at public events such as football tournaments organised by police in urban areas. In an attempt to make it easier for the public to report crimes, the mobile telephone numbers of senior police, including the IGP and all Regional Police Commissioners (RPCs), have been released to the public. It is hoped that by enabling the public to contact senior officers directly it will be possible to overcome popular fears that local police do not keep statements confidential, leaving witnesses vulnerable to reprisals. Incidents can also be reported anonymously by SMS using an emergency number or regional cell phone numbers. The phone numbers of senior regional and district police officers are now prominently displayed at all local police stations to enable citizens to make a complaint in case of corruption or poor service.

Under the *Ushalama Wetu Kwanza* (Our Safety First) initiative, police have made visits to primary schools to educate pupils regarding possible threats to their safety and the work of the police, in the hope of making children more responsible for their own safety and reducing their fear of the police (Bugaywa 2010). In addition the programme also appears to be aimed at improving pupil behaviour, for example reducing absenteeism, and increasing the likelihood that they will be law abiding in the future (TPF 2010a).<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

Attempts have been made to strengthen the relationships between police officers and the communities in which they work by allocating a police officer to each ward. By 2010 all 3676 wards in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar had been assigned a *polisi kata* (ward police officer), although it is envisaged that each ward will have two officers in the future (TPF 2010a: 39). This system is expected to increase the responsiveness of the force as officers will be able to respond to problems in a more timely fashion as well as giving citizens more say in policing practice. In addition the *polisi kata* is assumed to be less likely to solicit bribes from those among whom they must work every day (Mwapachu 2007). It is also hoped that ward officers will be able to use greater discretion and diplomacy in dealing with the public (URT n.d.: 48-49).

### 3.4.2 Co-producing security

CP as understood in Tanzania places considerable emphasis on the sharing of responsibilities between the public and the police. In light of budgetary constraints, sharing the responsibility for crime prevention with citizens through CP presented itself as an almost unavoidable strategy (L. Kusima in Scher 2009a). As outlined on website of the Ministry of Home Affairs:

To deliver the service the public deserves, TPF needs to enlist the cooperation and participation of the communities it serves and other stakeholders. This is critical especially in a situation where TPF is experiencing shortages in terms of human resources and infrastructure.<sup>43</sup>

A former Commissioner of Police Operations has described CP as a means of mitigating the shortage of police officers by ‘tapping on available resources i.e. the citizens’ (Tibasana 2002). To this end, police have called for material support from businesses and communities, as well as instituting local policing initiatives which enable the police to shed some of the ‘unnecessary load’ they had been bearing.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> <http://www.moha.go.tz/index.php/police-force/community-policing> (Accessed 11 February 2013).

<sup>44</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

### *Co-producing security with the private sector*

Police annual reports frequently evoke the importance of ‘partnership’ between the police and the private sector. This typically refers largely to donations received by the police from businesses, which are often cited as evidence of CP’s success (see 3.4.3).

Particularly strong relationships have been formed between the police and large mining companies including ABG and Geita Gold Mining, both of which have signed a memorandum of understanding with police outlining their commitment to supporting CP. The ABG North Mara mine, for example, which was the scene of shootings of civilians by police and mine security guards discussed above, has enthusiastically embraced CP by reorganising, training and employing local *sungusungu* to guard the perimeter of the mine, establishing close relationships between their head of security and village leadership and constructing police posts near the mine.<sup>45</sup> Using ‘traditional’ security groups enables a considerable reduction in the mine’s security costs. ABG have also funded the production of educational materials on CP for villagers living near the mine and provided human rights training to police officers stationed there.<sup>46</sup>

It is not only private companies that are called upon to support the poorly resourced police. The Ministry of Home Affairs has, for example, praised the construction of police stations by volunteers and called for more police stations to be built through local self help (The Guardian 2011). Other ways in which citizens might assist the police are illustrated by this account of CP given by Dr S. Haji, an academic involved in the design of the police reform programme:

I am the *mtaa* [sub-ward] chairman.... Now the police come to me if they don’t have any petrol. I direct them to somebody who will be able to help them or to find them a four-wheel drive to borrow for the weekend. This boosts the morale of the police. Or if the police have other problems they come and tell me, for example if they can’t pay school fees that month.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Interview member of ABG security management team 13.1.11; see also Tanzania Daily News 2012b on ABG in Kahama.

<sup>46</sup> Interviews: ACP K 11.10.11; member of ABG security management team 13.1.11.

<sup>47</sup> Interview Semboja Haji 7.10.11.



*Co-producing security with the 'community': ulinzi shirikishi*

CP is seen partly as an attempt to 'decentralise police powers and authority down to the people'.<sup>48</sup> This is largely manifested through the promotion of local security groups (*vikundi vya ulinzi*) organised by local government authorities. The emphasis placed on such local policing initiatives has led Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008: 65) to suggest that in Tanzania 'the concept [of CP] seems to have been misunderstood, the popular understanding being yet another alternative community police force'.

Police have held seminars for elected and appointed leaders of *mitaa*, villages and wards<sup>49</sup> in order to explain the concept of *ulinzi shirikishi* and how to go about establishing a local security group.<sup>50</sup> They are instructed to organise public meetings at which a security committee (*kamati ya ulinzi*) is to be selected and a strategy for organising night patrols should be decided. It is anticipated that *vijana* (young men) within each *mtaa* or village should take responsibility for patrolling, whilst other residents undertake to provide goods or money to ensure the guards have the necessary equipment (such as batons, whistles, mobile telephones) for patrolling and may receive some *posho* (subsistence allowance) (TPF 2008b).

The security groups are incorporated into the existing hierarchical organisation of the *mtaa* (or village in rural areas), whereby the young security guards are overseen by the security committee, which like the other committees comprising the governance of the *mtaa*, such as those for health and sanitation, is subordinate to the *mtaa* chairperson. The chairperson in turn reports to the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) (TPF 2008b).

According to guidance on establishing *ulinzi shirikishi* provided by the TPF, the duties of local security groups include: preventing crime and offering timely assistance to the community when required; educating the community about strategies of preventing crime and bringing about 'development' (*maendeleo*) in the area; providing a first response in times of trouble or natural disaster such as fire or floods; the prompt delivery of statements to the police regarding any suspicious behaviour; and ensuring

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<sup>48</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

<sup>49</sup> The structure of the Tanzanian local government system is outlined in the following chapter. The *mtaa* (plural *mitaa*), or sub-ward, is the lowest level of local government in urban areas.

<sup>50</sup> At the time of the research this element of the reform was being piloted in selected regions due to the particular security threats affecting these areas. These were: Dar es Salaam (high crime rates), Mwanza (prevalence of killings over witchcraft accusations), Mbeya (prevalence of killings over witchcraft accusations) and Kilimanjaro Regions (a border region), as well as areas of Mara Region (conflict near mining sites) (interview ACP K 11.10.11).

that they rid the area of any person(s) carrying out criminal activity (TPF 2008b: 15). Guidelines provide little information about how the young security guards are to go about performing these functions and considerable variation is apparent between administrative areas. Typically, however, a night patrol to prevent crime forms the core activity.

In addition to reducing crime, community collaboration is expected to have positive outcomes in itself:

Ulinzi shirikishi helps to increase levels of trust between people and to build relationships based on good communication in order to recognise and address various problems endangering the community, and that erode people's enthusiasm to work for their own economic, community and cultural development.<sup>51</sup>

TPF (2008b: 20)

Leaders are requested to report their plans to form a security group to the local police station and in December 2010 there were reportedly 2634 registered local security groups (Geofray 2011), an increase from 2174 in 2009 (TPF 2009: 4). As *ulinzi shirikishi* is intended to be a strategy that is led by residents, the role of the police is to offer advice, expertise and education about security to the groups and the rest of the community (TPF 2008b: 9). Thus, annual reports note numbers of people 'sensitised' regarding CP, of which for example there were apparently 11,487,151 in 2009 (TPF 2009: 4).

Although in official policy it is made clear that CP today is not the same as *sungusungu* (e.g. TPF 2007b) there are considerable similarities in terms of how both local initiatives are organised. For example the involvement of all local young men in patrolling on a shift basis, the use of whistles for communication, collection of contributions from other community members to provide equipment and *posho* and the division of labour envisaged between elders, who assume leadership roles, and the young who provide their physical labour, all draw strongly on the *sungusungu* model. In some cases it has been decided to adopt the terminology of *sungusungu*. It is also recognised by reform leaders that the association of CP with *sungusungu* is potentially useful. *Sungusungu* offered a 'loophole', which made it easier to encourage citizen participation as pre-existing structures could be revived, albeit with additional concern for education

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<sup>51</sup> This is the author's translation of the original Kiswahili text, which reads: *Ulinzi shirikishi unasaidia kuinua kiwango cha kuaminiana baina ya mtu na mtu, na kujenga mahusiano yanayolenga kwenye mawasiliano sahihi katika kutambua na kutatua kero mbalimbali zinazohatarisha jamii na kuzorotesha juhudi za kujiletea maendeleo ya kiuchumi, kijamii na kiutamaduni.*

regarding human rights.<sup>52</sup> Those responsible for managing the police reform describe *sungusungu* as the genesis of contemporary CP, which reflects ‘our tradition’, and the political culture of Tanzania.<sup>53</sup> These mixed understandings of CP as something that is both ‘traditional’ and familiar whilst also having the ‘modern’ accoutrements of respect for human rights and the law are also apparent in the three case sites, discussed further in Chapter 7.

### 3.4.3 Police evaluation of CP

Senior police responsible for the police reform programme highlight CP as being a particularly successful element of the reform to date, perhaps reflecting the comparative resources and time required to achieve reform objectives relating to infrastructure or recruitment. Collaboration with the ‘community’ and other actors is credited with having contributed to improved capacity to solve crimes and higher reporting rates amongst the public as well as popular willingness to contribute labour or donations to the police.<sup>54</sup> Similar positive assessments are made in police annual reports and other publications (e.g. TPF 2008a: 55, 2009: 82). The claims made for the impact of CP strategies and the rationale for positive assessments of CP are illustrated by this extract from the mid-term strategy paper for the police reform:

Interventions undertaken to improve the relationship between the Police Force and the community are also starting to bear some fruits. The public is now more willing to work with the police in fighting crime than was the case before as evidenced by the willingness of the members of the public to report crime and provide material support.

(TPF 2010b: 5)

These general claims were reiterated with regard to Mwanza region specifically by the RPC at the time reforms were introduced, who expressed his gratitude for the concept. He described CP as a ‘very big success’, as the crime rate had reduced somewhat, police were receiving more information from the public, neighbourhood watches were in place and a Mwanza Business Fund Against Crime had been established to make

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<sup>52</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

<sup>53</sup> Interview SACP LK & ASP IM 18.10.11.

<sup>54</sup> Interviews: ACP K 25.3.11 and 11.10.11; Dr Semboja Haji 7.10.11; Scher 2009a (transcript of interview with SACP L. Kusima).

contributions to the police, and the fund had already provided most of the motorcycles being used by the force.<sup>55</sup>

However, it is recognised that attempts to bring about the 'cultural reorientation' (IGP Mwema in TPF 2008a: 3) that sharing responsibility for policing between police and public requires have been hindered by a lack of clarity around the concept of CP. As was noted in the previous chapter, the concept of CP is itself highly malleable and difficult to define. Misunderstanding of the concept of CP has sometimes reduced the willingness of police to engage with reforms (TPF 2009: 82; TPF 2010c: 55). In particular, older police officers were described as being reluctant to change their methods and liable to view CP as an unwelcome abrogation of their powers.<sup>56</sup> With regard to the public, insufficient understanding of CP could lead to reluctance to participate as: 'the people ... think why should we work when these officers are paid and we pay taxes'.<sup>57</sup>

The legal framework for CP rests on general responsibilities vested in local government, rather than regulation that clearly establishes the rights or responsibilities of members of the public who participate in CP. The resulting variation between localities in terms of how CP is practised and the ad hoc nature of partnerships between police and local security groups, which affects their sustainability, are explored further in Chapter 7.

Unsurprisingly, the evaluations made by senior police are largely made from a police perspective and address the extent to which the work of the police has been facilitated by CP, for example through donations received or a greater rate of reporting of crime. They do not consider the extent to which CP constitutes a service which is more responsive to popular desires, or which parts of 'communities' might particularly benefit from or be negatively affected by CP. A more sober assessment by the independent LHRC notes that despite notable achievements through CP and a considerable effort being made to improve the image of the police through media outreach, 'community trust in police is still very weak' (LHRC 2012: 196).

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<sup>55</sup> Interview RPC Mwanza 30.6.11.

<sup>56</sup> Interviews: ACP K 25.3.11; SACP LK 18.10.11.

<sup>57</sup> Interview SACP LK 18.10.11.

### 3.5 Conclusion

The final section of this chapter outlined the official narrative of CP in Tanzania, which echoes the optimistic claims made for other forms of participatory development discussed in the previous chapter. CP is expected to make policing more responsive to popular demands, more effective in preventing and detecting crime and to be a cost effective means of improving the service provided by capitalising upon the capacity of 'communities'. The mobilisation of citizens for local security provision is not a new strategy in Tanzania. Financial constraints and ideological orientation, as well as political imperatives, have led successive regimes to authorise policing under various auspices to supplement the state police. Of most relevance to the contemporary reform programme, government attempts to promote participation in *sungusungu* in the past are presented as part of a historical narrative of CP and there are many similarities with organisational forms taken by *ulinzi shirikishi*. Whilst *sungusungu* had a significant effect on crime rates, the initiatives proved difficult to sustain when promoted by government. *Sungusungu*, like other local development initiatives, both reflected local power relations and became a means through which these could be sustained or contested. Furthermore, the extent to which *sungusungu* was associated with national and local party political competition contributed to its decline once the one party state was legally ended. Although CP in contemporary Mwanza should not be understood as a reversion to 'traditional' forms of self policing, the notable similarities between experiences of state-sponsored *sungusungu* and *ulinzi shirikishi* are explored in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 5 provides a more detailed account of the organisation of policing in Mwanza city, and introduces the three case sites and their CP practices.

## Chapter 4: Research Design and Methods of Data Collection

The objective of this research was to explore the extent to which end-users of CP arrangements considered CP to have improved their security and the policing of their neighbourhoods. The literature review in Chapter 2 identified several additional sub-questions likely to affect these outcomes: the ability of CP institutions to facilitate sustainable collective action; how the costs and benefits of participating in CP were distributed across communities; and for which sections of communities CP improved security and from what. As CP entails co-producing security with the police, the research also addressed how local level policing arrangements were affected by partnership with the police.

A qualitative case study approach was adopted, although a small semi-structured survey was also carried out. The city of Mwanza was selected for the study, and research was carried out there and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's commercial and *de facto* administrative capital, between October 2010 and December 2011. A total of 11 months was spent conducting research in Tanzania.

Very little information was available about the nature or extent of CP activities in Mwanza, or elsewhere in Tanzania, prior to commencing the research. Other than police publications, which outline the official model for local policing activities promoted as part of CP and its benefits from a police perspective, and occasional newspaper reports referring to specific cases, there has been little other analysis of CP outside of Dar es Salaam.<sup>58</sup> Typically existing evaluation has emphasised the positive impact of CP on crime prevention and rates of reporting crime, but has not explored the extent to which CP constitutes a form of policing desired by citizens, or the extent to which the impact of CP might vary within and between 'communities'.

Due to the paucity of data available about the activities CP entailed in practice, popular opinion of CP, connections between CP institutions and other forms of local governance and any variation in performance around the country, an inductive case study approach was adopted, being conducive to the generation of hypotheses and a

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<sup>58</sup> Published accounts of CP in Dar es Salaam have been produced under the auspices of the UN HABITAT Safer Cities programme, and relate to their efforts to promote the revival of local policing groups called *sungusungu* since 1997 (e.g. Safer Cities 2000; Mtani 2007).

focus on causal mechanisms, as opposed to causal effects (Ragin 2007; Gerring 2007: 37-39).

The remainder of this chapter outlines the rationale behind conducting this research in Mwanza, the selection of cases within Mwanza and the methods of data collection used in the case sites. The generalisability, or external validity, of the research findings, is discussed in the concluding section.

#### 4.1 Case selection

The local policing activities promoted as part of CP are organised at the *mtaa* (sub-ward) level. The *mtaa*, or 'street', is the lowest level of local government in urban areas. Three case study *mitaa* were selected in the city of Mwanza. Mwanza is Tanzania's second largest city in terms of population, and is located in the northwest of the country on the shores of Lake Victoria. A more detailed introduction to Mwanza is provided in the following chapter.

The research was carried out in Tanzania because the CP reforms appeared to present an interesting contrast to other documented examples of CP in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a regional context, Tanzania was relatively late to introduce CP, and both CP and the police reform programme with which it is associated have been unusual in the extent to which they have been internally driven and devised. Tanzania also has a long tradition of various forms of community-based policing, and particularly state-sponsored *sungusungu* vigilantism. Contemporary CP operates on a similar model to *sungusungu*, and is often described in the media and elsewhere as a continuation of the principles of *sungusungu* and other older forms of self-policing such as the People's Militia (see 3.2.1). The Tanzanian reforms thus offered the opportunity to gain insights through diachronic comparison.

The city of Mwanza was selected firstly as it is located in one of the five pilot regions in which police have promoted the formation of neighbourhood security institutions.<sup>59</sup> Working in Mwanza also appeared to offer an opportunity to trace the histories of various forms of CP, including *sungusungu*. *Sungusungu* quickly spread to Mwanza Region from Shinyanga, and as early as 1983 politicians called for the deployment of *sungusungu* in Mwanza city (see 3.2.3). In rural areas of Mwanza Region and in some parts of the city, *sungusungu* continued to operate long after it had declined in other

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<sup>59</sup> The other regions included in the pilot are Kilimanjaro, Mara, Mbeya and Dar es Salaam.

parts of the country. Although Mwanza has grown rapidly since the 1980s and has an ethnically diverse population, the largest ethnic group represented in Mwanza is the Sukuma, amongst whom *sungusungu* began. Although it rapidly became clear that CP in urban Mwanza did not represent a return to 'tradition' in the sense envisaged by some proponents of CP in Tanzania (e.g. Safer Cities 2000; Assiago n.d.), people's memories of *sungusungu*, and particularly their use of violence and connection to the one party state, proved illuminating regarding how people felt about participation in CP in the present, and the connections between CP and broader processes of social and political change in Tanzania.

CP is organised at the *mtaa* (sub-ward) level. Three of these administrative units were selected for in depth study. Cases were selected to demonstrate variation in terms of the extent to which CP had been 'successful', in terms of having sustained collective action. This was determined through scoping interviews with district police and eight of the city's 21 Ward Executive Officers (WEOs). Two of the cases (A and B) were considered to be particularly strong examples of CP, but had adopted different operational models, and in the third case (C) CP had been attempted but the system had repeatedly lapsed. The chairpersons of the selected sites were then interviewed and their willingness to participate in the research was established. The three case sites and their models of CP are presented in more detail in the following chapter.

This approach meant that only areas in which CP had actually been introduced (or at least attempted) were selected for in depth study. By default these are low- and middle-income areas, where residents could not afford to take individual measures to protect their property, such as hiring commercial security providers. I considered this to be acceptable in order to maximise the potential to generate empirical data about how CP was actually working, and carried out interviews with chairpersons of areas neighbouring the case sites where CP was not occurring in order to better contextualise my cases. The assessments of ward level officials sometimes proved somewhat optimistic, and the 'successful' cases also provided the opportunity to explore lapses in CP and the challenges of implementation.

#### **4.2 Data collection**

Several methods of data collection were employed, including semi-structured interviews, a small survey with closed and open-ended questions, participant observation of CP activities within the case sites and analysis of documentary and



archival sources. This section firstly explains why official crime statistics did not form a major source, before explaining the methods used in greater detail.

#### 4.2.1 Crime statistics

The accuracy and reliability of official crime statistics in Tanzania and elsewhere are subject to two major concerns. Recorded crime rates are affected firstly by the likelihood that citizens report crimes to the police, and secondly by the data collection and processing capacity and procedures of the government organisations concerned (Marenin 1997: 463). In the Tanzanian context, as in many other developing countries, crime statistics are liable to be particularly unreliable for several reasons. Firstly, the geographical coverage of the police is limited and there has, until recently, been limited digitisation of crime statistics in regional centres meaning that records are vulnerable to being lost or damaged. Secondly, there are a range of reasons why citizens may not report crimes to the police, including, for example, the perception that nothing will happen as a result of reporting, low levels of trust in police probity, anticipated expense of reporting a crime due to the likelihood that one will have to pay a bribe, and the police may be perceived as a source of insecurity themselves (see Marenin 1997).

There are two more specific reasons why official crime data is not used extensively to support the conclusions reached in this thesis. Firstly, CP is organised at the level of the *mtaa* (sub-ward), and police data is not available by *mtaa*. Furthermore, CP policies, which in part aim to increase rates of reported crime, are not easily amenable to assessment through recorded crime statistics. For example, the TPF has interpreted increased rates of reporting crime as an indication that CP is working well: people are more willing to communicate with the police and to assist them in identifying perpetrators. It might also be the case that effective local crime prevention efforts mean more suspected criminals are apprehended. However, it might equally be the case that higher or unaltered rates of recorded crime suggest that local crime prevention is ineffective, or that citizens remain unwilling to cooperate with police in solving reported crimes.

#### 4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews

### *Dar es Salaam*

The national police headquarters is located in Dar es Salaam. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to interview several senior police officers involved in the police reform programme, and CP more specifically, from the earliest stages of formulation and implementation. In addition, interviews were conducted with staff at Safer Cities Dar es Salaam, the Legal and Human Rights Centre and with several academics at the University of Dar es Salaam, including Dr Semboja Haji who was closely involved in the development of the police reform.

### *Mwanza*

Regional and district level police with responsibility for CP and the Regional Police Commissioner were interviewed in Mwanza, in addition to the ward police officers responsible for the wards in which the three case sites were located. Interviews with police officers were carried out at the police stations where officers worked or in the canteen at the police barracks.

Within the case sites, elected and appointed leaders were interviewed, including: elected chairpersons, *Mtaa* Executive Officers (MEOs), other members of the *mtaa* government and security committees formed to organise CP, and a sample of ten-cell leaders. Interviews usually took place at *mtaa* offices or at the residence of the interviewee, depending on their preference and availability. The total number of ten-cell leaders interviewed was 24, of which 11 were resident in A, seven in B and six in C. As many ten-cell leaders as possible were interviewed in each case site, however this was limited by time constraints, the necessity that we encountered or could arrange to meet an individual at their home, and by adverse weather conditions at the end of the fieldwork period that rendered parts of some areas inaccessible. Many of the local leaders were interviewed on numerous occasions and I also had many less formal conversations during observation of patrols or while waiting in offices for appointments, which greatly enhanced my understanding of CP. Several chairpersons of neighbouring *mitaa*, where CP was not practised, were also interviewed as to why their own efforts to establish CP had been less successful. Former leaders of *sungusungu* were also identified and interviewed within the case sites, some of whom were involved in contemporary CP.

Although this was not a key focus of the research, several interviews conducted with managers of commercial security providers, of various sizes, in Mwanza provided valuable context as to the political economy of security provision in the city.

Interviews were recorded when permission was granted by participants and background noise was not prohibitively loud.

#### 4.2.3 Survey of *mtaa* residents

A small semi-structured survey of residents of the three case sites was conducted in order to explore the perspectives of members of the 'communities' who are expected to benefit from, and participate in, CP. The survey was intended to provide quantitative data that could be compared between *mitaa*, for example regarding residents' perceptions of safety. However, it also presented a very useful opportunity to elicit more detailed qualitative data through the use of open-ended questions. This proved invaluable in constructing a picture of the operation of CP that was often somewhat different to that presented by leaders and police. A copy of the survey questionnaire is included in Appendix A. In summary, questions addressed: opinions of the impact of CP on local security and crime prevention and investigation; experiences and opinions of participation in or contribution towards CP; experiences of crime and reporting preferences; the degree to which residents felt local policing institutions to be responsive to their needs; and opinions of police performance and any changes in the police force since the policy of *polisi jamii* was introduced.

36 respondents, half male and half female, were selected in each case site, as outlined below. The decision to select a total of 108 respondents reflected a compromise between the potential to generate meaningful and reasonably representative quantitative data and the time constraints imposed by the analysis of numerous open-ended responses.

The sampling strategy employed was informed by the methods used by the Afrobarometer (see Afrobarometer 2007). In the absence of a list of all individuals in the *mtaa*, a multistage random area sampling procedure was followed (see Mannheim & Rich 1991: 98-101). It was not possible to obtain detailed maps or aerial photographs of the areas. Before commencing the survey, the boundaries of the *mtaa* on the ground were established and a walking route was developed for each site, which came as close to passing all houses as was possible. This was sometimes difficult due to the nature of

the terrain and irregular arrangement of dwellings. A starting point and walking direction were randomly chosen, and subsequently each  $n^{\text{th}}$ <sup>60</sup> house passed on the right hand side was selected. Once a dwelling was identified, those present were asked to compile a list of all residents aged 18 and over. The gender of respondents selected alternated between consecutive houses visited. I randomly allocated each individual a number and residents then selected a number that corresponded to an individual resident. If the individual concerned was absent from the house or did not have time to participate, an appointment was made for a second visit. If the individual was again not available upon the second occasion, the same procedure was carried out at the neighbouring dwelling. Limited space or the wishes of the participant meant that these interviews were sometimes conducted in the presence of other members of the household.

The demographic profile of respondents, in terms of age and socio-economic status, is shown in Appendix B. The proxies used for socio-economic status were the standard of dwelling (e.g. building materials used, connection to electric power), inability to afford essential items over the past year (food, healthcare and school fees), possession of luxury items (a television, a fridge, and/or a car) and level of formal education. The distribution of respondents by occupation is also shown in the appendix, although it should be recognised that individuals were often dependent upon the incomes of others within their household in addition to their own economic activities, and additional sources of income, such as rent paid by tenants were not taken into account.

The sample size was relatively small, as the estimated population of each *mitaa* was over 2,800 people. However, this was considered a worthwhile trade-off, as we were able to spend a sufficient amount of time with respondents to elicit highly detailed and useful qualitative data. In addition to including open-ended questions, it was also possible to record additional comments made in response to closed questions. Unanticipated findings emerged that would not have been likely to be reported had a more closed questionnaire been used.

#### 4.2.4 Participant observation

During my many visits to the *mitaa* offices it was possible to observe the daily practices of local governance including the handling of cases by the community police. Time spent waiting for scheduled interviews to take place, or sheltering from downpours

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<sup>60</sup> This number varied between the case sites in accordance with the total number of dwellings in the area, in order to ensure that the entire area was included in the sampling process.

thus proved highly useful. In two of the case sites I also attended more formal public meetings, at which CP and other issues were discussed. In addition, I participated in two night patrols in *mtaa* A, and one patrol in *mtaa* B. Before arriving in Mwanza I had decided that I would not participate in patrols, being concerned for my own personal safety and wishing to avoid the potential ethical dilemmas raised by witnessing illegal acts perpetrated by community police, such as beating of suspects. However, having learnt more about the activities of the community police, become more familiar with the geographical areas concerned and discussed the matter with police and those involved in CP, I re-evaluated the likely risks on both counts. The experience of patrolling in two of the case sites was extremely valuable, both in terms of the opportunities provided to collect data, and to earn the trust of the community police. It was not possible to participate in a night patrol in C as patrols were not taking place during the earlier stages of the fieldwork. In later stages of the fieldwork altered circumstances made me decide against participating in additional patrols due to increased risk. Heavy seasonal rain and lengthy power cuts as a result of national power rationing were deemed by the community police to make their work much more dangerous, as darkness and the noise of the rain facilitated criminal activity. All decisions were taken in consultation with an interpreter, Stephen John Shipula, who accompanied me during patrols.

Where possible notes were taken during observation, and where this was not possible, for example during night patrols, I recorded key words and wrote detailed accounts as soon as possible. I also discussed my observations with Stephen, who was able to add his recollections and clarify my understanding of any conversations held in Kiswahili if necessary.

#### **4.2.5 Analysis of documentary and archival sources**

In constructing the outline of CP in Tanzania presented in the previous chapter, I used many official documents produced by the TPF, as well as the TPF website, police annual reports and media coverage of CP. These sources were also useful in interpreting the objectives of CP from a police perspective.

Archival sources available at the London School of Economics, including Tanganyika Police Annual Reports, were helpful in adding some more detail on the history of policing in Mwanza, to supplement the existing detailed historical accounts of colonial policing in Dar es Salaam (Burton 2003, 2005). Time constraints meant that I was

unable to spend a longer period exploring material at the Tanzania National Archives or the National Central Library (*Maktaba Kuu*) in Dar es Salaam for any information relating to *sungusungu* in Mwanza in the 1980s and 90s. However, unpublished theses and documents available at the library of the University of Dar es Salaam were used to construct the history of *sungusungu* presented in the previous chapter.

#### **4.2.6 Language and communication**

The large majority of interviews conducted in Mwanza, and all of those that took place within the three case sites, were conducted in Kiswahili. I arrived in Mwanza with fairly basic knowledge of the language, but this rapidly improved over the course of fieldwork to the extent that I could carry out interviews and read police official documents produced in Kiswahili. However, an interpreter, usually Stephen Shipula, was present during the large majority of interviews, and we frequently revisited interviews that had been recorded in order to clarify meaning or to discuss the most appropriate translation of phrases used.

#### **4.2.7 Ethical considerations when working with research participants**

In order to obtain informed consent to participate in the research, all those interviewed and all participants in the survey were given a detailed explanation of the objectives of the project, the researchers' identities and how the data would be used and presented. Participants were encouraged to ask questions at any time. Appropriate official documentation, including my research permit obtained from the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and a letter of introduction from the Mwanza Regional Commission, was shown when requested. Additional consent was obtained before interviews were recorded.

Throughout, I was particularly concerned to avoid giving residents of the case sites the impression that they were obliged to participate in the research, either because the central government (through COSTECH) or local leaders had approved the research. This meant declining well-meant offers from *mtaa* chairpersons to provide letters instructing people to participate in the survey, and resisting being accompanied by a member of the *mtaa* government. I also decided that participants would not be asked to sign written consent forms before participating, as I felt this was likely to generate anxiety and to suggest that the research was 'official', in the sense of being connected to government.

An additional reason for refusing the assistance of the *mtaa* government in carrying out the survey related to the imperative to preserve respondents' privacy. The nature of the research made me particularly concerned to ensure that those who expressed negative opinions about the *mtaa* government or the police should not be subjected to future reprisals. All survey participants and interviewees have been made anonymous, excluding very senior police and academics based in Dar es Salaam. The case study sites are referred to as A, B and C in order to protect the identity of elected local leaders who could otherwise be identified by their job titles. Although none of the leaders interviewed considered this to be a concern, I have decided to preserve their anonymity in order to avoid any unforeseen consequences of publishing the data.

Although I had been concerned prior to starting the fieldwork that it would be challenging to recruit research participants, and particularly police officers, this was only very rarely the case. Both senior and local police were extremely helpful, and generally very happy to talk about what is viewed as an important and necessary reform.

A final imperative to be extremely clear about my own objectives arose due to the assumptions made by many participants about my identity and reasons for conducting the research. *Wazungu*<sup>61</sup> visitors were not common in any of the three *mitaa* and it was common for participants to ask me whether I was working for an NGO that might be bringing resources to the *mtaa* to help with CP or, in several cases, whether I was recruiting for my own private security firm. Even when I had explained what I was doing, answering the question, 'and how will this help us?' was not easy. I was able to offer some tokenistic forms of compensation for the time local leaders spent assisting me with the research, such as soft drinks, photographs and information about models of CP in other parts of Mwanza. Some requested to be informed of the findings of the study, and whilst I do not presume to assume that this will be of material benefit to local leaders or improve local security, I am currently considering how best to 'give back' my research findings. This raises considerable dilemmas relating to the most appropriate way to present the data and how to avoid giving offence or implicating individuals when recounting some of the more problematic aspects of CP. In addition, when conducting the research I struggled to resist attempts by local leaders, and police officers in Mwanza, to use my interest in CP, as a foreigner, to legitimise existing models and a means to convince other residents of the importance of participation.

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<sup>61</sup> *Wazungu* (singular *mzungu*) literally means 'Europeans', however it is typically applied to all white people.

### **4.3 Data analysis**

All interviews were transcribed either on the day the interview was conducted or as soon as possible thereafter. Completed survey questionnaires were allocated a number and digitised as soon after the interview as possible. After returning from Tanzania, the survey data was coded and entered into SPSS for analysis, in order to test for basic correlation between factors including place of residence, gender, socio-economic status and party political affiliation and the opinions expressed. The interview transcripts, and qualitative data collected during the survey that was not amenable to numerical coding, were also coded using Zotero bibliographic software, which allows entries to be categorised according to key words and facilitates the recording of key quotations. The analysis of the interview data was an iterative process and transcripts were revisited many times.

### **4.4 Conclusion: wider implications of the case study**

This chapter outlined the rationale behind adopting a qualitative case study approach, and provided detailed accounts of the research methods used and practicalities and ethical considerations affecting how these were implemented. The internal validity of the case study was enhanced through the triangulation of sources. However, a case study can be understood as ‘the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)’ (Gerring 2007: 20). The cases presented in the remainder of this thesis are not necessarily representative of CP as practised in the rest of the country, or in Mwanza. Furthermore, it is recognised that the data collected was contingent upon the positionality of the researcher and the time at which the research was conducted, and thus replicability is problematic (Burawoy 1998: 11). However the findings are generalised to theory (Yin 2003), and by ‘extending out’ (Burawoy 1998) from the empirical data collected within the case sites to broader processes entailed in the transition away from authoritarian rule and the intensification of party political competition. The research also explored the national level experience of CP through media analysis and interviews at the national police headquarters. The explanatory factors which emerge as particularly important, including the local government system in place, the impact of multiparty competition on local development and historical understandings of participation and self help, have been observed to have similar effects in diverse regions of the Tanzania.



The following chapter introduces the city of Mwanza and its structures of urban administration and policing in greater detail. The three case sites are introduced and the systems of CP in place are described. A history of *sungusungu* in urban and peri-urban Mwanza is also outlined to supplement the more general history provided in Chapter 3.

## Chapter 5: Community Policing in Mwanza

This chapter firstly provides an introduction to the city of Mwanza, its administrative structure and the actors involved in policing the city. In order to contextualise contemporary CP reforms, and to provide necessary background to understandings of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Mwanza today, a history of *sungusungu* in urban Mwanza is provided, based on interviews conducted in the three case sites. Finally, the three case sites, designated A, B and C, are introduced and the systems of CP adopted in each are outlined. This introductory outline provides the basis for more critical analysis of local policing in the following two chapters.

### 5.1 Introducing Mwanza

Mwanza is a port city located on the shores of Lake Victoria in the northwest of Tanzania. The city, which is the second largest in the country in terms of population, is the administrative and commercial centre of Mwanza Region and forms a transport hub for access to the Lake Zone<sup>62</sup> and the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Mwanza attained city status in 2000 following rapid population growth, which saw the population more than double between 1988 and 2002 (URT 2002). According to the 2012 census, the population of the city is 706,453 (URT 2013). The regionally dominant Sukuma remain the largest ethnic group in the city, along with the Zinza and Kerewe, however the city is ethnically diverse, with a total of 17 ethnic identities recorded in the city in 2010 (MCC 2010, cited in MCC 2013). As ethnicity is not recorded in census data it is difficult to establish a more detailed picture of the ethnic composition of urban Mwanza.

Due to the lakeside location, fishing and fish processing are central to Mwanza's economy. The introduction of Nile Perch to Lake Victoria in the 1950s, whilst ecologically damaging, enabled the growth of a fish export industry in the city (ALAT 2004: 160). The development of the mining industry in neighbouring districts has also brought economic growth to the city as the region's principal commercial and transport hub.

Whilst Mwanza city centre is increasingly characterised by new multi-storey buildings, densely populated unplanned settlements occupy many of the city's hills (see Figure

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<sup>62</sup> Lake Zone refers to the Tanzanian administrative districts of Mwanza, Kagera, Mara and Shinyanga.

1). In 2002 it was estimated by Mwanza City Council that 75% of residents were living in unplanned areas (MCC 2002, cited in Cadstedt 2006: 46), which are poorly served with regard to sanitation, accessibility and educational and health facilities (MCC 2007). These difficult conditions are compounded by Mwanza's hilly landscape, which is scattered with large rock features.



**Figure 1: Photograph of Mwanza city centre, showing multi-storey buildings in the city centre and informal settlements on surrounding hills. Taken by the author in January 2011.**

## **5.2 Urban administration**

Mwanza city is comprised of two administrative districts, Nyamagana and Ilemela, which also constitute single member parliamentary constituencies. Both incumbent

MPs were members of an opposition party, CHADEMA, at the time the research was carried out. Each district is divided into wards (*kata*) from which a councillor is elected to the Municipal Council.<sup>63</sup> The city's two MPs and 8 female members, nominated by political parties in accordance with the proportion of elected seats held, also hold seats on the council. A mayor is elected by the councillors from within their number. The executive arm of the council is led by the City Director, a presidential appointee.

Each of Mwanza's 21 wards has an appointed, salaried Ward Executive Officer (WEO). The WEO is responsible to the City Director and their responsibilities include participation in development planning, oversight of implementation of programmes within the ward, enforcement of by-laws and 'to initiate and promote participatory development in the Ward' (Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2006).

Each ward is further subdivided into *mitaa* (singular *mtaa*). It is this lowest level of local government which is given principal responsibility for initiating and managing CP. Although *mtaa* can be translated as 'street', the units are usually larger than a single street, particularly since the amalgamation of *mitaa* in 2009 to form larger units.

Each *mtaa* has a *serikali ya mtaa* (street government), which is elected on a party political basis every five years in a secret ballot of all permanent residents aged 18 and above. The most recent election took place in 2009. The governing committee is comprised of a chairperson and six councillors (*wajumbe*), of whom at least two must be female. Candidates must be sponsored by a political party and be literate in Kiswahili or English (URT 2009b). Those elected are not paid, and the *mtaa* government does not receive funding for its activities. However, they may benefit from sitting allowances for attending meetings. Sub-committees of the *mtaa* government are formed to address specific local development concerns, such as sanitation and school management.

In 2006 the position of *Mtaa* Executive Officer (MEO) was established. The MEO is appointed by the urban authority as a secretary to the *mtaa* government and to assist the *mtaa* chairperson in the implementation of projects (Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2006; URT 2009b). The MEO, unlike other members of the *mtaa* government, is typically not resident in the *mtaa* and receives a salary. It has not yet been possible to post an MEO in all *mitaa*, meaning that some are responsible for multiple areas.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> In 2012 it was decided to establish a separate municipal council for each of the urban districts.

<sup>64</sup> Interview MEO-A 15.11.11.

According to the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act of 1999, the responsibilities of the *mtaa* committee include implementation of council policies, advising the council regarding development plans and activities taking place in the *mtaa* and carrying out tasks as directed by the Ward Development Committee (WDC). The WDC consists of the chairs and MEOs of all *mitaa* within the ward and is chaired by the ward's elected councillor. It acts as a forum for the discussion of development plans emerging from the *mitaa*, but also forms a conduit for directives from the municipal level (Baker *et al.* 2002: 23). The *mitaa* governments are given responsibility for general community welfare and promotion of '*maendeleo*' (development) in their jurisdictions (Mwanza Regional Commission 2009). To this end they are expected to facilitate participatory planning in accordance with the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development approach adopted as part of a donor funded Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) (Fjeldstad *et al.* 2010).

The *mtaa* government is empowered to pass by-laws, subject to the consent of an assembly of local residents and approval by the District Council (Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982) and can impose fines to sanction non-compliance. A more general law and order function is implied by the expectation that the *mtaa* authority will advise the WDC regarding 'matters relating to peace and security in the Mtaa', and 'keep proper record' of residents (Local Government Laws Amendment Act 1999).

Participation in the governance of the *mitaa* largely occurs through public meetings, which should be held at least every two months (Local Government Laws Amendment Act 1999). Members of *mtaa* sub-committees are selected on these occasions and other local development initiatives, such as the mobilisation of resources to construct a school building, are discussed. Residents can also bring complaints or queries, for example over delays in promised improvement to local infrastructure.

The *mtaa* government also plays a significant role in local dispute resolution, particularly between landlords and tenants and in cases of marital conflict.<sup>65</sup>

As will become clear in the following two chapters, in practice the performance of the *mtaa* government appears to be highly dependent upon individual preferences and ability. As they are unpaid, committee members must balance their official duties with

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<sup>65</sup> Interviews: chairman-B 14.2.11; chairman-C 5.7.11.

pursuing their own economic activities and performing domestic obligations. The lack of funds available can mean that village or *mtaa* governments, often the first place to which residents appeal for help, are rarely able to offer any material assistance (Pallotti 2006, cited in Pallotti 2008: 227). Although the MEOs are paid, as explained by the MEO of one case site: ‘with government work it’s not like working for a big company where somebody might be checking up on you’.<sup>66</sup> Thus office hours may not be observed. As MEOs do not normally live in the *mtaa* in which they work the chairperson is still required to deal with any issues that occur outside of working hours, including organising to improve security at night.<sup>67</sup>

A final level of quasi-governmental administration is formed by the ten-cell leaders of the ruling party, CCM. Although the importance of the ten-cell leader has declined since the reintroduction of multipartism in 1992, they have continued to play a role in dispute resolution, organising funerals and in the implementation of CP, discussed below.

### 5.3 Crime and policing in Mwanza

It is difficult to compare rates of crime, and fear of crime, in the city of Mwanza with those of other urban areas as published annual crime statistics aggregate data at the regional level, rather than that of the district. Recorded incidents of selected serious crimes in the police district in which the three case sites were located are shown in Table 1, however in the absence of comparative data this is not highly instructive. The very small number of incidents recorded in 2010 in comparison to other years suggests there may be some irregularities in the data recording process.

**Table 1: Recorded incidents of selected serious offences in Nyamagana District 2008-2011.**

	Unlawful killings ( <i>mauaji</i> )	Rape ( <i>kubaka</i> )	Armed robbery ( <i>unyang’a nyi wa kutumia silaha</i> )	Burglary ( <i>uvunjaji</i> )	Cattle theft ( <i>wizi wa mifugo</i> )
2008	45	44	6	52	0
2009	121	95	16	36	57
2010	6	7	1	2	7
2011 (Jan-Sept only)	46	46	0	17	21

Source: Official police statistics collated by Nyamagana District Headquarters.

Furthermore, recorded crime statistics in all contexts, but particularly in developing countries with a poor record of police-community relations are not necessarily a good

<sup>66</sup> Interview MEO-A 15.11.11.

<sup>67</sup> Interview chairman-A 11.7.11.

indicator of levels of crime experienced by populations, being dependent upon the likelihood that citizens will report crimes to the police and the data collection and processing practices of governments (Marenin 1997: 463). According to the most recent victimization survey carried out in Tanzania, in the cities of Tanga, Mbeya and Mwanza and the municipalities of Moshi and Dodoma, less than half of burglaries, robberies and sexual and other assaults were reported to the police (UNODC 2009: 4). Selected results of this survey are presented in Table 2, and compared with results obtained in urban areas of Kenya (UNODC 2010) and Uganda (UNODC 2008). Data collected regarding the perceptions of residents of the three case sites regarding safety in their neighbourhoods is discussed in the following chapter.

**Table 2: Crime victimisation and fear of crime in Mwanza and other urban areas of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.**

	Dodoma, Mbeya, Moshi, Mwanza and Tanga <sup>68</sup>	Kenya <sup>69</sup>	Uganda <sup>70</sup>
Experienced burglary or attempted burglary	13.2	10 <sup>71</sup>	17.4
Experienced robbery	3	3.7 <sup>72</sup>	4.3
Experienced assault/threat of assault	2.9	5.1 <sup>73</sup>	9.3
Felt unsafe/very unsafe in own home after dark	32.5	29.6	36.5
Felt unsafe/very unsafe walking in neighbourhood after dark	44.1	48.6	49.9

Source: UNODC 2008, 2009, 2010.

The police in urban Mwanza are organised around the politico-administrative districts of Nyamagana and Ilemela. However, in practice some areas located in Ilemela District are incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Officer Commanding District (OCD) for Nyamagana. Thus all of the case sites were served by the central police station for

<sup>68</sup> This data was obtained in a victimisation survey carried out by UNODC in several urban areas of Tanzania including Mwanza (UNODC 2009). Responses refer to the year 2007.

<sup>69</sup> This data was obtained in a victimisation survey carried out by UNODC in rural and urban Kenya in 2010 (UNODC 2010). Only results for urban areas are included in this table. Responses refer to the year 2009.

<sup>70</sup> This data was obtained in a victimisation survey carried out by UNODC in rural and urban Uganda in 2008 (UNODC 2010). Reported results are not disaggregated according to whether they are for rural or urban areas, however 79% of respondents were resident in urban areas. Responses refer to the year 2007.

<sup>71</sup> This figure refers to both urban and rural respondents.

<sup>72</sup> This figure refers to both urban and rural respondents.

<sup>73</sup> This figure refers to both urban and rural respondents.

Nyamagana, located in the city centre. 320 police officers were employed in the district in 2011.<sup>74</sup> This gives an estimated police: population ratio of 1: 1336.<sup>75</sup> This compares favourably with the ratio for Mwanza Region as a whole, which was 1: 1,943 in 2010 (TPF 2010c: 44), reflecting the concentration of officers in urban areas. However, it is still a very low ratio by international standards, and is considerably less than more heavily policed Dar es Salaam, where there was one officer for every 358 people in 2010 (ibid.). In addition to the central police station there are two other sub-stations, which are supplemented by small police posts. Mwanza city also houses the Regional Police Headquarters and several specialised police branches including the Marine Police, Railway Police and units of the FFU.

The police force in urban Mwanza has promoted *polisi jamii* on the model outlined in the previous chapter. Seminars have been held for local government staff to emphasise their responsibilities in maintaining local security, police have conducted outreach in schools and use of local television and radio stations has been successful to the extent that the police now receive requests to provide material for outlets, rather than having to ask for space.<sup>76</sup> In September 2011, police in Nyamagana were aware of the existence of 54 local policing initiatives within the ward, although it was thought that only 38 of these were currently active as their activities fluctuated according to perceived need.<sup>77</sup>

In lakeside areas, CP was implemented through Beach Management Units (BMUs), which predate the official policy of CP, having been established following directives from the Tanzanian Fisheries Department in order to monitor illegal fishing and protect beach environments (see Medard *et al.* 2000). The BMUs are now encouraged by the police to extend their surveillance to other criminal activities such as theft and they sometimes conduct patrols.<sup>78</sup>

There were attempts to extend the UN HABITAT sponsored Safer Cities Programme, which had been promoting the revival of *sungusungu* groups in Dar es Salaam (see 3.2.3) to Mwanza in 2007. However, it proved very difficult to institutionalise Safer Cities within the City Council due to the frequent transfer of personnel and a shortfall in funding following a shift in donor priorities.<sup>79</sup> Although the council was involved in

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<sup>74</sup> Personal communication Sgt-Nyamagana 23.11.11.

<sup>75</sup> Based on the 2012 census data (URT 2013), which reports a population of 363,452 for Nyamagana District. However, as noted above, the borders of the police and administrative districts are not exactly the same.

<sup>76</sup> Interview Sgt-Nyamagana 19.11.11.

<sup>77</sup> Personal communication Sgt-Nyamagana 15.9.11.

<sup>78</sup> Interview Sgt-Nyamagana and BMU leader, Sweya, 11.11.10.

<sup>79</sup> Interview Anna Mtani 24.3.11.



the organisation of 'sensitisation' workshops for *mitaa* chairs, WEOs and MEOs about CP,<sup>80</sup> none of the local government officials or local police interviewed had heard of the Safer Cities initiative.

In addition to the Tanzania Police Force, several other actors are involved in policing public and private spaces in Mwanza. The city council employs an Auxiliary Police Force, composed of recruits who have completed militia training and some additional police training. They guard council property and may be deployed to enforce by-laws. During the research period there were several violent clashes between Auxiliary Police and petty traders over attempts to evict the latter from the city centre (Lumanyika 2010; Naluyaga 2011).

There is a thriving commercial security sector in Mwanza and in 2011 there were over 80 registered firms in operation, including both large multinational companies, such as G4S, and many small concerns run by former police officers or soldiers. Demand for commercial security services is reportedly very high.<sup>81</sup>

Less formalised responses to crime include the apparently spontaneous killings of suspected thieves at the scene of their alleged offence. 'Mob justice' is common in Mwanza Region. In 2009, for example, 405 incidents were reported in the region (David 2010). In rural areas killings are often associated with witchcraft accusations. According to Nyamagana District Police records, in 2009, of 126 people who were unlawfully killed, 88 were killed while allegedly stealing. However, such cases are rarely investigated or prosecuted (Plyler 2007: 134). As described by one resident of *mtaa* B recounting the death of a suspected thief outside his house, 'the police just came afterwards to take away the body'.<sup>82</sup> Incidents are typically blamed on lack of faith in state law enforcement bodies (Plyler 2007: 134).

#### 5.4 *Sungusungu* in urban Mwanza

This section contains a brief historical account of *sungusungu* and other neighbourhood security initiatives in the area that now forms urban Mwanza. This is based on interviews with residents of the three case sites, including those who formerly held leadership positions within *sungusungu*. This is included as a supplement to the general account given in the previous chapter as *sungusungu* in Mwanza diverged

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<sup>80</sup> Interview John Wanga 8.11.10.

<sup>81</sup> Interviews PSC1 19.2.11; PSC2 15.7.11.

<sup>82</sup> Survey-62.

somewhat from other urban examples due to the city's location close to the rural areas in which *sungusungu* originated. The urban experience of *sungusungu* has also received little attention in existing literature.

As noted above, Mwanza has grown rapidly since *sungusungu* emerged in the late 1980s, when the urban population was 182,899 (URT 1988, cited in Barke & Sowden 1992: 11). Two of the case sites were fairly sparsely populated at the time, compared by respondents to villages, and have since been further incorporated into the city through the construction of tarmac roads and improved public transport links. The remaining *mtaa* (A) is located in one of the oldest informal settlements in the city, and had a larger population and was closer to the city's administrative centre. However, the accounts given by residents in all three areas converged around the establishment, organisation and operation of *sungusungu*. Variations in accounts, for example the importance placed on dealing with witchcraft, did not appear to correspond to place of residence.

As noted in Chapter 3, the government ordered the deployment of *sungusungu* from surrounding areas in Mwanza town in 1983. Local *sungusungu* groups were subsequently established across the area that now forms Ilemela and Nyamagana Districts between 1984 and 1987. Residents had been suffering high rates of armed robbery and burglary in the preceding period and the police response was deemed inadequate.<sup>83</sup>

Interviewees recalled inaugurations like those described in Chapter 3. Mwanza had a diverse ethnic population and non-Sukuma or Nyamwezi were also required to participate, even to the extent of pretending to sing songs in Kisukuma during the ceremony.<sup>84</sup> An *ntemi*, *mtware* and *makamanda* were selected for areas approximating the size of contemporary wards.

Although the *kutemya* (inauguration) was carried out by *sungusungu* leaders from elsewhere and, as outlined below, the operation of *sungusungu* retained more of its 'traditional' elements than in other urban areas, *sungusungu* was typically understood as having been '*agizo ya chama*' (an order from the party) or the government. The Regional and District Commissioners were, for example, reported to have attended some inaugurations.<sup>85</sup> *Sungusungu* mirrored the administrative structure of CCM, so

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<sup>83</sup> Interviews: *makamanda*-A 1,2,3 26.1.11; TCL-B 5 24.6.11; TCL-C 4 28.8.11.

<sup>84</sup> Interview WEO-BT 16.8.11. See also Bryceson (2011: 279) on multi-ethnic participation in *sungusungu* elsewhere in the Lake Zone.

<sup>85</sup> Interview chairman-C 28.8.11.

that each branch office of CCM had a corresponding *sungusungu* office, and was described by one former *sungusungu* secretary as having been 'controlled by CCM'.<sup>86</sup>

In all three case sites *sungusungu* had a women's wing. Whilst the most senior leaders were men (although one ward in Mwanza selected a female *ntemi*), there were female *makamanda* and *askari* (soldiers). The female *sungusungu* arrested, searched and, if necessary, punished female suspects.

The *sungusungu* leadership was able to make a small income from participation by asking for '*hela ya mguu*'<sup>87</sup> from those who required their services and from fines imposed on offenders. Night patrols were conducted by all able-bodied young male residents who were allocated dates to participate.<sup>88</sup> Those who were excluded from patrolling due to work commitments, disability or age made small contributions towards the purchase of equipment. The *sungusungu* were armed with bows and arrows, which it was claimed were tipped with poison.<sup>89</sup>

As in rural areas, whistles were used for communication. *Sungusungu* from neighbouring areas cooperated with each other to apprehend suspected thieves and their stolen goods and return them to the area in which an offence had been committed. All households were required to have a whistle so that news of an incident travelled far and fast.<sup>90</sup>

The principal concern of *sungusungu* in urban and peri-urban Mwanza was theft of cattle and other property. It is difficult to establish the extent to which *uchawi* (witchcraft) was important. Some, including one former *kamanda* and a former secretary of *sungusungu*, asserted that it was. The chairman and secretary of *mtaa C*, for example, explained that it was vital for the leaders selected to be knowledgeable about *dawa* (medicine) in order to protect themselves from witchcraft, including by ensuring that food distributed at meetings was not contaminated.<sup>91</sup> However, most saw witchcraft as being '*kijijini*' (in the village), and not a problem affecting town life.

*Sungusungu* in Mwanza also played a role in enforcing participation in local development activities, such as repairing roads. One ten-cell leader recalled a by-law

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<sup>86</sup> Interview WEO-C 24.10.11.

<sup>87</sup> Literally 'foot money', this refers to a small allowance to compensate the *sungusungu* for their time and defray the costs of any necessary travel.

<sup>88</sup> One ten-cell leader reported that divorced women had also been obliged to participate in patrolling as they had 'chosen' to live alone (interview TCL-B 6 3.3.11).

<sup>89</sup> Interview *kamanda mkuu*-A 15.11.11

<sup>90</sup> Interview chairman-C 28.8.11.

<sup>91</sup> Interview chairman-C & secretary-C 28.8.11.

introduced at the time to prohibit people from playing *bao* (a Swahili game) until the afternoon to ensure productivity.<sup>92</sup>

As discussed further in Chapter 7, *sungusungu* is strongly associated in popular memory with their methods of interrogation and punishment. A suspected offender was initially interrogated by *sungusungu* leaders. If they did not offer a confession, they were tried again in public, with the aid of '*kupiga viboko*' (beatings), until they admitted their guilt. Beatings were severe, sometimes conducted with a fan belt tied to a stick, and water and salt were applied to wounds to increase pain. As a former secretary of *sungusungu* now resident in *mtaa* C explained: 'You would go into the [*sungusungu*] office with your hands raised in confession, even if you hadn't done anything'.<sup>93</sup>

The 'Field Force Unit', or *nguku* (baboons) administered especially harsh punishments. This division, named after the feared FFU of the police (see 3.2.1), disguised themselves with sisal fibres and feathers. In addition to beating people, the *nguku* reportedly sometimes used pliers and needles to torture suspects.<sup>94</sup>

Although some expressed unease regarding *sungusungu*'s methods, and the use of violence does seem to have contributed to the decline in popularity of the organisations in the mid 1990s, many saw *sungusungu* as incorruptible and expressed faith in their ability to identify the correct offenders every time, particularly in comparison to the police. *Sungusungu* had local knowledge: 'they were working in the community, and the community knew who was a thief'.<sup>95</sup> Residents participated in compiling lists of suspected criminals for *sungusungu*.

The brutal methods appear to have had a striking impact on crime rates, and respondents frequently described crime as having been eradicated. *Sungusungu* were also very successful in returning stolen property, which was an important element of their appeal.<sup>96</sup> One ten-cell leader, frustrated over the lack of action taken by police regarding a theft she reported from her home recently, claimed that if you were a thief:

They [*sungusungu*] would beat you until you brought the stuff back yourself!...[Now] every time I call the police they just say that legal processes are underway, but if *sungusungu* was still

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<sup>92</sup> Interview TCL-B 5 24.7.11.

<sup>93</sup> Survey-88.

<sup>94</sup> Interview chairman-C 28.8.11.

<sup>95</sup> Interview TCL-B 1 11.11.11.

<sup>96</sup> Interviews: TCL-A 5 25.2.11; secretary-C 28.8.11; *kamanda mkuu*-A 15.11.11.

here they would have got the money back straight away! They really helped.<sup>97</sup>

Accounts of the relationship of *sungusungu* with the police were often positive. However, as discussed further in Chapter 7, the extent to which contemporary *ulinzi shirikishi* work with the police is frequently evoked as a key difference between *sungusungu* and CP. *Sungusungu* on occasion required police support, for example when thieves had automatic weapons, and one former *kamanda mkuu* recalled that police sometimes attended *sungusungu* assemblies and on occasion referred cases to *sungusungu*.<sup>98</sup> However, it appears that conflict could arise over the potential income to be generated through policing. Police lost opportunities to extract payments from those arrested as *sungusungu* themselves tried suspects and imposed fines.<sup>99</sup> In the absence of a regular salary, *sungusungu* were dependent upon fines for compensation and should police seek to take over a serious case, for example involving use of weapons, before *sungusungu* had been able to impose their own fine, '*urugu kidogo*' (a bit of trouble) could result.<sup>100</sup>

As elsewhere, the reintroduction of multipartism contributed to a decline in *sungusungu*, which had been closely associated with CCM. A ten-cell leader in B explained that:

Initially it [*sungusungu*] was compulsory...because there were no opposition parties. The multiparty system has brought greater freedom.<sup>101</sup>

In addition, mistakes and punishment of those thought to be innocent caused *sungusungu* to become unpopular in some cases. *Sungusungu* were implicated in several deaths in Mwanza and leaders were arrested, making others reluctant to assume leadership roles. One former secretary of *sungusungu*, resident in what is now *mtaa* C, was arrested and incarcerated for one year in 1998 after a man died whilst under arrest in the *sungusungu* office. He claimed that the death was due to natural causes, blaming a pre-existing heart condition of which the *sungusungu* were unaware.

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<sup>97</sup> Interview TCL-B 5 24.7.11.

<sup>98</sup> Interview *kamanda mkuu*-A 15.11.11.

<sup>99</sup> Interviews: chairman-C 28.8.11; secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>100</sup> Interview WEO-C 24.10.11.

<sup>101</sup> Interview TCL-B 3 6.11.11.

Following his time in prison his family did not want him to be involved in *sungusungu* any longer.<sup>102</sup>

Although the formalised hierarchical structures and trial procedures of *sungusungu* were gradually abandoned in all three case sites, residents continued to organise for their own security as they had before *sungusungu* was established. At times of need, occasional night patrols were organised by the *mtaa* government and ten-cell leaders until more regular arrangements were made following the introduction of CP.

### 5.5 CP in the three case sites

Three *mitaa* were selected within Mwanza, as outlined in Chapter 4. All three of the *mitaa* were formed in October 2009, when existing *mitaa* were merged to form larger administrative units, after which local elections were held.

The official data available regarding population size and ethnic and socio-economic composition of populations within *mitaa* is very limited. Therefore the following introduction is largely based on extended observation of the three sites, interviews with residents and local authority officials, and available ward level data.

The model adopted in two of the case sites (A and C) remains close to that of *sungusungu*, although in *mtaa* B it was decided to employ local young men as guards.

#### 5.5.1 *Mtaa* A

A was the *mtaa* in which CP was most consistently practised and the community police assumed the widest range of functions. CP in A was rated highly by police officers in Mwanza and the *mtaa* has in the past been selected for visits by senior police officers, including the IGP,<sup>103</sup> and the chairman has on occasion participated in police educational broadcasts about CP.

A is a largely low income area located in one of Mwanza's oldest informal settlements, which was established in the 1960s (ICLEI 1996, cited in Cadstedt 2006: 46; Ndyuki 1999: 2). The *mtaa* spreads across a steep, rocky hillside approximately 1.5 km from the city centre. One paved road cuts through the *mtaa*, however the majority of the area is

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<sup>102</sup> Survey-88.

<sup>103</sup> The scheduled visit was abandoned when the IGP was delayed in Dar es Salaam.

not accessible by vehicle, being largely traversed by narrow pathways between houses, as shown in Figure 2. The size of an individual plot in the ward averages eight by ten metres (Ndyuki 1999: 2).

Infrastructure in the *mtaa* is very poor and the extent of environmental degradation and lack of service delivery led to the ward in which A is located being selected as one of the pilot sites for the DANIDA sponsored Sustainable Mwanza Programme in the late 1990s (Ndyuki 1999: 3). The *mtaa* is very densely populated and many houses contain multiple family groups. Although two compounds in the area had walls constructed around them this was exceptional. Housing is a mixture of semi-permanent structures made with mud bricks and corrugated iron roofs weighted down with rocks and permanent concrete structures with metal roofs (see Figure 3).

The population of the *mtaa* was recorded as 4,685 in the 2002 census,<sup>104</sup> and by 2011 the chairman estimated that the *mtaa's* approximately 500 houses were occupied by over 1,200 *kaya* (households).<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Interview chairman-A 15.11.11.

<sup>105</sup> Interview chairman-A 11.7.11. *Kaya* refers to a household or family unit. Multiple *kaya* may be resident in a *nyumba* (house).



Figure 2: Photograph showing typical housing and terrain in *mtaa* A. Taken by the author in July 2011.





Figure 3: Photograph showing typical dwellings in *mtaa* A and Mwanza's characteristic rock formations. Taken by the author in July 2011.

The *mtaa* chairperson and all of the elected councillors (*wajumbe*) of A were affiliated to Tanzania's ruling party, CCM. The elected chair was a local businessman, engaged in the fish trade, who occupied a relatively large, attractive house in the *mtaa*. The *mtaa* government rented an office in the centre of the *mtaa* that was regularly staffed by the chairman or several of the *wajumbe*.

The *mtaa* had an MEO, who was also responsible for a neighbouring street. However, during the research period she was frequently absent, even during her office hours (9am – 3pm). The chairman explained that although initially the *mtaa* committee had given the MEO the official stamps required for any letter of reference issued by the *mtaa*, her frequent absence and the need for services outside of her working hours had obliged him to take them back in order to serve the local population.<sup>106</sup>

A police station, with responsibility for the five surrounding wards, is located in a neighbouring *mtaa*, approximately 5 minutes walk from the *mtaa* office. However, proximity to a police station does not necessarily improve access to police services or

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<sup>106</sup> Interview chairman-A 11.7.11.

reduce response time. Although residents of A could easily walk to the police post, at night the police organise patrols over a wide area, meaning that the majority of officers, and any available vehicles, may be distant from the police station, whilst the few who remain on duty are often not permitted to leave their post.<sup>107</sup>

### *CP in mtaa A*

The chairman attended a seminar organised by police in 2006 and subsequently established a security group within his *mtaa*. In 2009 his *mtaa* was incorporated into a new larger administrative area (*mtaa A*), of which he was subsequently elected as chairman. He was able to extend CP across the entire new *mtaa*.

A security committee was selected with the intention of ensuring the representation of diverse groups resident in the *mtaa*. It included representatives of religious organisations, school pupils, disabled residents and political parties. The committee met every three months, leaving daily oversight of CP to the chairman and elected *makamanda* (commanders).

The 12 *makamanda*, of whom half were female, included all of the six *mtaa* councillors. All were aged between 40 and 60, with the exception of one 35 year old man. Like the majority of the *mtaa*'s inhabitants, the *makamanda* earned a living through informal sector activities such as petty trading (*biashara ndogo ndogo*) or poorly paid positions, for example as cooks. The onerous time demands of running CP in the *mtaa* probably precluded those with more regular employment from participating to the same extent and the economic incentives, discussed below, were less appealing to the relatively wealthy.

The *makamanda* led night patrols twice a week on a shift basis. In addition, residents could report incidents or suspicions for investigation. The *makamanda* could be employed to arrest a suspected offender or locate a party to a dispute for a small fee. As some *makamanda* were also members of the *mtaa* government, they already performed dispute resolution in the *mtaa*.

Through donations, the community police purchased uniforms and rented an office next to the *mtaa* office. As three of the most active *mtaa* councillors (all female) who were regularly present in the office were also *makamanda* of CP, it was easy for

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<sup>107</sup> Interview *kamanda* 2 25.11.11.

residents to locate the community police during the daytime and the CP office was also occupied during the night.

The important role played by women in leading patrols in A is highly unusual in Mwanza. The *makamanda* explained that it was important to have female participants because it was inappropriate for a man to search or arrest a woman, echoing the logic for formation of women's wings of *sungusungu*. Although the *mtaa* chairman accepted this explanation in part, he was very keen to stress that the involvement of women was really a reflection of what he understood as the core principle of *polisi jamii*, whereby everybody within a community should participate, including even children who can play a role by reporting a crime.<sup>108</sup>

### *Crime prevention*

A patrol was organised around the *mtaa* every night from 11 p.m. in order to apprehend any *vibaka* (petty thieves) roaming the area and to deter thieves from entering the *mtaa*. The *makamanda* on duty were accompanied by young male residents<sup>109</sup> who were allocated a monthly patrol date. The timetable for participation in patrols was organised around the ten-cell structures of CCM. Each ten-cell leader was required to provide the names of all eligible residents one night each month. Participants brought with them any available weapons, typically small machetes (*mapanga*) or sticks. The CP office kept a spear, a bow and arrow (which the *makamanda* claimed was tipped with poison), machetes and batons.

Households in which an able-bodied young man was not resident and those unable to participate due to work commitments contributed 3000 Tanzanian Shillings (TSH) each month in order to purchase necessary equipment, such as torches and batteries.<sup>110</sup>

Participation was made compulsory through the introduction of a by-law, which imposed a fine of 5000 TSH, for failure to report for patrol. Residents who continued to obstruct CP were liable to be taken to the local police station and could face a jail term. Participation was rigorously monitored and enforced by the *makamanda*, who devoted up to an hour at the beginning of each night's work to visiting the houses of those who had not reported for duty.

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<sup>108</sup> Interview chairman-A 26.1.11.

<sup>109</sup> Women were also able to participate in patrols should they prefer this to contributing money.

<sup>110</sup> At the end of October 2010 when fieldwork in Mwanza started, 3000 TSH was equivalent to approximately 2 USD.

During patrols anybody seen moving around the area was liable to be confronted and asked to '*kaa chini*' (sit or crouch on the ground) in order for their identity and purpose to be ascertained. Residents were lectured about the importance of not taking risks by moving around the area at night.

The weapons carried by the community police were ostensibly for self-defence but were sometimes used during the apprehension of suspects. Some of the *makamanda* explicitly claimed that they beat suspected thieves apprehended at night, however it was not possible to ascertain the extent to which this was true. Reports of incidents during patrols did suggest that excessive force was sometimes used to restrain and subdue those apprehended.

Those apprehended on suspicion of a criminal offence were taken to the nearby police station. The community police also reported here each evening before a patrol to inform the police of the names of those participating, who would then be entitled to free medical care in case of an injury sustained during the patrol. This procedure also helped to prevent those patrolling being mistaken for thieves.

In addition to patrolling, the *makamanda* and the *mtaa* chairman took proactive steps to target those they thought to be at risk of offending. Residents who were suspected of engaging in crime could be summoned to the *mtaa* office to be warned about their activities and photographed, for use in future investigations. Surveillance of the houses of residents deemed suspicious was also prioritised during night patrols and the chairman was very keen to obtain a video camera to be used for covert surveillance.

#### *CP for hire*

In late 2010 when the research began, a sign was prominently displayed on the doors of the *mtaa* office in order to inform residents to phone the chairman's number should they require any crime-related assistance. It was noted that '*huduma hii ni bure*' (this service is free). However, the success of CP through night patrols enabled the *makamanda* to expand their activities in order to make some small financial gains.

Requests for security provision from local property owners enabled the community police to charge for their services. For example, the owner of a maize milling machine located on the border of *mtaa* A agreed a fee to ensure the patrol passed his property a certain number of times each night, and vehicle owners parked their cars and motorbikes outside the office overnight for a fee of 500 TSH per day. Community

police were also available for hire for special events such as funerals, which are targeted by thieves because the host is likely to have additional property on their premises, such as utensils and chairs borrowed from neighbours.<sup>111</sup>

Upon payment of 3000 TSH, the *makamanda* could be employed to locate and arrest suspected criminal offenders or debtors. Police at the local police station in fact referred those who had reported a crime for which there was a known suspect to the community police, so that the *makamanda* could arrest the individual concerned and deliver them to the police station. In the case of other disputes, such as quarrels over the use of abusive language, the *makamanda* arbitrated between parties and could impose further fines or other punishments. In one case observed, for example, a young woman who had refused to apologise for her part in an argument was imprisoned in the office overnight. The extent to which local dispute resolution formed a part of *ulinzi shirikishi* in A was somewhat unusual, reflecting the fact that the *makamanda* were also members of the *mtaa* government.

These additional examples of cases observed in the CP office in A illustrate the range of reasons for which *mtaa* residents, and others, sought the assistance of the community police:

- A male resident who had travelled to Dar es Salaam called the community police upon hearing reports that his estranged wife was removing furniture from his house. The *ulinzi shirikishi* group apprehended her vehicle and confiscated the furniture.
- An elderly female resident complained that young men living in a house situated higher on the hill than hers had been throwing stones onto her plot. One *kamanda* agreed to visit her house on each of the four following days to assess the situation before confronting her neighbours.
- A woman resident in another *mtaa* requested that the community police assist her in identifying and locating a man, known to live in A, who owed her money. The *kamanda* on duty knew the individual concerned and agreed to locate him or his family members for a fee of 3000 TSH.
- A woman complained to the community police that her brother had stolen iron sheets from her. He was arrested by several *makamanda* and, due to the complexity of the case, escorted to the police station.

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<sup>111</sup> Interview chairman-A 15.11.11.

The community police in the other two case sites were not involved to the same extent in resolving residents' problems and proactively seeking out suspected wrongdoers.

Despite being able to charge fees for their services, it was claimed by the *makamanda* that it was rare for income to exceed operational costs, such as renting the office and purchasing items such as stationery.<sup>112</sup> However, as discussed in the following chapter, other residents often assumed that leaders were making financial gains from CP.

### 5.5.2 *Mtaa B*

*Mtaa B* is located approximately 5.5 kilometres from the city centre. Most of *B* is planned, with wide dirt roads and large plots. Many of the houses are within walled compounds (see Figure 4). However, approximately one third of the area of the *mtaa* is unplanned and has much poorer quality housing that is not accessible by vehicle (see Figure 5). This area is locally referred to as the 'squatter area' and housing quality and infrastructure is similar to that of the majority of *mtaa A*. The chairman estimated the population of the *mtaa* to be 4000 people.<sup>113</sup>

*B* was formed in 2009 through the amalgamation of two pre-existing *mitaa*. The chairman, a retired policeman in his late 50s, was affiliated to CCM. He was a prosperous businessman, well-known in the city, with several enterprises, including a busy city centre restaurant, a garage and a lorry that he hired out. The *mtaa* government had an office, however this was rarely occupied by either the chairman or his councillors. An MEO acted as a secretary at public meetings, however he was also employed as a teacher and some complaints were made that this prevented him from fulfilling his duties in the *mtaa*.<sup>114</sup>

The nearest police station to *B* is located approximately two kilometres away. However, as this station does not have a vehicle it is likely that any police emergency response would have to come from Nyamagana District Police Headquarters in the city centre.

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<sup>112</sup> Interviews: *makamanda-A* 6 & 2 25.11.11.

<sup>113</sup> Interview chairman-B 28.1.11.

<sup>114</sup> Observation public meeting 20.2.11.





Figure 4: Photograph showing a typical street in the planned section of *mtaa* B. Taken by the author in November 2011.

### *CP in mtaa B*

The chairman was the first to establish *ulinzi shirikishi* in Mwanza, in 2005. As noted above, he was a retired police officer who claimed '*ulinzi ni kwenye damu*' (security is in my blood).<sup>115</sup> His *mtaa* was subsequently merged with another to form B in 2009. Despite attempts to do so, it had not proved possible to extend the CP system across the new larger *mtaa*. Thus in 2011 CP was practised in only half of *mtaa* B. Nevertheless, the *mtaa* was considered by local police to have a particularly successful example of CP in operation, and had also been honoured by visits from the Regional Commissioner and Regional Police Commissioner.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Interview chairman-B 2.12.10.

<sup>116</sup> Interview PK-B 3.3.11.




Figure 5: Photograph showing the unplanned area of *mtaa* B. Taken by the author in July 2011.

Rather than following a model similar to that of *sungusungu*, as was the case in A, it was decided that each house owner should contribute 1000 TSH each month in order to employ some unemployed local young people as night guards, and by-laws were introduced to this effect. Owners of businesses, such as guesthouses or small shops,



were charged 5000 TSH and those with cars paid 3000 TSH. The guards were promised a salary of 40,000 TSH per month.<sup>117</sup>

The guards recruited were aged between 17 and 29. Whilst the youngest was in secondary school, the majority were also working in low paid jobs in the daytime. The group included a painter, several *dala dala* (shared minibus taxi) conductors, factory employees and one driver. Most had completed only primary school education. All of the guards were male, although they claimed that should they be required to arrest or search a woman they would ask the female *mtaa* secretary or a female ten-cell leader to do so.<sup>118</sup>

A security committee, with both male and female members, was selected at a public meeting in order to oversee the guards and organise collection of money to pay them. All members were aged 45 and above. In practice, however, there was no oversight of the guards' nocturnal activities beyond a requirement that they complete a register to monitor attendance.

Each night the young guards conducted a patrol, armed with various weapons including machetes, an iron bar, a spear, batons and a bow and arrow. Any person encountered in the *mtaa* at night was challenged to ascertain that they were residents of the area and had an acceptable reason for being abroad at night. The guards were expected to escort those suspected of having committed a criminal offence to the *mtaa* chairman, who might subsequently direct them to take the suspect to the police station.

Unlike in *mtaa A*, it was not common for residents to report crimes to the community police. They did not have an office or uniforms, were not available during the daytime and their identities and contact details were not necessarily known to other residents. Therefore none of those interviewed in B said that they would report crimes to the guards. However, the community police did sometimes respond to community concerns and might conduct their own surveillance and investigation at night, for example by sharing their phone numbers with those who were suspicious of their neighbours, so that the guards could be alerted to any unusual activity and track the suspect's nocturnal movements.

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<sup>117</sup> This is a relatively small amount. Renting a room in the area could cost up to 30,000 TSH per month.

<sup>118</sup> Interview guard-B M 20.11.11.

### 5.5.3 *Mtaa C*

C is located in a ward that was characterised as ‘rural’ by the council in 2007 (MCC 2007), and is approximately 12 km from the city centre. The area has experienced rapid population growth in recent years and now appears more like a satellite town to the city of Mwanza, with many shops, restaurants, a market and high frequency minibus-taxi connections to the city centre. There are still large cultivated plots on the borders of the *mtaa*, however, and many residents engage in agriculture.

What is now *mtaa C* was settled by several Sukuma families and their livestock in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and some of the offspring of these early inhabitants were still resident in the area in 2011. The area remained very sparsely populated until the mid-1990s, at which time there was only one expensive bus to Mwanza town each day.<sup>119</sup> However, by 2011, through the gifting of plots to family members and subdivision and sale of other land, the population had greatly increased and population density was similar to that of the planned areas of *mtaa B*. Although the area is now multi-ethnic, and many earlier Sukuma residents have moved out to more rural areas,<sup>120</sup> it was more common to hear Kisukuma spoken in C than in the other two case sites and this was the only area in which some research participants preferred to speak Kisukuma, rather than Kiswahili, during interviews. The chairman estimated the population of the area to be 2800.<sup>121</sup>

The *mtaa* is unplanned, but in contrast to A there is much more space for building due to the relatively recent sub-division of plots, and plots and houses tend to be larger (see Figures 6 and 7). Many of the houses were newly built or still under construction. Although the newer houses are typically fairly large and constructed from concrete, the process of construction can be a very long one and many residents were living in unfinished houses while they attempted to save money to finish building. Some of the area’s poorer residents were tenants living with virtually no material possessions or furniture in large unfinished houses in order to protect the owner’s property during construction. The area represents both a cheaper alternative to building in the city centre for the relatively poor, and an opportunity for the wealthy to construct the large houses they desire where there is still space to do so. There was thus considerable variation in quality and size of housing and in the socio-economic status of residents. Most of the *mtaa* is accessible by dirt roads and paths, however these can rapidly become impassable when it rains.

<sup>119</sup> Interview father of chairman-C 22.8.11.

<sup>120</sup> Interview chairman-C 5.7.11.

<sup>121</sup> Interview chairman-C 5.7.11.



Figure 6: Photograph showing open cultivated area and housing in the centre of *mtaa* C. Taken by the author in November 2011.

The elected chairman of the ward was a local businessman in his early 40s, running a successful family cattle business. Like the chairmen of the other two case sites, he was affiliated to CCM. He and the *mtaa* secretary carried out the bulk of the work of the *mtaa* government, and the chairman was dismissive of the abilities of the other councillors, who played no role in organising or overseeing CP in the *mtaa*. There was no *mtaa* office so residents in need of assistance contacted the chairman by mobile phone or visited his home in the evenings. There is a WEO who works at the nearby ward office, however upon her attendance at a meeting of ten-cell leaders the chairman found it necessary to introduce her to those present and explain that residents could approach her if necessary.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Observation of public meeting 5.8.11.





Figure 7: Photograph showing housing and partially flooded path in *mtaa* C. Taken by the author in November 2011.

The nearest police station is located approximately 2.5 kilometres away by road. However, the station does not have a vehicle, and any emergency response would thus come from the Nyamagana Police District Headquarters, 12 km away, or from police on patrol.

### *CP in mtaa C*

In 2008 *mtaa C* was the last of the three case sites to adopt CP, although as noted above a less formalised system had been in operation prior to this time. In C the terminology of *sungusungu* was reintroduced and an *ntemi* and *mtware* were selected, as well as a secretary and other *makamanda*, all of whom were male retirees. Unlike in A, a deliberate effort was made to separate the leadership of *sungusungu* from the *mtaa* government, as the chairman had little faith in the capacity of most of his elected councillors to respond to local problems, viewing them as having been selected '*kwa ushabiki*' (according to their popularity), rather than for relevant skills.<sup>123</sup>

#### *Crime prevention*

All able-bodied men who did not have conflicting work commitments were required to participate in night patrols, in accordance with a timetable organised around CCM's ten-cell structure. Women were not included in patrols because it was doubted that they had sufficient physical strength and some had complained that participation would interfere with childcare.<sup>124</sup> In contrast to the other two sites, it was not initially considered necessary to formalise a system of collecting contributions from residents to support nightly patrols and expenses were collected on an *ad hoc* basis from relatively wealthy residents.

A by-law was introduced to compel participation in CP and the chairman reported that in the early stages of implementation six residents had received a short prison sentence following referral to the police over infringements.<sup>125</sup> However, initial rigorous enforcement of the rules seems to have been short lived as the system was in place for only four months, after which time the *mtware* was removed from his post and a recently arrived retired soldier was selected to replace him. Despite efforts to revive the system, ten-cell leaders were lax in providing names of residents who could be called upon to patrol and, although outright refusal was rare, it was common for residents to claim injury or other mitigating circumstances to avoid attending to patrol.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Interview chairman-C 5.7.11.

<sup>124</sup> Interview chairman-C 2.2.11.

<sup>125</sup> Interview chairman-C 2.2.11.

<sup>126</sup> Interview *mtware*-C 22.8.11.

The difficulty in organising regular patrols led leaders to alter the system, and in September 2010 ten-cell leaders were asked to collect 2000 TSH from each household in order to employ local young people to guard. However, of 54 ten-cell leaders, only 14 provided any money, and even those that did so had not collected from all households under their jurisdiction. When a meeting was held in early August 2011 to try to encourage those who had not collected contributions to do so, only 16 of the *mtaa*'s 54 ten-cell leaders attended.<sup>127</sup>

By October 2011, these proposals had been abandoned and the leaders had reverted to '*utaratibu wa jadi*' (the traditional system),<sup>128</sup> whereby ten-cell leaders were required to provide the names of participants in accordance with a timetable. The 'volunteers' were accompanied by one of the leaders of *sungusungu*. Although at the time women were not involved in patrolling, it had been hoped to employ some female guards, and the secretary of *sungusungu* felt that female involvement in apprehending and guarding suspects was important as in 1995 one *mtware* had been accused of sexually assaulting a female detainee.<sup>129</sup>

Any apprehended person was secured in a small lock up adjoining the *sungusungu* office and then questioned by the '*wazee*' (old men, referring to the leaders of *sungusungu*).<sup>130</sup> In the case of a criminal complaint the detainee was taken to the police station. The secretary of *sungusungu* emphasised that unlike the former *sungusungu*, today's guards did not routinely dole out corporal punishment. However, he also noted that if the person detained appeared to have sustained injuries at the hands of those patrolling or by other means, the police were called immediately so that the *sungusungu* leadership should not be seen as culpable for the injuries.<sup>131</sup>

Although patrols had been revived by late 2011, they were not organised every night. It became apparent during the research that many residents of C were either unaware that CP was in operation in the *mtaa* or had very little knowledge about what the *sungusungu* were doing, or were supposed to be doing, and this is discussed further in the following chapter.

<sup>127</sup> Observation of public meeting 5.8.11.

<sup>128</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>129</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>130</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>131</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

### *Investigation and dispute resolution*

The *sungusungu* had a small office on which the telephone numbers of the *ntemi* and *mtware* were painted. If an incident was reported to the *sungusungu* they decided whether it should immediately be reported to the police. Minor incidents such as fighting, disputes over debts or cases of petty theft when the perpetrator had apologised were dealt with in the office.<sup>132</sup> If *sungusungu* were required to retrieve a party to a dispute or a suspected offender the individual concerned was charged 4000 TSH. Half of this money was used for office overheads and the remainder shared amongst those who had completed the job. The secretary of *sungusungu* claimed that fines were not imposed, as '*sisi sio mahakama*' (we are not a court).<sup>133</sup> As noted above, however, knowledge of the activities of *sungusungu* was limited and for many the *mtaa* chairman was probably their first recourse in case of a dispute.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced Mwanza, Tanzania's second largest city, and outlined the structure of urban administration. The lowest level of urban government, the *serikali ya mtaa* (sub-ward government), is intended to be responsible for implementing CP. These elected bodies do not receive any regular funding from the central government and are composed of volunteers, and possibly one salaried executive officer. The chairpersons of Mwanza's *mitaa* have been educated by police as to their responsibilities with regard to CP, however they retain considerable discretion over how CP is actually implemented, and whether any further action is taken at all. The practices described as *polisi jamii* or *ulinzi shirikishi* thus varied considerably between the three case sites.

In *mtaa A* the *mtaa* councillors and others were selected as *makamanda* (commanders) of CP. Residents were obliged to participate in night patrols led by the *makamanda* in accordance with a monthly timetable. In addition to preventative patrols, the *makamanda* resolved disputes, arrested suspected criminals or disputants for a fee, and offered security provision for special events such as funerals.

In *mtaa B*, an elected security committee collected a monthly levy from residents in order to employ local young men as night guards. The guards conducted patrols around the *mtaa* but did not play a role in investigating local crime. The system

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<sup>132</sup> Interview *mtware*-C 22.8.11.

<sup>133</sup> Interview 23.11.11.

operated in only half of the *mtaa*, as it had not been possible to extend patrols and revenue collection since the size of the *mtaa* was increased in 2009.

In *mtaa C*, leaders were elected to organise *sungusungu* and an office was constructed. However, residents consistently failed to report to patrol, and leaders decided to collect money to employ some young men to guard the area. This was also unsuccessful and a system based on voluntary night patrols was reintroduced. However, many residents were not aware that there was any system of CP in place and had neither participated in patrols nor contributed funds.

The following chapter explores the performance CP in the three *mitaa* more critically, and in particular the impact of CP on perceptions of local safety, how well collective participation in CP was sustained in the three *mitaa*, the extent to which CP as practised constituted a response to popular demands, and the differential impact of CP on various sectors of the neighbourhoods introduced above.



## Chapter 6: Outcomes and Experiences of Participation in *Ulinzi Shirikishi*

In this chapter, the performance of CP institutions is assessed across four dimensions: their impact upon popular perceptions of neighbourhood safety and local crime; how well collective action was sustained; the distribution of the costs and benefits of participating in CP across communities; and finally, the extent to which CP as practised in the three case sites constituted the kind of service residents wanted.

In the following section, the impact of CP on popular and police perceptions of public safety in the three *mitaa* is explored through data collected during the survey and interviews with elected local leaders and local police. Both residents and police were largely positive about the impact of CP where it was operating, and described considerable improvements in local safety and reduced crime rates. However, sustaining collective action in the interests of local safety proved very difficult. Section 6.2 describes how collective action problems were overcome in *mtaa* A due to a strict sanctions regime, whereas in B and C, participation was either intermittent or partial and rules were not enforced.

Section 6.3 outlines the unequal way in which the costs and benefits of participating in CP were distributed within 'communities'. Whilst leaders were sometimes able to secure legitimate, and possibly illegitimate, private benefits through policing, *ulinzi shirikishi* was sometimes experienced by other residents largely as an obligation to provide labour or money. These burdens were particularly onerous for the relatively poor.

Section 6.4 addresses for whom *ulinzi shirikishi* provided security, and from whom or what residents were protected (Luckham 2007: 690). Collective benefits were generated through night patrols, which prevented crime and made neighbourhoods safer. However, when the community police charged for services some were unable to afford their help, and future opportunities to make neighbourhood policing more commercialised may reduce the 'community' orientation of *ulinzi shirikishi*. Young people were widely considered a potential threat to others living in the *mtaa*, particularly when they congregated in public spaces. Thus some young people, and particularly males, experienced CP as an intensification of gerontocratic authority over the *mitaa*, which restricted their freedom of movement.

The final section addresses the extent to which CP provided a service that was responsive to local demands. The ‘local’ nature of CP offered several advantages over state provision of policing, including proximity to residential areas. However, although CP was valued for its impact on local safety, in all three *mitaa* it also generated suspicion and resentment, particularly in *mtaa* A, where some residents felt coerced into participation and excluded from decision making processes.

## 6.1 How effective was CP at improving neighbourhood security and policing?

The following analysis draws largely on the perceptions of residents, police and local leaders of security in their neighbourhoods before the introduction of CP and since, and their assessments of the impact of CP. Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain recorded crime statistics compiled at the *mtaa* level because police jurisdictions do not correspond to the administrative *mitaa*. The additional problems with relying upon recorded crime statistics in this context and the difficulty of assessing CP from rates of reported crime were discussed in Chapter 4 (4.2.1).

### 6.1.1 Perspectives of *mitaa* leaders

In all three areas elected local leaders, including *mitaa* chairmen and councillors and security committee members, gave unanimously positive assessments of improvements in local security since the introduction of CP, claiming that overall crime rates and the severity of crime were significantly reduced.<sup>134</sup> Leaders compared their areas to neighbouring *mitaa* to illustrate the superior security in their jurisdictions. The chairman of A, for example, explained that a motorbike taxi driver asked to deliver a passenger to the ward would agree to drive as far as his *mtaa* office, knowing this area to be safe, but would refuse to venture into neighbouring areas.<sup>135</sup> In B, the MEO claimed that people chose to move to the *mtaa* due to its reputation for superior security.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Interviews: *makamanda*-A 11.11.10; chairman-A 1.12.10; chairman-B 2.12.10; chairman-C 2.2.11; *ntemi*-C 10.7.11; *mtware*-C 8.11.11; secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>135</sup> Interview chairman-A 22.2.11.

<sup>136</sup> Observation of public meeting in B 20.2.11.

### 6.1.2 Perspectives of local police

The *polisi kata* (ward police officers)<sup>137</sup> responsible for all three *mitaa* were unanimously positive regarding the impact of CP institutions on crime in their respective areas and emphasised that their own jobs had become easier since these were established. Their comments supported the observation of the head of the CP office within the national police headquarters that police officers were usually grateful for CP as previously they had been carrying an ‘unnecessary load’, whereas now civilians were shouldering some of this burden.<sup>138</sup> The *polisi kata* responsible for *mtaa* B, for example, claimed that at present the area was ‘*salama sana, salama kabisa*’ (very safe, completely safe), whereas prior to the establishment of CP institutions it was ‘*tofauti kabisa... shida kubwa*’ (completely different... a big problem) as it had been the police alone who were responsible for tackling crime.<sup>139</sup> Similarly in A, one of the two *polisi kata* claimed that today ‘*kuna amani sana kabisa*’ (it is completely peaceful), in contrast to the period prior to *polisi jamii* when people had not recognised their own responsibility for crime prevention.<sup>140</sup>

### 6.1.3 Perspectives of *mitaa* residents

The 108 residents surveyed in the three *mitaa* were asked about their perceptions of the safety of their person and property before CP was introduced in the area and since in four hypothetical situations: when walking alone in the *mtaa* in the daytime and at night, when alone in their homes at night, and when valuable possessions were left in an unoccupied house. As some of the residents had moved to the *mtaa* since CP had been established, or were not aware of the existence of CP, they were not asked to provide a perspective on safety before CP was introduced. Percentages referred to here regarding perceptions of safety before establishment of CP thus refer only to the proportion of those respondents who had been resident in the *mtaa* for a sufficiently long period of time to answer this question. Unless otherwise specified, survey data for *mtaa* B presented in this section refers only to responses collected in the part of the *mtaa* in which CP was active, in order to provide a better representation of popular opinion of CP where it was functioning.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>137</sup> The position of *polisi kata* was introduced as part of the community policing reforms (see 3.4).

<sup>138</sup> Interview ACP-K 25.3.11.

<sup>139</sup> Interview PK-B 3.3.11.

<sup>140</sup> Interview PK2-A 7.2.11.

<sup>141</sup> Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

Table 3 shows the overall results obtained for questions regarding perceptions of local security before and since CP was introduced. The following section disaggregates the results by case site and explores the contrast between responses in *mtaa* A and B, where CP was operating relatively consistently at the time of the survey and residents were generally very familiar with the system, and *mtaa* C, where leaders had failed to establish regular CP activities and a third (33%) of those interviewed were either unaware of the existence of CP institutions or were unfamiliar with their activities.

**Table 3: Perceptions of safety in the three case sites, before and since CP was introduced.**

	Before CP was introduced (n=66)		Since CP was introduced (n=108)	
	Not safe/very dangerous (%)	Quite safe/very safe (%)	Not safe/very dangerous (%)	Quite safe/very safe (%)
How safe was/is it to walk around the area alone during the daytime?	14	86	4	96
How safe was/is it to walk around the area alone at night?	77	18	44	54
How safe was/is it to be at home alone at night?	47	52	19	80
How safe was/is it to leave valuable items in your home?	71	29	38	61

### *Perceptions of safety before CP began and since*

Mwanza's crowded informal settlements, like that in which *mtaa* A was located, are considered to be particularly crime-affected parts of the city (e.g. Joel 2009).<sup>142</sup> Over half (53%) of respondents in *mtaa* A reported that they, or a member of their household, had been a victim of crime since they had moved to the area,<sup>143</sup> sometimes multiple times, and the large majority of incidents had occurred at home or elsewhere in the *mtaa*. These included burglary (22% of respondents) and robbery where force was used (17% of respondents). Complaints made by residents about the period prior to the start of *ulinzi shirikishi* in *mtaa* A included the ubiquity of *vibaka* (petty thieves) who stole phones, bags and even people's clothes and shoes, and were sometimes armed with knives.<sup>144</sup> *Wadokozi* (opportunistic thieves), who stole items carelessly left outside houses, were also considered to have been a problem.<sup>145</sup> A more serious threat was posed by *majambazi* (armed thieves, thugs) who used *fatuma* (large stones) to break people's doors.<sup>146</sup> At night would-be thieves were reported to pass between houses, looking for unoccupied dwellings and households with valuable property, meaning

<sup>142</sup> Also interviews: Sgt-Nyamagana 24.1.11; PSC1 19.2.11.

<sup>143</sup> All incidents mentioned had occurred since 2004.

<sup>144</sup> Survey respondents: 1; 19; 20; 21; 22; 24; 31; 32; 35.

<sup>145</sup> Survey respondents: 15; 31.

<sup>146</sup> Survey respondents: 4; 28.

that televisions and radios had to remain silent.<sup>147</sup> Some residents claimed that those who wished to use the cover of night for illegal activities threw stones at other residents to persuade them to retreat indoors and leave the coast clear.<sup>148</sup> Before CP was introduced, motorbike taxi drivers considered it too dangerous to deliver passengers to the majority of the *mtaa*.<sup>149</sup> Women were considered particularly vulnerable to crime before CP was introduced,<sup>150</sup> including young girls who risked becoming victims of robbery and sexual assault on their way home from school.<sup>151</sup>

When asked about security in the present, many fewer residents considered the area to be unsafe than had done so before CP started. There was a corresponding increase in the number of people who felt safe in the *mtaa* since CP had started, as illustrated by Figure 8. Only one of those interviewed considered the area to be ‘very dangerous’ at night in the present, and 47% said it was now ‘very safe’. This pattern was also apparent when residents were asked about their safety when at home alone at night and the likelihood that items left in their home would be stolen (see Figures 9 and 10). There was little difference between women and men’s feelings about their personal safety in the area, and in fact women were more likely to feel safe at night.

A common indication given of the relative safety of the area was the fact that items, such as utensils, could now be left outside the house without fear that they would be stolen.<sup>152</sup> During patrols observed, the chairman proudly pointed out laundry left drying outside houses overnight. Others emphasised that it was now possible to walk the streets at night without fear,<sup>153</sup> even when using a mobile phone.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Survey respondents: 8; 29; 32.

<sup>148</sup> Survey respondents: 29; 36.

<sup>149</sup> Interview chairman-A 22.2.11.

<sup>150</sup> Survey respondents: 5; 31; 32. Interviews: TCL-A 1 16.2.11; TCL-A 12 17.2.11; TCL-A 6 17.2.11.

<sup>151</sup> Survey respondents: 3; 17. Interviews: TCL-A 1 16.2.11; *kamanda*-A 1 15.7.11.

<sup>152</sup> Survey respondents: 9; 15. Interviews: TCL-A 3 17.2.11; TCL-A 2 23.2.11; TCL-A 4 23.2.11; TCL-A 10 25.2.11.

<sup>153</sup> Survey respondents: 27; 30; 36. Interviews: TCL-A 12 17.2.11; TCL-A 5 25.2.11.

<sup>154</sup> Survey-36.




Figure 8: Perceptions of safety when walking alone at night in *mtaa* A.Figure 9: Perceptions of safety when at home alone at night in *mtaa* A.

Figure 10: Perceptions of safety of valuable items left at home in *mtaa* A.



In *mtaa* B, a smaller proportion of residents (39%) claimed that they had been a victim of crime since moving to the area than was the case in A. The incidents reported were also typically less serious, being mainly petty theft of household items. However, some residents complained that before CP started a person moving around the *mtaa* at night was liable to be robbed and that opportunistic theft from outside and inside homes was common.<sup>155</sup>

As in *mtaa* A, there was a positive change in perceptions of personal safety in the *mtaa* since CP was introduced (see Figures 11 & 12). The difference between responses given by men and women was negligible. 71% of those interviewed considered the *mtaa* to be safe at night in the present, which was the highest proportion of any of the three sites. Respondents were also more likely than in the other case sites to consider it to be safe to be at home alone (100%) and to leave valuable items in their homes (79%). The latter proportion represented a considerable increase from the 21% who thought it had been safe to leave property at home when there was no community security system. (Figure 13).

<sup>155</sup> Survey respondents: 37; 39; 41; 45; 48; 58; 60; 62; 66; 69; 72.

Figure 11: Perceptions of safety when walking alone at night in *mtaa* B.




Figure 12: Perceptions of safety when at home alone at night in *mtaa* B.







Figure 13: Perceptions of safety of valuable items left at home in *mtaa* B.



In *mtaa* C, however, where *ulinzi shirikishi* had lapsed before the survey was conducted and leaders were struggling to reform the system, there was no such clear difference between perceptions of safety prior to and since the concept of *ulinzi shirikishi* was introduced in the *mtaa* (see Figures 14-16). Whilst residents were more likely than residents of the other *mitaa* to consider the area to have been relatively safe before CP was attempted, they were also more likely to consider the area to be dangerous in the present.

Figure 14: Perceptions of safety when walking alone at night in *mtaa* C.




Figure 15: Perceptions of safety when at home alone at night in *mtaa* C.




Figure 16: Perceptions of the safety of valuable items left at home in *mtaa* C.





Figure 17 provides a comparative picture of perceptions of safety at night in the three *mitaa* at the time the survey was carried out. It is notable that in A and B the proportion of residents who considered their area to be safe at night was over twice as large as those who gave this response in C. The chart also shows the findings of a victimisation survey carried out in Mwanza and other urban areas of Tanzania in 2008 (UNODC

2009).<sup>156</sup> Residents of A and B were more likely to feel safe in their neighbourhoods at night than participants in the victimisation survey, whereas respondents in *mtaa* C were likely to feel less safe. The proportion of all respondents who considered their neighbourhood to be safe/not safe at night is the same as that reported in the victimisation survey.

**Figure 17: Perceptions of safety of walking alone at night in the three case sites and in other urban areas of Tanzania.**



Source: survey data collected by author and UNODC (2009).

It was notable that, in contrast to the other two *mitaa*, women in *mtaa* C were more likely than men to consider the area to be unsafe. Only three of the 18 women interviewed in the *mtaa* felt that it was safe to walk around the area after dark, and half of the women felt it was not safe for them to be at home alone at night. *Vibaka*, sometimes armed with knives, made the area unsafe at night,<sup>157</sup> and women were particularly vulnerable to theft in the streets, and when in their homes.<sup>158</sup> 42% of those interviewed in *mtaa* C claimed that they or a family member had been a victim of crime since moving to the *mtaa*, and a large majority of these incidents had taken place at home or in the neighbourhood. A quarter of all respondents had experienced burglary or attempted burglary. In August 2011, when the survey was carried out, seven of those interviewed had already been victims of crime that year.

<sup>156</sup> The survey involved 1,888 households in Dodoma, Mbeya, Moshi, Mwanza and Tanga.

<sup>157</sup> Survey respondents: 75; 80; 81; 82; 84; 87; 95; 99; 103; 105; 107.

<sup>158</sup> Survey respondents: 75; 94; 103; 108.

*Did community policing make a difference?*

The data explored above regarding residents' perceptions of safety both before and since CP was introduced suggest that CP had an impact on how safe respondents felt in their neighbourhoods. In the area in which CP did not endure, residents were more likely to feel unsafe when walking alone in the *mtaa*, when at home on their own and to fear that valuable items might be stolen from their homes. This was the case despite the fact that in those areas where CP was now practised, residents had felt less safe before CP was introduced.

Survey participants were also asked to rate the extent to which they thought that CP had improved safety in the *mtaa*.<sup>159</sup> In both A and B the large majority of respondents felt that CP had had an impact on the safety of their area. 90% in A and 100% of respondents in B said that CP had helped 'a lot' or 'to some extent' to improve safety in the *mtaa*. 89% of those residents of *mtaa* C who were aware that CP had been initiated considered CP to have had a beneficial impact on local safety.

The success of *ulinzi shirikishi* in improving safety was attributed to the deterrent effect of patrols, which stopped would-be thieves from entering the area,<sup>160</sup> and the investigative skills of the community police, who were local residents themselves, and thus able to identify criminals operating in the neighbourhood.<sup>161</sup>

Respondents were also asked to rate the ability of the community police to prevent and investigate crime in the *mtaa* (see Figure 18). In both A and B<sup>162</sup> the majority gave positive appraisals of the ability of the community police to prevent crime (58% and 68% respectively). In C, however, only 28% gave an unequivocally positive appraisal of crime prevention through CP, probably reflecting the intermittent nature of patrols. A high proportion (42%) said that the community police did nothing at all to prevent crime in the *mtaa*.

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
<sup>159</sup> Only those who had been resident in the *mtaa* since before the introduction of CP were asked this question and percentages given refer to the proportion of these respondents, rather than of the total number of respondents.

<sup>160</sup> Survey respondents: 26; 31; 40; 88.

<sup>161</sup> Survey respondents: 19; 26; 33; 77; 96.


<sup>162</sup> Percentages refer to respondents resident in area of *mtaa* B where CP was operating only.

Figure 18: Perceptions of the ability of the community police to prevent neighbourhood crime.



Respondents were also asked to rate the ability of the community police to investigate crime in the *mtaa*. In A, where investigation and dispute resolution were significant components of community policing, preventative and investigative activities received almost equal ranking, with over half of respondents considering *ulinzi shirikishi* to be 'very good' or 'good' at investigating crime. Unsurprisingly the investigative functions of guards in B were not ranked as highly as their activities were largely limited to patrolling and crimes were not usually reported to them. In *mtaa C*, 36% thought that *sungusungu* were good at investigating crimes, however 39% said they did nothing at all to investigate crime (Figure 19), reflecting the sizeable proportion of the population who were not aware there was a CP system in place.

Figure 19: Perceptions of the ability of the community police to investigate neighbourhood crime.



### Community policing versus state policing

Tanzania has a very low police to population ratio and the police force struggles with significant shortages of human and material resources, and crucially stations often lack means of transport, meaning that police are rarely seen in residential areas outside of the city centre. Thus it was not surprising that over a third of those surveyed in all three of the sites (34%) said that the police did not do anything to prevent crime in their *mtaa*. This proportion was consistent across A, B and C (33%, 36% and 33% respectively), despite the variation in distance to the nearest police station. The police were frequently described as confining their patrols to main roads, which could be passed by vehicle, rather than entering the *vichochoro* (narrow footpaths between houses) where people actually live and where crimes are committed.<sup>163</sup> In the words of one interviewee in *mtaa* B: ‘the police are only found in the important areas, not with *wananchi* (ordinary people)’.<sup>164</sup> Police were also widely criticised for taking a long time to respond to reported incidents.<sup>165</sup>

<sup>163</sup> Survey respondents: 6; 20; 28; 29; 62; 90; 92. Interviews: TCL-A 6 17.2.11; TCL-A 7 23.2.11; TCL-B 7 8.2.11.

<sup>164</sup> Survey-62.

<sup>165</sup> Interviews: TCL-C 3 17.11.11; *kamanda*-A 2 25.11.11. 24 (22%) of the survey participants also spontaneously mentioned this to explain why they considered the police to be ineffective in preventing crime in the *mtaa*. It is possible that a higher proportion of residents would have expressed this view had a question that asked directly about police response time been included.

Employing a commercial security guard was not feasible financially for the large majority of residents of the three case sites. Only one participant in the survey (resident in *mtaa* C) had a guard at their residence, as the compound also contained their business premises. In this context, CP was welcomed as a service that was otherwise largely absent. This was reflected in residents' attitudes regarding the contribution of time or money towards CP. As one resident of A explained, 'people need *ulinzi* (security). If we didn't contribute what could we depend on?'<sup>166</sup> In contrast, when CP was not in place, options could be limited:

If the police catch people they can pay a bribe to be set free... In the past I would have gone to the ten-cell leader, but now it would have to be the police. But all they do is give you an RB.<sup>167</sup>  
If you pay a bribe they will find the suspect. Corruption puts us at risk. Really I have nowhere to go for help.<sup>168</sup>

The community police, in contrast, offered a very localised service, in terms of both proximity to people's dwellings and familiarity with the local context. Over half of respondents (51%) said they would prefer to report a crime to an actor within the *mtaa*, either the chairman, a ten-cell leader or the community police, whereas only 35% said they would go straight to the police.<sup>169</sup>

The community police were also 'closer' to the community in terms of their experience of living amongst the population being policed, and were thus assumed to know which residents were involved in criminal activities.<sup>170</sup> As one survey participant in C explained, 'they are closer to us than the police and they have the ability [to investigate crimes in the *mtaa*] because they live with the community and the *vibaka* [petty criminals]'<sup>171</sup> It was possible to report suspicions to the community police without being required to provide evidence, and they would sometimes undertake to gather evidence themselves through nocturnal surveillance. Residents of A and B, where CP had operated consistently over the past two to six years, were more likely to positively

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<sup>166</sup> Survey-17.

<sup>167</sup> Report book number, which indicates that a statement has been recorded.

<sup>168</sup> Survey-92 (unemployed 32 year old male resident in *mtaa* C).


<sup>169</sup> For 10% reporting preference was affected by the type of incident. A small theft, for example, would be reported to the *mtaa* chairperson whilst a more serious offence would be reported to the police. The full findings of the Afrobarometer 2011 survey in Tanzania had not been released at the time of writing, however the 35% of respondents who preferred to report crimes to the police can be compared to 62% in urban Kenya (Afrobarometer 2012b), and 41% in urban Uganda (Afrobarometer 2012b).

<sup>170</sup> Survey respondents: 19; 26; 31; 33; 83; 96. Interview TCL-C 3 17.11.11.

<sup>171</sup> Survey-83 (24 year old female, occasional water seller).

rate the ability of the community police to prevent crime than they were to praise the police (see Figure 20).<sup>172</sup>

**Figure 20: Assessments of the ability of the community police/police to prevent neighbourhood crime (A and B only) (n=64).**



Other commonly voiced criticisms of the police related to their lack of action upon reported crimes, whereby the victim is expected to arrest a suspected perpetrator themselves and deliver them to the police. The police were also accused of demanding money before performing any service, which had led some survey respondents to abandon cases lodged with the police when the costs became prohibitive.<sup>173</sup> Officers were also considered likely to accept bribes from those arrested and release them, possibly putting those who report a crime at risk (see also Plyler 2007: 133-134). Thus the chairman of A complained:

The police and the courts are very problematic. You might know a person who's a thief and take them to the police, but after a few weeks you see they are back walking around and if you ask them they say he has not been charged according to the law.<sup>174</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Positive responses were either 'very good' or 'good'. Negative responses were 'not good', 'very bad' or 'they do not do anything to prevent crime in the *mtaa*'. The overall percentage of respondents in all three *mitaa* who rated the police capacity to prevent crime in the *mtaa* as 'good' or 'very good' was 29%, which is much lower than the 51% of Tanzanians who said the government was doing well at reducing crime according to the 2011 Afrobarometer survey (Afrobarometer 2012a).

<sup>173</sup> Survey respondents: 8; 82.

<sup>174</sup> Interview chairman-A 13.1.11.



Such claims are possibly partly related to misunderstanding of laws governing due process and bail procedures. However, as outlined in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.2) the police have consistently been rated the most corrupt public institution in popular surveys conducted in Tanzania.

## 6.2 Collective participation in community policing

Despite the large majority of survey respondents considering it 'fair' to participate in or contribute to CP in principle, in all three areas the community police had consistent problems in sustaining the collective action necessary for *ulinzi shirikishi*.

In only one of the case sites (A) was CP sustained throughout the entire fieldwork period (October 2010 – November 2011). This was largely the result of a strong sanctions regime, and the selective benefits available to leadership, discussed in sections 6.2.4 and 6.3.2. In *mitaa* B and C, participation was less rigorously monitored and enforced and lack of trust in leaders decreased the likelihood that residents would contribute funds for CP.

### 6.2.1 Popular acceptance of the principle of participation

A very high proportion of survey respondents, 89%, considered it 'fair' to participate in or contribute financially to CP institutions. This was consistent across the three *mitaa*, despite many in C being yet to see any improvement in local security as a result of CP. Typical explanations for this included the assertion that it was fair as '*ulinzi ni wa kila mtu*' (security is for every person),<sup>175</sup> and the amount of money required was small.<sup>176</sup> Others stressed the idea that contributing or participating was a necessity as there was no alternative to community action, implying police and government inability or unwillingness to provide security.<sup>177</sup> However, in practice acceptance of the fairness of cooperating in CP and the necessity of doing so did not preclude considerable difficulty in organising the collective action required.

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<sup>175</sup> Survey respondents: 16; 25; 48.

<sup>176</sup> Survey respondents: 35; 62; 69; 72.

<sup>177</sup> Survey respondents: 17; 61.

### 6.2.2 Failure to institutionalise CP in *mtaa* C

The difficulties leaders faced in organising CP in *mtaa* C were outlined in the previous chapter (5.5.3). Although by November 2011 occasional patrols were carried out, a third (33%) of those surveyed in the *mtaa* were either unaware that CP had been introduced or thought that the idea had been abandoned. 42% said that neither they nor a member of their household had ever participated in or contributed money for CP.

The secretary of *sungusungu* explained that attempts to collect contributions from residents were hindered by a lack of popular understanding about what the money was for and the aims of CP more broadly.<sup>178</sup> Public meetings about CP had been poorly attended and no subsequent attempts were made to popularise the idea. There were no procedures in place for monitoring collection of funds and identifying those who had failed to do so. Sanctions were not enforced for failure to contribute funds or to participate in patrols. In addition suspicions of the chair of the security committee, who was thought to have abused his position in the past, made ten-cell leaders reluctant to collect funds and prevented others from contributing.<sup>179</sup> The chairman of the security committee was subsequently removed from his post and when the research was concluded in November 2011 had not yet been replaced.

### 6.2.3 Partial institutionalisation of CP in *mtaa* B

The chairman of B, a retired police officer, held a strong personal commitment to maintaining security in his *mtaa*. However, despite his pride in having been the first to start *ulinzi shirikishi* in Mwanza, he had on many occasions considered ending the system due to persistent failure to collect a sufficient amount of money from residents to pay the community guards their agreed salaries.<sup>180</sup> Furthermore, CP activities occurred in only half of the *mtaa* as following the merger of two pre-existing *mitaa* in 2009 to form the new administrative unit of B, CP had not been extended across the entire area, despite the chairman's desire to do so.

When CP was established in 2005, 20 young men from the *mtaa* were employed as guards. However, when full payment was not received over consecutive months, the guards ceased reporting for duty. By February 2011 only half of the original group

<sup>178</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>179</sup> Interviews: *mtware*-C 24.8.11; secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11; TCL-C 3 17.11.11.

<sup>180</sup> Interviews chairman-B 2.12.10 & 28.1.11.

remained, the others having found alternative employment. The shortfall in funding was initially blamed by leaders and the guards themselves on residents' failure to contribute as required. As was the case in C, it was rare for a person to refuse to give money. However, delaying payment or claiming that a spouse had not left money for the payment was common.<sup>181</sup>

Attempts were made to increase the amount of money collected. Tenants, as well as homeowners, were asked to contribute. Ten-cell leaders carried out a census to establish the number of those eligible to pay. Although this led to an initial increase in payment received by the guards, and some young men who had previously stopped participating returned to work, by October 2011 there were only seven guards remaining, and they complained they had not been paid since August.<sup>182</sup> At this time the young men stopped going to patrol at night without informing the *mtaa* chairman of their decision. When this was revealed at a public meeting those present were angry and many claimed that crime had increased during this period. It was deemed essential that guarding should resume.<sup>183</sup> The chairman and security committee again emphasised the importance of increasing revenue collection, claiming that residents of the unplanned section of the *mtaa*, the relatively poor, were the worst offenders. This explanation was contested by one security committee member, however, who accused his colleagues of embezzlement at a public meeting in October 2011.<sup>184</sup>

The chairman had attempted to extend the system of CP operating into the remainder of the *mtaa*. However, he claimed to have difficulties in organising public meetings all residents would attend, due to the size of the area. Several ten-cell leaders, one of whom was the former chairman of the area, suggested that people did not consider CP to be necessary as individuals were able to take private measures to improve security, by purchasing guns that could be fired in the air to deter would-be criminals,<sup>185</sup> or hiring private security guards and building walls around their houses.<sup>186</sup> In the words of the former chairman of the area, an elderly gentleman living in a relatively humble dwelling:

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<sup>181</sup> Interviews: chairman-B 14.2.11; security committee member-B 1 20.11.11. Observation of public meeting 30.10.11.

<sup>182</sup> Interviews: guard-B M 20.10.11; security committee member-B 1 20.11.11.

<sup>183</sup> The importance placed on having a local security system was apparent at both of the public meetings attended, consistent with the chairman's claim that whenever the survival of *ulinzi shirikishi* is called into question people protest that it must continue (interview chairman-B 2.12.10).

<sup>184</sup> Observation of public meeting 30.10.11.

<sup>185</sup> Interview TCL-B 5 24.7.11.

<sup>186</sup> Interview former chairperson of part of *mtaa* B 6.11.11.

After [the new chairman] was elected he tried very hard to start CP. They called the people [to a meeting], they agreed, but I don't see that anything has happened....This *mtaa* is difficult. There are rich people here. They don't want to contribute... If you tell a rich person to leave his home and guard, there is no way he will agree. He will say 'I have my own guard, I have my own dog and that's enough.'... To govern a rich person, somebody of means, if you talk to him he'll just look at you like you have a problem.... But we are just trusting in God. We protect ourselves. I don't have a gate.<sup>187</sup>

#### 6.2.4 Enforcing participation in *mtaa* A

In A night patrols were carried out without cessation from the time that CP was introduced. Sustaining CP was predicated upon strict monitoring of participation by the *makamanda*, with the assistance of ten-cell leaders, and enforcement of sanctions for non-compliance. However, organising collective action was onerous and time consuming.

The *makamanda* of A were obliged to spend a considerable part of their working night rounding up those scheduled to participate who had failed to report for duty. During the first night patrol observed only two of those who were supposed to participate reported at the correct time. The *makamanda* subsequently loudly banged on the doors of people they thought to be shirking their patrol date. In one of these cases the young man in question was able to excuse himself by showing his injured foot; another demonstrated that it was actually not his date to patrol; and a third reluctantly agreed to participate, despite having tried to excuse himself with a toothache. The fourth person was not at home, and the *makamanda* promised his sister that he would be taken to the police the next day.<sup>188</sup> This was apparently not an atypical evening.<sup>189</sup> The chairman acknowledged that it was very hard work to sustain *ulinzi shirikishi*, and claimed that, '*wanapenda ulinzi, lakini hawataki kulinda*' (they like security, but they don't want to guard).<sup>190</sup>

<sup>187</sup> Interview former chairperson of part of *mtaa* B 6.11.11.

<sup>188</sup> Observation of patrol 29-30.1.11.

<sup>189</sup> Interviews: *kamanda-A* 5 29.1.11; *kamanda-A* 3 8.8.11.

<sup>190</sup> Interview chairman-A 21.2.11.

In addition to the very public sanction for non-attendance to patrol described above,<sup>191</sup> failure to participate could result in a fine or, in the case of persistent offences or unwillingness to cooperate with the *mtaa* government, in police prosecution and a possible prison sentence.

However, the way in which CP was organised in A may undermine its sustainability in the future. Ostrom (2000: 150) outlines several necessary characteristics of rule design for the effective governance of use of common pool resources which are highly relevant to the future of CP as practised in *mtaa* A. Firstly, if some are obliged to provide greater inputs than the average user but receive fewer benefits, they will be less willing to contribute in the long term. Secondly, individuals should be able to participate in making and altering the rules that govern them if they are to be well adapted to local circumstances and considered to be fair. These conditions have not been met in A, as discussed in sections 6.3 and 6.5. In addition, the conditions specified by Ostrom depend upon a degree of transparency and the accountability of those responsible for monitoring and sanctioning behaviour of others, in order for residents to know that rules are equitably enforced and to enable the swift resolution of any conflicts that might endanger intra-community trust. The following chapter explores the typical lack of accountability and transparency of local governance in Tanzania and the implications for cooperation in the interests of public security.

### 6.3 Costs and benefits of participation

#### 6.3.1 Unequal distribution of the costs of participation

CP like other forms of 'community-driven development' is often presented as being a low cost means of providing services (see 2.2.1). As one police sergeant told a group of CBO members assembled for training, *ulinzi shirikishi 'ni mpango wa kupunguza uhalifu kwa gharama nafuu'* (is a way of reducing crime at a low cost).<sup>192</sup> However, the costs involved were not always considered low by residents of the three *mitaa*, and particularly the relatively poor.

In *mtaa* B, and briefly in *mtaa* C, residents were obliged to contribute financially each month in order to employ local guards. Some considered the amounts requested

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<sup>191</sup> Houses are typically located very close to each other and do not have glass in the window frames, meaning that the noise made by the *makamanda* and any subsequent discussion was entirely audible to neighbours.

<sup>192</sup> Observation of training 19.11.11.

negligible, and would have been happy to pay more,<sup>193</sup> however participation through financial contributions could be very difficult at a time of economic hardship related to rising food prices, drought and rationing of power supply. In both *mitaa* some residents struggled to pay monthly contributions.<sup>194</sup> In *mtaa* B, for example, security committee members sometimes failed to collect enough money from the unplanned section of the *mtaa*, whereas in the surveyed area with typically much higher quality housing, residents often paid a year's worth of monthly contributions at once. When guards stopped patrolling for a brief period in 2010 due to unpaid salaries, residents of the surveyed area offered to double their individual contributions in order to maintain the service in their area only.<sup>195</sup> Although some efforts were made to take socio-economic inequalities into account, for example by taking more money from those who owned a car, the extent of variation was such that for some the amount required was trifling, whereas for others it was difficult to spare.

The relatively poor were also disadvantaged by systems of CP that relied upon 'voluntary' labour. Participation in night patrols was physically demanding and potentially dangerous. Participants were poorly equipped, carrying only 'traditional'<sup>196</sup> weapons, and usually did not have suitable footwear or warm clothing. The majority had no training in ensuring their own safety or that of an apprehended person. In all three areas, members of patrols had in the past been attacked resulting in injury, including a non-fatal gunshot wound in C. It was also possible that participants might be mistaken for perpetrators of crime, and this had occurred in both A and B. Thus perceptions of danger understandably made some reluctant to participate in patrols.<sup>197</sup>

In both A and C, wealthier residents, and those who had regular employment, could opt to pay a fee in lieu of participation in a night patrol. This shifted the burden of labour to those who could not afford to opt out, generating resentment and potentially compromising the ability of poorer residents to pursue their own livelihoods.<sup>198</sup> As one resident of C explained:

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<sup>193</sup> Survey respondents: 41; 69; 72 (all residents of B).

<sup>194</sup> Interviews: chairman-C 14.11.11; TCL-B 8 15.11.11; *mtware*-C 18.11.11. Observation of public meeting-B 30.10.11.

<sup>195</sup> Observation of public meeting 30.10.11. Interview: guard-B M 30.10.11.

<sup>196</sup> The word '*jadi*', or 'traditional' was frequently used to differentiate the unsophisticated weapons of the community police from those of the police and *majambazi*.

<sup>197</sup> Interviews: chairman of *mtaa* neighbouring B 13.7.11; WEO-BT 11.2.11; Survey respondents: 14; 84; 94.

<sup>198</sup> See Cleaver & Toner (2006: 214) for similar findings regarding participation in communal labour in Moshi Rural District, Tanzania.

Those with gates don't want to go and guard. They won't come outside if you knock to ask them if it's their turn. It's just *sisi wadogo* (us small people).<sup>199</sup>

### 6.3.2 Selective benefits through community policing

Leaders of CP institutions were sometimes able to receive remuneration for their efforts, which enabled them to continue to devote time to CP. Whilst these selective benefits were conducive to ensuring CP could be sustained, other residents could be left confused about how money was being used, leading to fears of corruption and the perception that CP 'only helps the leaders'.<sup>200</sup> Whether justified or not, fears related to misuse of public funds hindered collective action and may have negative effects on the future sustainability of CP. Furthermore, the availability of selective economic benefits may in the future lead community police to prioritise non-collective services over crime prevention across the entire *mtaa*.

It was not necessarily considered problematic that those participating in CP should receive some compensation for their efforts. In both A and C, where patrols were carried out by volunteers, plans to employ permanent local guards had been endorsed at public meetings, and, when asked an open ended question about how to improve CP, a fifth of survey participants in these *mitaa* said that participants in *ulinzi shirikishi* should receive allowances.

Making money from policing activities is not necessarily inconsistent with being seen as a legitimate security provider as policing may cost money to undertake, and actors may identify their activities as constituting a job for which they are entitled to remuneration (Buur & Jensen 2004), as was the case for the young guards in B. However, claims that community police have only pecuniary motives may play an important part in negotiations over what constitutes legitimate authority and undermine the claims made by CP institutions to represent the 'community' (ibid.: 146). In A and C the community police charged a small fee for investigative or dispute resolution services. However, this was usually described as '*hela ya miguu*' (expenses) or *posho* (an allowance), rather than as a fee. Similarly, Green (2012: 318-319) observes that those who are paid by civil society organisations for the duration of a project tend to describe themselves as volunteers who are receiving '*posho*' (an allowance), rather

<sup>199</sup> Survey-92 (unemployed 32 year old male, *mtaa* C).

<sup>200</sup> Survey-10 (*mtaa* A).

than as recipients of a salary, reflecting the importance of voluntarism in establishing closeness to the poor and a legitimate role in community development.

In A, the *makamanda* did not have regular or substantial alternative incomes, and some financial incentive was probably important in enabling them to sustain their commitment to CP, although they claimed to be motivated only by their desire to serve the community.<sup>201</sup> The costs of running the office, for example payment of rent and purchase of stationery and furniture, and a contingency fund for medical treatment were also funded through CP fees and any fines imposed. The amount of money that the *makamanda* could make was therefore relatively small, sometimes reaching 8,000 TSH per week, although this was described as unusual.<sup>202</sup> The *makamanda* claimed that the amount of money collected from contributions, excluding fines and fees for services provided, barely covered running costs.<sup>203</sup>

Although the sums involved may have been relatively small, the pursuit of personal or group economic gains shaped the service provided. Firstly, the *makamanda* increasingly attempted to solicit economic contributions from residents rather than encouraging them to join patrols. This meant that the burden of patrolling was largely born by poorer residents, as discussed above, and the smaller number of participants potentially made patrolling less safe.<sup>204</sup> Although it was agreed at a public meeting that guards would be employed through community contributions, as was the case in *mtaa* B, the *makamanda*, who would have lost out financially were this to happen, had not taken any steps to reform the system when the research concluded in November 2011.

Economic incentives may encourage the community police to operate more like a private security provider in the future, rather than providing collective benefits across the neighbourhood, as was observed of some *sungusungu* organisations (Heald 2002: 24). For example, the community police in A had apprehended a private security guard colluding with thieves the previous year. The grateful representative of the mobile phone company whose mast the guard had been employed to protect recommended that the community police should bid for contracts like theirs in the future.<sup>205</sup> Although such large commercial opportunities had not yet been pursued, the community police were providing additional protection to business and vehicle owners who could afford to pay.

<sup>201</sup> Interviews: *makamanda*-A 1,2 & 3 26.1.11; *kamanda*-A 1 15.7.11.

<sup>202</sup> Interview: *makamanda*-A 2 & 6 25.11.11.

<sup>203</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 1 15.7.11.

<sup>204</sup> Survey respondents: 2; 23; 24; 25; 30; 32. Interview: male residents of A 27.1.11.

<sup>205</sup> Interview chairman-A 11.7.11.



Furthermore, in all three *mitaa*, residents harboured suspicions that leaders were also appropriating public funds to make illegitimate private gains through CP. Regardless of whether this was true, suspicions of corruption formed a major impediment to collective action.

In A, some residents questioned why 3000 TSH was requested from households who could not provide a participant for patrols. This could be expected to generate a much larger amount of money than could possibly be required for the purchase of torches and batteries. The fines imposed for non-participation were also contentious, and some residents suspected that leaders were inflating contribution rates and imposing arbitrary fines in order to enrich themselves.<sup>206</sup>

In B, allegations of corruption were made against members of the security committee responsible for collecting contributions to pay the community police. One member of the committee accused his colleagues of embezzling funds intended for the guards' salaries.<sup>207</sup> Even before these public allegations were made, residents queried how their money was being used, as the size of the population meant that more than sufficient funds should have been available to pay the guards, yet they continued to complain they were not paid.<sup>208</sup>

In C, mistrust of the chair of the security committee, who was thought to have a previous record of misuse of public funds, made ten-cell leaders reluctant to collect contributions and residents were often unwilling to give, as outlined in section 6.2.

#### **6.4 For whom did CP institutions provide security and from whom or what?**

CP strategies are premised upon the 'fundamental illusion' of community (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 51). As argued in Chapter 2, the assumptions underlying CP, 'essentialise and romanticise "the local"', minimising local social inequalities and hierarchies (Mohan & Stokke 2000: 249). The experience of residents of the three case sites of CP was affected by socio-economic, gendered and generational variables as well as their position within the existing formal governance structures of the *mitaa*. CP reflected localised social conflicts and became part of the way in which they were manifested, as leaders gained authority to protect their 'community' from perceived threats.

<sup>206</sup> Interview male residents 29.7.11; Survey respondents: 4; 9; 10; 23; 25; 30.

<sup>207</sup> Interview 20.11.11; observation of public meeting 30.10.11.

<sup>208</sup> Survey respondents: 37; 38; 47; 51; 55; 59; 67.

The general benefits provided by preventative patrols carried out by community police were largely collective. The entire population benefited from safer streets, and by doing so they did not prevent any other residents from doing the same. However, in A, and to a lesser extent in C, CP services became quasi-commercialised, whereby residents were obliged to pay for investigation of crimes, which poorer residents were unable to do.

Security, in addition to referring to the protection of an individual from violence and other threats, is also 'a process of political and social ordering, maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power' (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 10). The ability to define threats to security, or deviance, both conveys political power and is dependent upon and constitutive of existing power relations (Jensen 2008). In Mwanza those in a position to determine the objectives of CP within the *mitaa* were largely relatively senior residents in existing leadership positions. CP became a means of dealing with pervasive anxieties about 'idle' *vijana* (young men) and exerting greater control over young people in the *mitaa*.

#### **6.4.1 CP in a context of socio-economic inequality: affording access to services**

The positive assessments of the impact of CP on public safety were outlined in section 6.2. No obvious patterns emerged from the survey data to suggest that particular social groups, whether defined by gender, socio-economic status or age, were more or less positive about the preventative effects of *ulinzi shirikishi*. Although a few complained that CP benefited only those who had property that was worth protecting and should thus be paid for by local business owners,<sup>209</sup> this was not a commonly expressed view and it could be argued that relatively poor residents had the most to gain from CP. The most common crimes affecting the three *mitaa*, theft of small items from pedestrians and burglary, could affect any resident. Poorer residents were less able to take alternative measures to prevent or deal with crime, such as employing a private security guard, building a wall around their property or making a potentially expensive visit to the police station, and even a small theft would have a greater relative impact.

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<sup>209</sup> Survey respondents: 57; 82; 92.

However, charges for other policing services were prohibitive for some residents. In A, where fees were charged for investigation of crimes or arrest of a suspect, several survey respondents commented that they would not report cases to the community police as they anticipated being asked for money,<sup>210</sup> and many who did use the service in order to obtain the arrest of a suspect subsequently complained that they could not afford to pay.

As noted above (6.3.2), the ability to charge for policing services may lead to less 'community' orientated policing in the future. It should be recognised, however, that CP services were not necessarily more expensive than referring a case to the police force.

#### 6.4.2 Policing *vijana*: 'idle' youth and crime

The *mtaa* government has been given responsibility for local security through CP on the basis of its responsibilities in law, but also as it is assumed to be '*karibu na jamii*' (close to the community) (TPF 2008b: 1). Protection of the 'community' is typically central to the claims local policing institutions make to authority (Buur & Jensen 2004: 146). However, 'community', and thus who is worthy of protection is not a stable and uncontested category, and various forms of 'everyday policing' are an important way in which community is constructed, performed and maintained (ibid.). Designation of what, or who, is 'criminal' can be a key way in which local power relations are constructed and contested, and policing is thus closely linked to localised social conflict (Jensen 2008). In Mwanza, as Plyler (2007: 130) observes:

...who can be categorized as a thief depends on economic, age, and gendered identities...Tanzanian thieves are generally young, poor men who lack economic security and the financial means to be self-sustaining. They are not random targets, but are (poorly) situated in social and economic hierarchies.

CP increased the powers of occupants of existing leadership positions, mostly relatively senior residents, to enforce their understandings of appropriate behaviour within the *mtaa*. Those deemed to contravene these standards most frequently were *vijana* (young men), who were seen as a threat to other residents, particularly when they congregated in groups and occupied public space. As a consequence young men

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<sup>210</sup> Survey respondents: 13; 14; 23; 25.

could find themselves subject to arrest or violent punishment when they breached the moral standards of their elders, even when this did not contravene state law. Local police shared assumptions about the criminality of apparently idle *vijana*, and sometimes supported local leaders in controlling younger residents.

The preoccupation with 'idle' youth in urban spaces and their supposed freedom from established modes of discipline and control is of course not unique to Mwanza or to the present day (see 3.2.4). The demographic and economic circumstances of contemporary African states has contributed to a sense of 'youth crisis', characterised by increasing urbanisation, high unemployment, violence, crime and the HIV and AIDS epidemic (Burgess & Burton 2010: 2-3). Demographically young people dominate sub-Saharan Africa. According to Tanzania's 2002 census, over half of the population of the Tanzanian mainland was aged 19 or under (54.7%) and 78.4% were aged under 35 (URT 2006b). High levels of unemployment and intense competition for resources following the economic crises of the 1970s frustrate the ability of the young to earn a living with implications for their ability to move into adulthood, meaning that 'youth can become less a stage of life leading to adulthood than a permanent trap' (Cooper: 2008: 194). Beset by 'poverty, idleness and ennui' (Abbink 2005: 2-3), youth have been a highly visible part of violent political struggles and criminality across the continent. There is a rich anthropological literature exploring the intersection of policing, vigilantism, criminality and inter-generational conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Richards 1996; Heald 1999; Oomen 2004; Kagwanja 2006; Jensen 2008). As Jensen (2008: 49) observes of Nkomazi in South Africa, 'everyday policing remains an important political language and performance in settling the conflict between the young and the old.'

Young people were expected to provide the majority of labour inputs for CP, but were typically not represented in leadership structures and were seen as requiring the supervision of more senior *mtaa* residents. Except in B, where guards were employed (although often paid only intermittently), being excluded from leadership positions meant that young people did not benefit from the opportunities for legitimate or covert financial gain through policing discussed in the previous section.

The youngest *kamanda* in A was 35. Others were aged 45 and over, but continued to play an active role in patrolling and monitoring attendance, claiming that it was necessary to supervise the youthful 'volunteers' to prevent shirking. Ten-cell leaders, who are likely to be relatively senior and to be homeowners with families, were relied upon to provide information to support or discredit testimonies of younger

participants in night patrols. In B, the guards, the oldest of which was 29, were supposed to be supervised by the chairman and the security committee, which according to one of its youngest members (a businessman in his forties) should be senior in age to the guards to provide '*mawazo mzuri*' (good ideas) and to prevent the use of excessive force which was liable to occur if the guards were not supervised.<sup>211</sup> Money was collected and controlled by the security committee and the *mtaa* accountant. The guards attended public meetings at which CP was discussed, having been ordered to do so by the chairman, but they were not called upon to speak, even when the matters at hand directly concerned their livelihoods. In C the leadership of *sungusungu* were all retirees, the oldest of whom was 88. In all three *mitaa* the rank and file participants in CP were expected only to participate in the physical aspects of policing, mainly patrolling the *mitaa* and arresting suspects, rather than tasks requiring judgement such as investigation of cases.

Attempts to monitor and reform the activities of young people were an important element of CP in all three *mitaa*, reflecting popular concerns about youth who are perceived to be idle and possibly using illegal substances and thus prone to commit crimes. Residents of the three case sites were asked to describe the kind of people who committed crimes in the *mtaa*. 92% identified young men (*vijana wa kiume*) as the main perpetrators of local crime. 13% claimed that young women (*vijana wa kike, wasichana*) were also involved, although this was typically thought to be in a secondary capacity, for example tricking victims into situations where they could be robbed by young men. The assumption that it was young men who committed crimes was shared by the leaders of CP institutions.<sup>212</sup>

Respondents emphasised that many *vijana* were unemployed and 40% associated drug usage (mainly marijuana) with crime, partly due to the imperative to steal in order to afford drugs, but more commonly due to the assumed effect of illegal substances on the behaviour of young people. For example:

The whole ward is dangerous because of marijuana. A person gets high so they can go and commit a crime.<sup>213</sup>

It [smoking marijuana] contributes significantly to crime in the *mtaa*. They smoke and then lose respect for elders.<sup>214</sup>

<sup>211</sup> Interview security committee member-B 2 5.7.11.

<sup>212</sup> Interviews: MEO-B 9.12.10; chairman-A 13.1.11; *kamanda*-A 2 26.1.11; chairman-C 5.7.11; security committee member-B 2 5.7.11.

<sup>213</sup> Survey-8 (20 year old male school pupil, *mtaa* A).

*Vijana* steal after smoking marijuana and taking other drugs...If you see a group of 10 young men, you know that 4 or 5 are taking something.<sup>215</sup>

In addition to drug use, a lack of parental discipline was also blamed for youth criminality. Parents might also be dependent upon the proceeds of crime brought into the household by their offspring, and thus endorse their activities.<sup>216</sup>

Youth is not a fixed category that can easily be abstracted across different cultural contexts, but rather 'consists of a constantly shifting population moving in and out of locally determined notions of youthfulness' (Burgess 2005: viii). The specific age range respondents described as '*vijana*' was quite varied but most commonly fell between 15 and 25. However, 14% of participants implicated younger children, from the age of 10, in committing crimes and leaders also claimed that, 'even children' were involved.<sup>217</sup>

The formation of groups or gangs by young men and their congregation in public spaces in the *mtaa* to smoke or '*piga stori*' (chat) gave a visible focus for popular fears. When describing areas of the *mtaa* thought to be dangerous, many residents attributed this to the presence of groups of *vijana*. In all three *mitaa*, groups of young men could be observed from the early evening in places identified by residents as their *kijiwe*.<sup>218</sup>

The typical image of a local criminal is exemplified by this account given by a 46 year-old female resident of C:

There is a lot of smoking of marijuana [in the *mtaa*]. They [*vijana*] sit on those big rocks and play cards and smoke. There are lots of groups of them with different names. One is called Nigeria. They are already a lost cause (*wameshindikana*). They're often affected by the disintegration of their families. Some of them have been forced away from their homes and they don't have any work or anything else to do. Recently a girl of 15 was passing this area at 7pm on a day when the electricity was off

<sup>214</sup> Survey-96 (53 year old male farmer, *mtaa* C).

<sup>215</sup> Survey-90 (34 year old male knife sharpener, *mtaa* C).

<sup>216</sup> Interviews: chairman-A 1.12.10; *kamanda*-A 2 26.1.11; PK-A 2 7.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; WEO-C 24.2.11. Survey respondents: 29; 107.

<sup>217</sup> Interview *ntemi*-C 10.7.11. Also interviews: *kamanda*-A 2 26.1.11; TCL-A 10 25.2.11; TCL-A 8 26.2.22.

<sup>218</sup> *Kijiwe* literally means 'small stone' but can be translated as 'jobless corner' (e.g. Mtani 2007: 76; Reuster-Jahn & Kießling 2006: 7), where young men congregate. See Reuster-Jahn & Kießling (2006: 7) for further discussion of the term.

and she was stabbed for no reason.<sup>219</sup>

Although there was some disagreement as to whether the perpetrators of crime in the *mtaa* were *mtaa* residents, the dominant perception was that they were '*watoto wa humo humo*'<sup>220</sup> (children from here) and were well known in the *mtaa*. 18% of survey participants asserted that those committing crimes in the *mtaa* were from other areas of the city, sometimes those neighbouring the *mtaa* concerned. However, 51% stressed that criminals came from within the 'community', and thus had knowledge of local geography and opportunities to steal,<sup>221</sup> although they might also work with others from outside. The notion that criminals were embedded in the community was apparent in assertions that the youths concerned were 'our children'.<sup>222</sup>

The following summary of an account given by the MEO of B about the rationale for establishing *ulinzi shirikishi* in the *mtaa* is illustrative of the importance of fears of youth criminality and indiscipline in the establishment of CP:

There were young men who could be seen congregating with no particular purpose or occupation and smoking marijuana. This coincided with a spate of robberies. It was feared that these young men could be a bad influence on other children in the *mtaa*, of which there are many. The first objective of CP was to arrest these young men and bring them to the *mtaa* office to be instructed to change their behaviour and, importantly, to refrain from inviting young men from other areas into the *mtaa*. The *mtaa* leadership also visited the houses of the parents of these young people to persuade them to talk to their children. Those young men who were thought to be actually breaking the law were taken to the police for prosecution.<sup>223</sup>

One of the main objectives of night patrols in all three *mitaa* was controlling and preventing the movement of people, and particularly young men, around the *mtaa* at night. However, women were also subject to the attentions of the community police, whether they were lectured as to the risks of being abroad at night,<sup>224</sup> or suspected of having the intention of breaching standards of sexual morality (see below). Often those

<sup>219</sup> Survey-107.

<sup>220</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 3 8.11.11.

<sup>221</sup> Survey respondents: 27; 47; 45; 55; 60; 75; 77; 85.

<sup>222</sup> Interviews: TCL-B 7 8.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; TCL-A 7 23.2.11; TCL-A 11 23.2.11.

<sup>223</sup> Interview MEO-B 9.12.10.

<sup>224</sup> Observation of patrols in A 29-30.1.11 and 21-22.2.11.

encountered during the patrol were automatically assumed to be guilty should they not be familiar to the guards. One 20 year old man in A, who was himself attending school, explained that CP had improved safety a lot in the *mtaa* as if the community police encounter a *kijana* who is wandering around the *mtaa* for no reason they beat him.<sup>225</sup> Another resident, a 34 year old man, complained that he and his brother had been arrested when returning late at night from watching a football match in a bar. They were obliged to pay a fine of 10,000 TSH in order to obtain their release.<sup>226</sup> Other young men had been beaten and fined for the same reason,<sup>227</sup> leading one resident to complain that the community police did not know the law: 'They just catch people who are walking at night.'<sup>228</sup>

Similarly in B, survey participants gave examples of the guards harassing residents who were returning to their homes after the patrols had started and threatening them with punishment if they were not recognised.<sup>229</sup> Residents who were intoxicated or rude to the guards might be given a physical punishment or obliged to join the guards for the rest of the patrol.<sup>230</sup> When CP was first introduced, patrols commenced at 19.00. The guards thus encountered a larger number of people in the streets and found it difficult to establish their authority to interrogate other residents. They attempted to earn respect by administering serious beatings to those they met, although following some additional training from the chairman and MEO, and the shifting of the patrol time to 23.00, they were no longer so hasty to resort to violence.<sup>231</sup> The use of violence against suspected thieves, however, is not necessarily considered problematic. As one security committee member in B explained, '*mwizi akipatikana lazima apigwe*' (if a thief is caught he must be beaten).<sup>232</sup>

The following account of one incident observed during a patrol in B illustrates the way in which the movements of young people were policed, particularly when sexual morality appeared to be at stake:

*After walking for about ten minutes we saw two young men and two young women walking slowly along the path in front of us. M [a community guard] shouted at them, 'mnaifanya nini?' (what are you doing?). They stopped and one of the men replied 'tupo tu' (nothing, we're just here). M and the others approached and M began an interrogation of the men. They claimed to*

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<sup>225</sup> Survey-8.

<sup>226</sup> Survey-34.

<sup>227</sup> Survey-33.

<sup>228</sup> Survey-10. Also survey-13.

<sup>229</sup> S37; S51; S67.

<sup>230</sup> Interview Chairman-B 14.2.11.

<sup>231</sup> Interviews: MEO-B 9.12.10; B-guard M 18.2.11.

<sup>232</sup> Interview security committee member-B2 5.7.11.



be from the neighbouring mtaa. The women said they were from mtaa B and the men were escorting them to their houses. Throughout the conversation M was holding his club over his shoulder. The guards told the men to go home, telling them they shouldn't be in this area after 11pm. Although the men tried to remonstrate, appealing to the guards to be sympathetic and recognise that they just wanted to walk their girlfriends home, their pleas were flatly rejected. M shouted that 'ni sheria zenu, lakini sio sheria zetu' (those are your rules not ours). The men left, leaving the women to further interrogation.

The women were ordered to 'kaa chini' (crouch on the floor) and asked for the name of their ten-cell leader and the chairman of the mtaa as proof that they were indeed resident in mtaa B. They could not remember the name of their ten-cell leader but one woman claimed she had contributed money for community policing and could show them a receipt. M said they would go to her house the next day to verify this. They protested that they had thought it was only 10pm and had been returning from work. The guards weren't willing to accept this explanation without proof either and D [a community guard] said he would go the next day to see if they were actually working in the bar they claimed.

Throughout the encounter the manner of the guards towards the young women, who appeared younger than the guards, was very aggressive. They used raised voices and stood over the women who had been made to crouch on the floor. The women were repeatedly told they should not be bringing people into the mtaa after 11pm. At one point a guard threatened to slap them if they didn't heed the warnings and D warned that if they were to do the same again, 'mnajua tulivyofanya zamani' (you know what we used to do).<sup>233</sup>

Community police in C were cooperating with police to deal with the 'problem' of unemployed youth in the mtaa through pre-emptive arrests and were willing to frame those against whom no evidence of wrongdoing could be found. Leaders explained:

Before [CP] we used to have 3 or 4 incidents [of crime] per week. It was bad. But we've improved the situation as now we arrest young men who we think are involved in crime and take them to the police. This is very effective. We have joined hands with the police...the youth don't like us. They don't like ulinzi [security].<sup>234</sup>

<sup>233</sup> Observation of patrol 18-19.2.11. The guards were threatening to violently punish the women, by referring to their practices in the early days of CP, discussed above.

<sup>234</sup> Interview: secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11.

If we get complaints about a *kijana* we go and fetch him and bring him to our office. If we can't find out anything specific that he's done wrong then we take him to the police who will find marijuana or *gongo* (illicit liquor) on them. They know that even if there is no case against them, a case will be found at the police station... *Vijana* really hate us. Especially me... They say, 'that soldier is a bad man', but other people are happy.<sup>235</sup>

MEOs interviewed in the ward in which C is located emphasised the importance to the philosophy of *ulinzi shirikishi* of the Swahili saying, '*Mtoto wa mwenzio ni wako*' (your neighbour's child is yours), which implies that all adults should take responsibility for the behaviour of young people. They described one of the 'successes' of CP as the fact that residents could now call the police when they saw groups of young people congregating in the area and the police would come to patrol there. Residents of both A and B expressed their appreciation of periodic police operations to remove young men from the *mitaa*.<sup>236</sup>

There was a tendency to place collective responsibility on youth for the crimes of their peers. In A following an incident whereby perpetrators could not immediately be identified the *makamanda* called those 'known' to be '*vibaka*' and threatened to take them to the police if any stolen property was not returned, encouraging young people to find out which amongst them was responsible.<sup>237</sup> One *kamanda* explained how following an armed robbery perpetrated by two unidentified teenagers, she and a colleague arrested another young man from the *mtaa* and interrogated him as to the perpetrators, threatening to beat him until he told them a name, which he promptly did.<sup>238</sup> To some extent, as Buur (2003: 34) finds in New Brighton, South Africa, the wrongful accusation or punishment of a young man or boy was considered justifiable as 'youths are considered "generic criminals"'. The security of the community might be considered to outweigh the rights of individuals, which provides a justification for violent punishment or 'mob justice', even if the victim is innocent (Plyler 2007: 129).

In contrast, in one *mtaa* neighbouring A the chairman had not attempted to start CP, seeing it as merely a money making scheme for those involved. As a young man himself who had attended school with many of the other young residents, he was

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<sup>235</sup> Interview *mtware*-C (a retired soldier) 18.11.11.

<sup>236</sup> Survey respondents: 23; 37; 48; 51; 65.

<sup>237</sup> Survey-5.

<sup>238</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 2 25.11.11.

confident that if an incident was reported or anticipated he would be able to reason with the perpetrators.<sup>239</sup>

### 6.5 Is CP more responsive policing?

CP has been promoted as a means of making policing more responsive, being 'policing which is determined by strategies, tactics and outcomes based on community consent' (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 2). Whilst CP provided a valued service in Mwanza, and addressed threats to local safety as defined by the majority of residents, albeit at the expense of others, responsiveness to citizens was not embedded in CP practices. Responsiveness can be understood as:

...the desired attitude of power-holders towards citizens: we wish them to be responsive to the concerns and problems of ordinary people, to listen with impartiality and fairness to divergent views and to subject all expressions of need and interest to publicly agreed rules for weighing the merits of competing claims.

(Goetz & Jenkins 2005:13)

In contrast to the ideal of a 'community-based' initiative, CP could be experienced largely as coercion and harassment, and was perceived by some as entailing the partial and arbitrary exercise of power. This was not only the case for those young people subjected to pre-emptive arrest or punishment. In *mtaa* A, where CP had proved most durable and the community police performed the widest range of functions, some residents made bitter complaints about the perceived unfairness of their treatment at the hands of the *makamanda* and the narrow interests served by CP.

Although the chairman of A stressed his understanding of *polisi jamii* as something which involved the entire community,<sup>240</sup> it was more common for survey participants to refer to the community police as a particular group of people with their own interests and objectives, rather than a 'community owned' institution over which they had influence.<sup>241</sup> Fears that public money was being diverted to private interests were discussed in section 6.3.2. Some residents also suspected the community police of

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<sup>239</sup> Interview Chairman-KA 12.8.11.

<sup>240</sup> E.g. Interview Chairman-A 26.1.11.

<sup>241</sup> See Cleaver & Toner (2006) for similar findings with regard to water user committees elsewhere in Tanzania.

stealing from people's homes. One story that was mentioned several times related to a woman who had reportedly been forced to leave her home to participate in a patrol at night, but had returned to find that all of the possessions had been stolen.<sup>242</sup> One 33 year-old woman who had recently moved to A claimed:

The *makamanda* are *vibaka*. Those wearing the uniforms are dangerous. They're thieves. They bang on people's doors at night and then force their way inside to have a look around if there's anything to steal.<sup>243</sup>

A more common complaint related to the way in which the *makamanda* went about mobilising popular participation in CP. Participation was often described as a result of coercion, whereby, 'they force you to do it. It's compulsory, otherwise you get fined'.<sup>244</sup> The *makamanda* were aware that forcing people to participate in community policing was affecting their social relationships in the *mtaa*. One *kamanda*, for example, explained: 'people are complaining a lot about *polisi jamii*. A large proportion [of residents] hate us. Forcing people to go and guard makes them hate us'.<sup>245</sup> In addition to the disturbance caused by the *makamanda* when they banged on doors and harangued latecomers into patrolling, some claimed that leaders had used, or threatened violence, when collecting them for duty.<sup>246</sup> CP entailed considerable intrusion into the homes and lives of other residents. During one patrol observed, for example, the *makamanda* awoke one man who, upon hearing the considerable commotion outside, rushed to the door without dressing. He subsequently became an object of mockery for the five minutes it took to establish that he was not actually scheduled to patrol that night. As discussed above, the relatively poor were more likely to have such experiences, as the better off could pay to excuse themselves from patrolling. Furthermore, those living in poorer quality housing in the unplanned sections of the *mitaa*, where houses are much closer together and have mesh rather than glass in the window frames, were more likely to be disturbed at night by the noise made by the *makamanda* when recruiting participants.

The community police could thus be perceived as needlessly aggressive towards other residents and somewhat heartless, as illustrated by the following statements made by residents:

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<sup>242</sup> Survey respondents: 9; 10; 18; 25.

<sup>243</sup> Survey 25.

<sup>244</sup> Survey-13.

<sup>245</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 2 25.11.11.

<sup>246</sup> Survey respondents: 13; 19; 31.

*Ulinzi shirikishi* is not working! The chairman is not working, even though we elected him. The community police are very aggressive at night. They even come into people's bedrooms! They took one of our neighbours who was ill and couldn't patrol to the police and fined him 10,000 TSH. They just protect the motorbikes and cars and shops on the road. They don't protect us. We just depend on God. We don't want community policing. We'd rather just protect ourselves...It [CP] just disturbs us!<sup>247</sup>

My tenant was beaten by the community police. He refused to go to guard so they took him away and beat him. But then they came back and came inside the house searching for something. We don't know what they were looking for. They took away our *panga* (machete) because they said the tenant had threatened them with it... They take even small children to go and guard. Better the police than community policing!<sup>248</sup>

They took me to the office until morning because my husband was working in a factory and wasn't there. I would have been OK if they'd taken me with them to patrol, but they kept me in the office where it was very cold. My husband came in the morning and paid a fine of 5000 TSH.<sup>249</sup>

They knock on doors and disturb people and demand money before they'll do anything. It would be better if people guarded their own houses.<sup>250</sup>

They came around checking on the state of cleanliness around our houses.<sup>251</sup> I had only buried my child a few days previously, but they found some problem here. I hadn't had chance to do any cleaning! They took me to the office. I was in

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<sup>247</sup> Survey-9 (46 year old female, petty trader).

<sup>248</sup> Survey-13 (22 year old female, housewife).

<sup>249</sup> Survey-31 (31 year old male, shop owner).

<sup>250</sup> Survey-14 (18 year old male, welder).

<sup>251</sup> The community police had begun to monitor and enforce sanitation by-laws, which also enabled them to impose fines to be shared with the Ward Health Officer.

tears, but one woman just asked me if I thought I was the only person who'd ever lost somebody.<sup>252</sup>

We give money, but incidents [of crime] are still occurring. Even if you're ill you are told to give money. What do they collect this money for?<sup>253</sup>

'Local' policing is typically assumed to offer advantages of accessibility, both in terms of proximity to where users live, and in using comprehensible language rather than formal legal terms and procedures (e.g. Baker 2009b: 86). The accessibility of CP in the first sense was valued, as noted in section 6.1.3, and it could be easier to approach the community police because they did not require the production of evidence, as the police might. However, the more 'informal' aspects of CP in A were a cause for concern for some residents who would have preferred greater consistency with formal state procedures and the law, rather than what they perceived to be the arbitrary and unfair enforcement of rules determined by personal and group interests. Three participants in the survey claimed to have themselves been wrongly accused of a crime or unfairly punished by the *makamanda*,<sup>254</sup> and more general concerns related to the leaders' lack of knowledge of legal processes and that they exercised considerable discretion.<sup>255</sup> These respondents did not reject the principle that members of the community could perform a local policing role, but suggested the need for additional training, or an oath to uphold the law, so as 'they shouldn't take the law into their own hands'.<sup>256</sup>

Although it was recognised that people did not necessarily enjoy sacrificing their time to patrol, more fundamental opposition to CP was sometimes dismissed by leaders, and local police, on the basis that those who complained were criminals themselves,<sup>257</sup> or needed more education in order to understand the importance of CP.<sup>258</sup>

<sup>252</sup> Survey-30 (30 year old female, housewife).

<sup>253</sup> Survey-25 (31 year old female, housewife).

<sup>254</sup> Survey respondents: 17; 30; 34.

<sup>255</sup> Survey respondents: 10; 17; 18; 25.

<sup>256</sup> Survey-18.

<sup>257</sup> Interviews: Chairman-A 1.12.10; OCS-A 12.1.11; *kamanda*-A 1 26.1.11; PK-A 2 7.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; TCL-A 9 16.2.11;

<sup>258</sup> Interviews: TCL-B 7 8.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; PK-C 30.10.11; TCL-B 3 6.11.11.

## 6.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the performance of CP in Mwanza in terms of its impact on local perceptions of security and policing, its sustainability and the distribution of the costs and benefits of participation. CP was widely praised for having reduced crime and extended a policing service into areas from which the state police were deemed to have been largely absent. However, this account of CP in the three *mitaa* demonstrates the difficulty of evaluating community-based development projects and the ‘ambivalence of success’ (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 216). As Cleaver & Toner (2006: 216-217) observe of community management of water supply elsewhere in Tanzania, although projects may improve residents’ quality of life, and the principle of participation or contribution may not be contested, it should not be assumed that this reflects ‘community’ ownership and inputs, and that ‘community’ institutions do not represent distinct groups with private interests. CP provided a service that was largely absent before and is perceived by residents to have significantly improved local security. However, residents also resented being coerced into communal labour and feared public funds were being misused. Certain groups within ‘communities’, the relatively poor and the young and unemployed, were particularly likely to experience CP as an unmanageable and unfair burden, or as arbitrary restriction of their freedom. In two of the three *mitaa* it proved difficult to sustain CP, and these negative experiences of CP may make the organisation of collective action to improve local security even more difficult in the future. The following chapter attempts to explain these outcomes by situating CP within the broader context of local governance in Tanzania, histories of participation in local development and the nature of partnerships between communities and the police.

## **Chapter 7: From *Sungusungu* to *Ulinzi Shirikishi*: Compulsory Participation, Party Politics and Partnership with the Police**

The previous chapter considered the performance of neighbourhood CP institutions in three *mitaa* across four dimensions: their impact on public safety, their ability to initiate and sustain collective action, the extent to which they were responsive to community needs and wishes and the way in which the costs and benefits of CP were distributed across communities. In summary, where CP was working it was largely deemed to have brought about significant improvements in local safety and to have some qualitative advantages over relying upon the state police. The notion that citizens should participate in providing security was widely supported. However, in two of the case sites considerable collective action problems had halted CP, partly attributable to suspicions of corruption in the *mtaa* government and its sub-committees. Where it was operating consistently, CP could be very unpopular and tended to disproportionately burden poorer residents and to be aimed at controlling the movements and activities of young men, increasing resentment of the reforms and of local leaders.

In order to understand and explain the mixed outcomes of CP in Mwanza it is necessary to situate contemporary practices in the context of local governance in Tanzania. CP reflects historical understandings and practices of 'participation' in local development, which emphasise the obligation of citizens to contribute towards national development. The *mtaa* government, which was given responsibility for CP, is not subject to strong accountability mechanisms, which might have made CP more responsive to residents and reduced obstacles to collective action. Local development can be highly politicised, and multiparty political competition, reintroduced in 1992, means the old ways of organising self-help do not always work.

Partnership between local policing organisations and the state police was largely positively received on both sides. However, CP was affected by the broader capacity constraints which hinder police performance in other areas and partnership did not mitigate, and in some cases reinforced, the unequal outcomes of CP and collective action problems within the *mitaa*.

In the first section of this chapter perceived connections between *sungusungu* and contemporary CP practices are discussed. Although familiarity with the concept of *sungusungu* facilitated introduction of CP, the ways in which participation in and



support for *sungusungu* were sustained are not viable today. The second section addresses the importance of histories of local development and the local governance context for contemporary CP practices, highlighting parallels with 'self-help' and participatory development in other sectors and emphasising the impact of party political competition on governance in the *mitaa*. The final section explores how the relationships established between state and community police affected the service provided, concluding that although CP was generally considered a considerable improvement on *sungusungu*, due to collaboration with the police and respect for state law, the police have not been able to mitigate collective action problems in the *mitaa* or the unequal distribution of costs and benefits resulting from CP.

### 7.1 Sungusungu to ulinzi shirikishi

As discussed in Chapter 3 (3.4), CP as practised in Tanzania was not based entirely on imported 'western' models, as has often been the case in other aid recipient countries (Brogden 2004). Reformers evoked historical models of local policing, and in particular *sungusungu*, although in its modern form, *sungusungu* was expected to comply with state law and respect human rights. CP was not typically seen by research participants as something which had originated abroad and been introduced to Tanzania. Many were intrigued to know whether *polisi jamii* existed outside of Tanzania, and one highly committed police sergeant in Mwanza on several occasions invited the author to participate in television broadcasts, as he hoped that demonstrating international interest in *polisi jamii* would increase its popularity.

*Sungusungu* was reflected in contemporary reforms in terms of both the organisational model used and often the personnel involved. In all three case sites, people who had previously held leadership roles within *sungusungu* were closely involved in CP,<sup>259</sup> as 'you need an experienced person, so we are using those who have experience of *sungusungu*.'<sup>260</sup> In some *mitaa* in Mwanza, including *mtaa C*, Kisukuma terms for the *sungusungu* leadership structure were used, such as *ntemi* and *mtware*. The chairman explained that '*tulifuata mfililizo uliokuwepo*' (we followed the system that was already in place).<sup>261</sup>

<sup>259</sup> This included one female *kamanda* in A, two security committee members in B and the *mtaa* secretary and chairman of security committee in C.

<sup>260</sup> Interview *kamanda-A* 2 26.1.11.

<sup>261</sup> Interview Chairman-C 5.7.11.

Some residents did not understand *ulinzi shirikishi* to be something distinct from *sungusungu*.<sup>262</sup> For example, one ten-cell leader explained:

It's not that *sungusungu* has died. Its name has changed. Now we call it *ulinzi shirikishi*, but it's origin is *sungusungu*... there's no difference (*Sungusungu si kama imekufa. Ni tuseme jina limebadilika. Sasa hivi ndiyo tunaita ulinzi shirikishi, lakini asili yake ni sungusungu... tofauti hamna*).<sup>263</sup>

Other ten-cell leaders cited the importance of people having seen the benefits of *sungusungu* in the past,<sup>264</sup> and being quickly and easily able to understand and accept the concept as it was a reintroduction or development of an old system.<sup>265</sup> Thus adopting models that approximated that of *sungusungu* was a convenient option, or a 'loophole',<sup>266</sup> for police and local leaders. Leaders had knowledge of an existing template for local policing and residents were quickly able to understand what was expected of them. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was very rare for residents to question the principle of participation in local policing. By using terms associated with *sungusungu* and describing *ulinzi shirikishi* in similar terms, leaders avoided the costs and uncertainty associated with attempting to construct entirely new institutions. To some extent *ulinzi shirikishi* was thus able to 'piggy-back' on the familiar idiom of *sungusungu* (Lund 2006b: 692).

The utility of *sungusungu* structures has been recognised in development interventions in a range of sectors, including community based forest restoration (IUCN 2002) and wildlife conservation (National Geographic 2013), largely on the basis of their 'traditional' status and proven efficacy. This is most clearly articulated with regard to policing in publications of the UN HABITAT sponsored Safer Cities programme introduced in Dar es Salaam in 1997, which sought to revive *sungusungu* to prevent crime in the city. *Sungusungu* were described as 'proven and promising structures and strategies to work through in communities' (2000: v). However, it is important to remember that the 'success' of *sungusungu* in urban Mwanza was largely due to its close ties to what was then the country's only political party, CCM, and the use of brutal methods of interrogation and punishment. Eventually the association of *sungusungu* with CCM and the use of violence were instrumental in *sungusungu*'s

<sup>262</sup> *Sungusungu* and *ulinzi shirikishi* are also often used interchangeably in newspaper articles about CP (e.g. Nditi 2012; Guardian Correspondent 2013).

<sup>263</sup> Interview TCL-B 4 16.11.11.

<sup>264</sup> Interview TCL-B 3 6.11.11.

<sup>265</sup> Interview TCL-C 1 15.11.11; TCL-C 2 14.11.11; TCL-C 5 18.11.11; TCL-B 4 6.11.11.

<sup>266</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

decline. Today, CP must operate in a different context, which is explored throughout the remainder of this chapter. Firstly *ulinzi shirikishi* must now work under the auspices of the police, and espouse, at least in principle, the importance of human rights, and secondly the reintroduction of multipartism has had important implications for organising collective action at the local level.

## **7.2 Local governance and development in Tanzania**

Participation in CP in Mwanza was made compulsory through by-laws, and, particularly in *mtaa* A, was maintained through the application of strict sanctions. Although they often welcomed improvements in local safety, residents did not necessarily see *ulinzi shirikishi* as a ‘community’ led initiative over which they had influence. Suspicions of how public funds were being used were rife. These findings should be seen in the context of the history of ‘self-help’ in Tanzania, and the nature of local governance at the *mtaa* level.

### **7.2.1 Why participate 1: compulsion and obligation**

A brief history of self-help in Tanzania was provided in Chapter 2 (2.4). The historical trajectories of participation in local development in Tanzania have produced a particular understanding of what participation is and is for, which informs how CP is practised today. In contrast to donor justifications for participatory projects which emphasise the empowerment of local people and their involvement in decision making, Tanzanian expectations of participation, rooted in Nyerere’s concept of self-reliance (*kujitegemea*), emphasise the *obligation* of citizens to contribute labour and resources for national development (Marsland 2006). Self-help during the socialist period was typically enforced through by-laws and directed towards ends determined from above. Citizens were expected to realise their responsibilities, rather than shape the direction of local development. Considerable continuities are apparent in participatory projects today and local government planning remains largely ‘top down’. As was the case for self-help during the one party era, participation in CP was enforced through by-laws, threats and occasional violence (see 6.2.4 and 6.5).

The process of introducing CP began with police instructing leaders as to the responsibilities of local government and other community members with regard to security. This knowledge was then taken back to the *mitaa* and presented to public assemblies where proposed systems of CP were endorsed. As one resident of A explained:

The office just gave the plan to the community and forced them to implement it. There was no consultation. They didn't even hold a meeting. They just sat in their office and decided amongst themselves. They told the ten-cell leaders to bring names [of people eligible to participate] and said that if people didn't do it they'd be fined. I was told that as a former police officer I'd be on the committee, but they never called me.<sup>267</sup>

After the consent of the community had been obtained at a public meeting (discussed further below), the participatory element of *ulinzi shirikishi* largely entailed popular contributions of money or labour, and volunteering information about local crime. Difficulties in sustaining CP were often blamed by the *mitaa* chairmen and ten-cell leaders on the community's lack of understanding of the concept and their responsibilities. It was considered necessary that residents receive more education so that they would appreciate the importance of CP.<sup>268</sup> This perspective was also apparent in police narratives about CP, which credited the reforms with having made people realise that they shared responsibility for local security with the police.

### 7.2.2 Why participate 2: personal and group accumulation

The trajectory of CP in *mtaa* A demonstrated the extent to which community-based development is not always distinct from commercial forms of service delivery, and that actors involved in local governance may be pursuing personal economic gains. The community police initially provided a free service for all residents affected by crime. However, the service became gradually more orientated towards providing private goods for individuals who could afford to pay, and a certain group of individuals assumed the role of patrolling in exchange for financial contributions from others.

This reflects the fact that various forms of 'voluntary' or 'community-based' associational groups already provide many more easily excludable, and thus chargeable, services in Mwanza's low-income *mitaa*. Participation in providing goods and services does not necessarily demonstrate recognition of shared collective objectives, but may be a means of pursuing personal or group economic or other objectives. Voluntary participatory projects may often thus be assumed to have benefits for *members*, rather than the entire geographically defined community (see also

<sup>267</sup> Survey-10 (47 year old male, retired police officer).

<sup>268</sup> Interviews: TCL-B 7 8.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; PK-C 30.10.11; TCL-B 3 6.11.11.

Dill 2009). In a training session for representatives of CBOs from across Mwanza on CP and establishing small businesses observed by the author, for example, attendees debated the potential for their CBOs to make money through solid waste collection. However, it was concluded that in some areas this would not work because the *mtaa* governments were very protective of their monopoly on this lucrative service.<sup>269</sup> In *mtaa* A, the chairman was hopeful that he could in the future establish a CBO or NGO to improve sanitation in the *mtaa*. He had already organised for the community police to carry out weekly inspections of the area. Whilst the laudable intention was to use CP to improve security in a more holistic sense, to include threats to safety from poor sanitation, it was also the case that the community police could now impose fines for infringements, which they shared with the Ward Health Officer.<sup>270</sup> The quasi-commercialisation of CP in some areas demonstrates the importance of interrogating assumptions about the nature of community-based service delivery as opposed to other forms of governance.

### 7.2.3 Accountability, transparency and collective action

The role of the *mtaa* government in CP is predicated upon the idea that the lowest level of local government is '*karibu na jamii*' (close to the community) (TPF 2008b: 1). The assumption that the *mtaa* leadership will act in 'community' interests is emblematic of the 'rather sugary representation of village government' (Brockington 2008: 122) that informs other localised development strategies in Tanzania, such as community-based forest management (ibid.). In fact, as discussed above, the *mtaa* government has often acted to enforce local participation in schemes devised elsewhere. Furthermore, residents have very limited opportunities to hold their leaders to account.<sup>271</sup> Using formal accountability mechanisms specified in law can be difficult for residents due to the lack of transparency that characterises much of the operation of the *mtaa* government and the potential repercussions of speaking out against leaders who are also neighbours.

The legal framework establishing local governance at the *mtaa* level was outlined in Chapter 5 (5.2). Briefly, residents over 18 years of age elect a chairperson and 6 councillors every 5 years, on a party political basis. Additional sub-committees, such as

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<sup>269</sup> Training observed 19.11.11.

<sup>270</sup> Interview Chairman-A 11.7.11.

<sup>271</sup> Accountability is understood here, following Schedler (1999) as entailing both 'answerability', referring to 'the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing', and 'enforcement', referring to 'the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties' (ibid.: 14).

those responsible for health and security, can be formed and members are selected at *mtaa* assemblies, which must be held at least every 2 months. The *mtaa* government is able to formulate by-laws, which are referred to the district level for approval. No personnel at the *mtaa* level receive a salary, with the exception of the MEO who is appointed as a secretary to the *mtaa* committee and paid by the government. Local governance arrangements are thus ostensibly democratic, with electoral accountability between citizens and their leaders and provisions are made for regular popular consultation. However the formal rules mask considerable variation between areas, and in practice the lack of transparency and limited opportunities to hold leaders accountable permit pursuit of private interests by leaders, which has distorted the outcomes of CP and often hindered collective action. As Brockington (2008: 112) argues: 'In practice, in spite of all the presence of these elements of good local government, there appears to be little accountability, transparency and justice at work in Tanzanian local government.'

The extent to which *mitaa* governments can be responsive to popular demand is constrained by their very limited capacity to form and implement policy. In the absence of regular funding, and subject to directives from higher tiers of government, the village and *mtaa* governments are to some extent reduced to being 'government on paper' (Green 2010a: 26). However, they are still often the first recourse for residents seeking to resolve local disputes or facing extreme financial need, although rarely can any material assistance be offered (Pallotti 2006, cited in Pallotti 2008: 227). The effectiveness and level of activity of village and *mitaa* governments in Tanzania is highly varied, and in many cases governments rarely meet at all (Green 2010a: 25). Whether projects are implemented can thus be highly dependent on the abilities and preferences of individuals.

As discussed further below, the police strategy for introducing CP in the *mitaa* relied heavily upon *mitaa* chairpersons who were invited to seminars at which the concept was explained. They were then expected to organise public meetings in order to share information with their constituents and select leaders for CP. Police, residents and local leaders emphasised the importance of the chairman's own perseverance and understanding of CP in whether further steps were taken. One of the *polisi kata* responsible for *mtaa* A, for example, explained that A was the first *mtaa* to start CP in his area because the chairman, '*anaelewa zaidi*' (he understands more).<sup>272</sup> The chairman himself criticised the laziness of other leaders who failed to take action upon

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<sup>272</sup> Interview PK2-A 7.2.11.

information provided by the government.<sup>273</sup> The importance of a leader having the innate ability to explain concepts to constituents and persuade them to agree to proposals was also emphasised by the chairman of C in explaining why not all of the *mitaa* in his ward were practising CP.<sup>274</sup> The chairmen of both A and B realised the importance of their leadership to the institutions they had created and had doubts about the future of CP once they left office.<sup>275</sup>

Those responsible for CP were supposed to be selected by the wider community, and thus subject to some form of electoral accountability. However, the elections, conducted at public meetings, entailed a person's name being proposed, usually a high status individual, and achievement of 'consensus' on the appointment (c.f. Lange 2008: 1125). Thus those who claimed to have participated in the selection of the leaders for CP did not find it easy to identify criteria they had used to select candidates. Several commented that they had not used any criteria as participation meant only confirming the person nominated through a show of hands.<sup>276</sup> Others described the leaders as having been chosen by the *mtaa* government or chairman,<sup>277</sup> meaning that in A where the leaders of CP were also members of the *mtaa* government, '*walichagua wenyewe ofisini*' (they chose themselves in the office).<sup>278</sup> Only 13% of those interviewed said they had played any role at all in selecting the leaders of CP institutions, despite the fact that leaders often described themselves as having been chosen by the 'community'.

Tanzanian citizens often have very little information about local governance processes, particularly regarding collection and use of funds (Kelsall 2004: 57; Brockington 2008; Chaliga 2008). Thus increasing the transparency of local governance is a key recommendation made by Lawson and Rakner (2005) in their overview of patterns of accountability in Tanzania. In all three *mitaa*, residents were often unclear about the organisation of CP, and were especially concerned about how much money was collected and how it was used. Survey respondents complained that they could not understand why so much money was required and that they had no means of knowing whether neighbours were contributing or free riding. In C, over a third (35%) of those interviewed were either unaware of the introduction of CP, or knew of the concept but not how it was being put into practice.

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<sup>273</sup> Interview Chairman-A 13.1.11.

<sup>274</sup> Interview Chairman-C 5.7.11.

<sup>275</sup> Interviews: Chairman-B 14.2.11; Chairman-A 7.11.11.

<sup>276</sup> Survey respondents: 32; 50; 103.

<sup>277</sup> Survey respondents: 14; 55; 103; 104.

<sup>278</sup> Survey-14.

The principal opportunity residents had to solicit information from leaders and justification for actions taken was during public meetings, which were legally expected to be held at least every two months. However, these typically offer little opportunity to subject leaders to answerability or to have an input into local policy making (Shivji & Peter 2000: 58; Chaliga 2008; Rabé & Kamanzi 2012). Public meetings are forums 'which appear inclusive but within which very few people have authority to speak' (Green 2010b: 1256). Residents often view such forums as an occasion when they are informed of decisions that have already been made by *mtaa* or more senior leaders (Rabé & Kamanzi 2012).

Meetings are not always well attended as they require residents to give up a considerable amount of time and are sometimes called at very short notice, for example the day before the meeting is scheduled.<sup>279</sup> The agenda, including whether a leader will be selected, is not necessarily known before the meeting. A survey conducted by Research for Poverty Alleviation in 2003 found that less than a third of respondents (29.95%) had previously participated in a village, *mtaa* or ward meeting (cited in Chaliga 2008: 15). In 2007, only 18% of residents of urban areas other than Dar es Salaam reported having been involved in production of a village or *mtaa* development plan (URT 2007: 52).

There is also potential for leaders to abuse their power over the scheduling and recording of public meetings. Chaliga (2008: 8), in a study of village and *mtaa* level governance across 6 districts, encountered complaints that villagers often did not hear about a meeting until after it had been held or that V/MEOs wrote false reports of meetings. Although such allegations were not encountered in the three case sites, some did relate their frustration over the lack of reform of CP in A to the chairman's reluctance to call a meeting, claiming that he would not do so as he knew he would face opposition to CP.<sup>280</sup> Minutes of meetings are sent to the Ward Office without being reviewed by any other meeting participants. Leaders may also fail to attend meetings to avoid being obliged to explain their actions.

At one meeting observed in *mtaa* B, for example, allegations of corruption were made by one member of the security committee against his colleagues. However, the accused, including the *mtaa* accountant, were not in attendance at the meeting, although they had reportedly held a closed meeting with the chairman the previous day. In the absence of the accountant, no records of transactions could be shown to

<sup>279</sup> See also Kelsall (2004: 60-63) on lack of time as a constraint on participating in local democracy.

<sup>280</sup> Interview male participants in CP, *mtaa* A 27.7.11.



residents, despite requests for evidence that no wrongdoing had taken place. The debate was halted by rain after 45 minutes and the meeting was abandoned without resolution. The earliest date at which another meeting could be held was the following Sunday, a week later, as the chairman was occupied with his personal business concerns at other times.

Aside from the opportunity to withhold their vote at the following election, the potential for residents to exert sanctions on leaders who do not fulfil popular expectations is very limited. In A, for example, although some residents made very serious accusations about the performance of the community police, including use of violence and theft, none had pursued the matter further. This may be related to the extent to which local leaders play a mediating role between residents and other state organs to which a complaint might be made. Many claimed, for example, that they needed a letter from their chairman if they wished to go to the police station.

In addition, residents may be very reluctant to speak out against leaders due to the potential future implications for themselves and their families. In a 'face to face' society the cost of conflicts with neighbours is very high, often resulting in impunity for the individual concerned, despite condemnation and distrust resulting from their actions (Oliver de Sardan 1999: 30). It is possible that fear of reprisals by local leaders prevents reporting of the misdemeanours of public officials (Tanzania Participatory Poverty Assessment 2003: 89). Residents rely upon good references from the *mtaa* committee in order to obtain jobs and bank loans and one's fortunes in a future dispute may depend upon the judgement of the individual concerned. In C, for example, although ten-cell and *sungusungu* leaders were willing to explain that many did not trust the former chairman of the security committee and were thus reluctant to contribute funds to CP, this was not mentioned at a public meeting called to discuss why insufficient contributions had been received. The *mtware* of *sungusungu* expressed exasperation that people were afraid to speak out against this individual and he was able to continue in his position as *mtaa* secretary.<sup>281</sup>

It is not necessarily the case that the *mtaa* government is in fact intended to be an institution that represents other residents. Green's (2010a) compelling analysis of government and governance in Tanzania illustrates the extent to which village and *mtaa* level government constitutes the representation of central government at the local level:

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<sup>281</sup> Interview *mtware*-C 22.8.11.

What is now presented by the state as an autonomous system of local government (*serikali ya mitaa*), associated with local authorities and district councils, continues to convey the local representation of central government. This association is to be expected. Since independence, successive local government reforms intentionally blurred the separation between elected local authorities and centrally appointed officials, a distinction that has only recently been reimposed.

(Green 2010a: 22)

Local government in Tanzania can appear characterised by the ‘omnipresence of petty corruption’ (Rabé and Kamanzi 2012: 64-65). Popular fears and suspicions of corruption reduced the willingness of residents to contribute money and made some doubt that the community police were acting in the public interest, whilst the failure of leaders to implement plans that had been agreed was a source of frustration for some. Past experiences of corruption and the failure of initiatives might engender cynicism and reduce future willingness to participate (Marsland 2006: 78). The shortcomings of downward accountability were not mitigated by oversight from above. As discussed below, the police typically communicated primarily with leaders as representatives of the *jamii* (community), and a lack of capacity to closely monitor CP activities in the *mitaa* allowed local authorities considerable discretion.

The limited transparency and meaningful accountability mechanisms within the *mitaa* had negative implications for organising local collective action. The lack of information available to residents about the contributions made by others and how money was used by leaders, as well as limited opportunities to discuss and resolve nascent conflicts, did not generate conditions under which ‘reciprocity, reputation and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self interest’ (Ostrom 1998: 3). Instead, residents were often reluctant to contribute funds due to fears that they would be misused and resented what was perceived as the partial application of rules that they had little opportunity to influence.

#### **7.2.4 Politicisation of local development**

An additional impediment to organising collective action at a local level was the extent to which CP and other local development initiatives are associated with party political

competition. Whilst there are continuities in the practice of local development, discussed above, the shifting political landscape has produced new challenges to the legitimacy of local leaders and the organisation of collective activities within *mitaa* in urban Mwanza.

### *Party political competition and the delivery of local public goods*

Although Tanzania's ruling party, CCM, has retained the presidency and a parliamentary majority since the reintroduction of multiparty competition in 1992, the elections held in 2010 saw a surge in opposition fortunes, particularly in urban areas including Mwanza. Both of Mwanza's two urban constituencies, Nyamagana and Ilemela, were taken from CCM by CHADEMA. CHADEMA was also much more successful than in the past at the local level, winning 11 of 21 wards in the city, and a CHADEMA affiliated councillor was selected to be mayor.<sup>282</sup>

Members of *mitaa* and village governments are elected on a party political basis, and there may be multiple parties represented in the *mtaa* government. The politicisation of local development emerged as a significant impediment to organising collective participation in CP. Local politicians are keen to take credit for any improvement in local conditions in the hope of boosting future electoral prospects, and may thus seek to block development initiatives that are likely to be credited to other actors (Marsland 2006: 73-76; Lange 2008), particularly if they represent an opposing political party (Rabé & Kamanzi 2012: 61).<sup>283</sup> The association of development policies with the governing party should also be understood in the context of the history of local development in a one party state discussed in Chapter 2 (2.4), whereby citizens have been required to participate in self-help under the direction of the government, which was often indistinguishable from CCM. In addition, the ruling party has utilised patronage to stimulate community-based development as part of attempts to increase its popularity since the introduction of multi-party competition (Kiondo 1994: 60-61).

In this context, CP has been undermined by party political competition at the local level, leading the IGP to urge people not to use their political affiliation as an 'excuse' not to participate (Kazoka 2011b). The principle of *ulinzi shirikishi* is contested by opposition party supporters on the basis that it is a CCM policy aimed at increasing support for CCM by improving local safety, and that CP relieves the CCM government

<sup>282</sup> The mayor was subsequently removed from office in 2012 following a vote of no confidence, after which it was decided to establish a separate municipal council for Ilemela and a CCM candidate was elected to head the new Nyamagana Municipal Council.

<sup>283</sup> See Fjeldstad (2001: 10) on similar conflicts over the payment of local taxes.

of its responsibility to provide security for citizens (Sarya 2009; Guardian on Sunday correspondent 2011).<sup>284</sup>

In the three case sites, the *mitaa* governments were CCM dominated and party political factions did not emerge within the local authorities. However, in *mitaa* neighbouring both A and B, political differences were cited as having directly obstructed the formation of community policing initiatives.<sup>285</sup> Although they had been able to establish CP, leaders in all three *mitaa* acknowledged that some residents continued to associate the policy with CCM.<sup>286</sup> The secretary of *sungusungu* in C, for example, claimed that '*vyama vinasumbua*' (parties cause trouble), as people sometimes protested that they could not guard as '*ni kazi ya CCM, ni wazo wa CCM*' (it's CCM's work, it's CCM's idea).<sup>287</sup> Despite claiming that *polisi jamii* was not political, local leaders did on occasion themselves associate the concept with CCM, and alluded to the fact that promotion of *polisi jamii* featured in the party's 2010 manifesto. For example, at a public meeting convened to encourage ten-cell leaders to collect money to fund the employment of guards in C, the secretary of *sungusungu* urged attendees to work harder as they were all responsible for the ruling party's manifesto and anybody who did not fulfil their obligations to the party would be replaced.<sup>288</sup>

It was not only *ulinzi shirikishi* that was attributed to political motivations. The MEO of B explained:

We have lots of good ideas about collective work we could do, but there is politics in the minds of the people. When people come with an idea for a programme they use it to expand their own political influence, so implementation doesn't work. People are worried when you introduce a new programme as they think it's politics coming in. Even when community policing was introduced, people said they thought it was the idea of one politician wanting to expand his own support.<sup>289</sup>

In addition to encountering resistance to CP when it was perceived to be a CCM electoral strategy, leaders experienced more general opposition to the notion of contribution to collective works. Although 90% of survey respondents claimed they

<sup>284</sup> Also interviews: RPC Mwanza 30.6.11; ACP LK 18.10.11.

<sup>285</sup> Interviews: Chairman-*mtaa* neighbouring B 13.7.11; MEO-A 15.11.11.

<sup>286</sup> Interviews: Chairman-B 9.12.10; Chairman-A 11.7.11.

<sup>287</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>288</sup> Observation of public meeting, 5.8.11. Also interview Chairman-B 22.2.11.

<sup>289</sup> Interview MEO-B 9.12.10.

considered it 'fair' to contribute to or participate in CP, in practice the principle of self-help was frequently challenged. Many of those interviewed felt that since the end of the one party era it was more difficult to organise collective development efforts as people had the freedom and knowledge necessary to question leaders and refuse to participate. This was the experience of ten-cell leaders, but was also noted by police officers. In the absence of opposition parties citizens could be forced to comply with instructions, whereas today in the multiparty context people had greater freedom,<sup>290</sup> and were more likely to question directives and how money collected is being used and to consider providing 'development' or policing to be the responsibility of the government.<sup>291</sup> One former *kamanda* of *sungusungu* who is now a ten-cell leader in C explained:

The problem now is that people question everything. They want to know what any money collected is being used for, where the [community] guards are etc. It's different from during the one party era when it was much easier to organise things. Now people are better educated and you have to explain everything.<sup>292</sup>

The former chairman of part of *mtaa* B, who was frustrated at the failure of his neighbours to act on exhortations to start CP in the area, compared the period when Nyerere was president, and the number of '*wasomi*' (educated people) was few, favourably with the present circumstances, asking:

What can you say to an educated person who has degrees? To govern the educated is hard work. The *mtaa* chairperson is a very small person. If you tell somebody something they just ask who you are.<sup>293</sup>

Opposition party members were considered particularly likely to challenge the assumption that they should be obliged to participate in providing goods that should be provided by the CCM government.<sup>294</sup> This forms a stark contrast to when *sungusungu* was first introduced in Mwanza, when people had no choice but to follow

<sup>290</sup> Interviews: *mtware*-C 30.8.11; TCL-B 3 6.11.11; TCL-B 2 20.11.11.

<sup>291</sup> Interviews: OCS K 20.7.11; TCL-C 5 19.8.11; TCL-B 4 6.11.11; Sgt-Nyamagana 19.11.11.

<sup>292</sup> Interview TCL-C 5 19.8.11.

<sup>293</sup> Interview former chairman of part of *mtaa* B 6.11.11.

<sup>294</sup> Interviews: TCL-A 2 23.2.11; OCS K 20.7.11; WEO-BT 16.8.11; Sgt-Nyamagana 19.11.11.

CCM directives as ‘the party was the government’.<sup>295</sup> Opposition party resistance to participation in self-help is also reported by Chaliga (2008) and Grawert (2009: 309-310).

New realities could lead to tension between generations of leaders. The *mtware* of *sungusungu* in C, for example, complained that the *ntemi*, an 88 year old man, did not understand that it was now necessary to explain policies to people: ‘He thinks you can just force people to do things like you could with *sungusungu* in the past, but it’s not like that now’.<sup>296</sup>

An additional challenge to CP in the multiparty context is the importance of ten-cell leaders in organising local collective action. Ten-cell leaders were useful in organising *ulinzi shirikishi* due to their knowledge of other residents and ability to monitor participation, as well as performing tasks such as collecting money. However, the legitimacy of their role in local governance is sometimes called into question. CHADEMA has, for example, decided that its members should elect their own ten-cell leaders, and argued that they should enjoy the same level of government recognition as those of CCM (Saiboko 2012).

Of the 24 ten-cell leaders interviewed across the three *mitaa*, 14 (58%) said they experienced difficulties in carrying out their roles due to the multiparty system. They complained that opposition party supporters do not recognise the authority of the ten-cell leader and that development initiatives explained by ten-cell leaders are perceived as emanating from the ruling party and designed to enhance its popularity. The chairman of B also noted that he could not rely upon ten-cell leaders to assist in explaining *ulinzi shirikishi* to the population as opposition party members would complain.<sup>297</sup>

Young people were identified as being particularly likely to question the authority of ten-cell leaders and their ‘obligation’ to participate in development activities, partly as *vijana* are deemed more likely to favour opposition parties.<sup>298</sup> One ten-cell leader in A explained:

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<sup>295</sup> Interview TCL-C 6 23.11.11.

<sup>296</sup> Interview *mtware*-C 22.8.11.

<sup>297</sup> Interview Chairman-B 26.7.11.

<sup>298</sup> CHADEMA has followed a pro-youth mobilisation strategy and Babeiya (2011: 97) describes the 2010 elections as characterised by ‘young people’s euphoria with a pro-opposition stance.’

...people are afraid to have [CCM] flags outside their houses now.<sup>299</sup> After the election, *vijana* said they would punish the ten-cell leaders because they were the ones causing problems in the *mitaa* by supporting CCM. They wanted to punish us as they say the ten-cell leaders don't want change....Very few *vijana* voted for CCM. If you encounter a young man at 6pm on the street you feel like you've met a lion. The *vijana* of Mwanza are very intimidating (*wanatishia sana*).<sup>300</sup>

Thus conflict over local development is not only political but generational. In Nyerere's socialist Tanzania, young people were expected to contribute to nation building through voluntary labour (Burgess 2005: xvii). However, claims of duty to the nation may hold little sway over urban young people in East Africa today (Burgess & Burton 2010: 13). Baker (2005; 2007) and Kyed (2010) reach similar conclusions in their studies of local policing in Uganda, Rwanda and Mozambique respectively. In Uganda and Rwanda younger generations are less willing to make sacrifices in the interests of rebuilding the nation than was the case in the immediate aftermath of war (Baker 2005; 2007). In Mozambique, people volunteered in vigilante movements during the socialist period, but are much less willing today to accept that they should provide their labour without remuneration, as providing security is increasingly seen as the responsibility of a democratic government (Kyed 2010: 22).

Multiparty competition at the local level has the potential to increase the accountability of local governance institutions and make it more likely that citizens will act to seek redress when they perceive leaders to have erred. On one occasion in *mtaa* B, for example, a CHADEMA member who was selected for the security committee made credible public allegations of corruption against his colleagues, identifying his actions as part of a wider CHADEMA agenda to end a political culture whereby corruption was accepted.<sup>301</sup> However, it remains to be seen whether this will become the norm, rather than antagonistic partisanship that can block efforts to improve conditions.

### *Political patronage and community policing*

*Ulinzi shirikishi* has also been linked to political competition through patronage relations. There are obvious incentives for *ulinzi shirikishi* to accept offers of political

<sup>299</sup> Ten-cell leaders often display a green and yellow CCM flag outside their house.

<sup>300</sup> Interview TCL-A 1 16.2.11.

<sup>301</sup> Interview security committee member-B 1 20.11.11.

patronage. They do not receive any regular funding aside from that which can be raised through community contributions and the lack of available resources makes it very difficult to perform their functions effectively and safely. Thus in A, the uniforms worn by the *makamanda* were donated during the election campaign period in 2010. The CCM ward councillor for the area claimed to have provided their belts.<sup>302</sup> The future implications of patronage ties between CP institutions and politicians may be a cause for concern due to the potential for local forms of policing to be instrumentalised to some extent by politicians (e.g. Anderson 2002; Baker 2002; Meagher 2007). During the most recent general election campaign period in 2010, there were clashes in the ward in which *mtaa* A is located between CP groups who were campaigning for the parties of the chairman of their respective *mitaa*.<sup>303</sup>

### 7.3 Co-producing security in Mwanza

CP as practised in Tanzania entails 'institutionalised co-production', defined as 'the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions' (Joshi & Moore 2004: 40). Elements of co-production are apparent in both elements of the community policing strategy: attempts to improve relationships and communication between police officers and the 'community', and promotion of citizen groups to provide local security. Citizens provided time, financial contributions and information, and police provided some education and training and, in theory, processed any apprehended persons in accordance with the law. Relationships were apparent across all four of the dimensions identified by Baker (2010b: 601-614) in his argument for greater attention to 'linkages' between state and non-state providers of security: sharing of intelligence; shared equipment and training, joint patrols and operations and enrolment. As discussed in Chapter 2 (2.2.1), the logic for co-production through CP reflects both the governance and logistical imperatives identified by Joshi and Moore (2004: 41).

Police and leaders of CP institutions praised the working relationships between state and community police and the improved public image of the police, which facilitated intelligence gathering. Partnership with the police and observance of state law were frequently cited as making CP better than the *sungusungu* of the past. However, the inequalities in policing provision resulting from CP, continued use of corporal punishment and difficulty in sustaining collective participation in CP suggest that co-

<sup>302</sup> Interview survey-29 (Ward Councillor resident in the *mtaa*).

<sup>303</sup> Interview: PK-A 1 27.1.11.



production has not fulfilled its potential to generate ‘an adequate mix [of state and non-state action] that does not stifle local participation and yet addresses the good of the whole and the particular needs of marginalized groups’ (Tripp 2003: 135). This is not necessarily a failure of police policy, as the aims of CP were not to revolutionise policing but to make pursuing existing police objectives more cost effective and efficient. Despite the criticisms of CP made below, however, it should be remembered that in many cases partnerships between the police and community groups have improved policing services that were previously available to residents, in some cases providing a service where one barely existed before.

### **7.3.1 Mutual benefits: complementary attributes and incentives for co-production**

The Tanzanian CP strategy envisages co-production based on the complementary attributes of the state police and their ‘community’ partners. Neighbourhood CP institutions have knowledge of the local population and environment and mobilise voluntary labour or financial contributions. The police offer access to resources which are highly valued by those involved in CP, including vehicles and automatic weapons, and knowledge of policing procedures and use of equipment. They also facilitate the interactions of the community police with other public agencies, for example hospitals and courts and can sanction those arrested by the community police with incarceration and the threat of prosecution. By working with the police, the community police can assume ‘legal’ authority for their activities, despite the fact that CP is not incorporated into law.

Contemporary partnership is very different from the formerly antagonistic relationship between *sungusungu* and the police, whereby the activities of one actor appeared to threaten the livelihoods of the other and their ability to perform their roles. Co-production has gone a considerable way towards mitigating both the violent excess and disregard for due process of *sungusungu* and the resource poverty of the police and their poor relationship with the citizenry. Both police officers and local government leaders interviewed recognised the potential benefits of pooling resources, reflecting a widespread acknowledgement that the police were too few to provide an adequate service over the entire city, and police acceptance of the importance of local capabilities.

### *Capitalising upon local resources*

The people are better at knowing local information and also provide voluntary labour that the police can't afford. Incidents [of crime] are much fewer now. The people committing crime were living here, so [local] people knew who they were. Before CP it was the responsibility of the police, and this is why there were lots of incidents. There was a gap between the people doing [criminal] things and the police, and the police can't afford to patrol.<sup>304</sup>

The positive attitudes of local and senior police officers towards CP, and particularly the reduction it brought about in their workload, were discussed in the previous chapter. As the chairman of B, a former police officer, remarked: 'The police like it [CP] very much. There is a good relationship. They have less work to do if there is peace.'<sup>305</sup> In addition, improved communication between residents and police was valued for facilitating intelligence gathering. Prior to the introduction of *polisi jamii*, there had been a 'gap' between the police and the community,<sup>306</sup> and citizens feared police or saw them as enemies whom they were reluctant to assist.<sup>307</sup> Police officers interviewed were unanimous in claiming a significant improvement in rates of reporting and willingness to communicate with the police as well as greater understanding of their work and challenges they face. Several officers mentioned that they could now attend social events such as funerals in the area in which they worked.<sup>308</sup> A particular innovation credited with success by both police and civilian participants was the distribution of police officers' mobile telephone numbers (see 3.4.1).

Forming partnerships with alternative policing providers can be problematic for state police forces keen to protect 'what they see as their rightful dominance in the field of security' (Baker 2009a: 378). Senior police officers responsible for CP noted the difficulty in altering police culture and that many police officers, 'think community policing means they are being robbed of their police powers...they are far from understanding'.<sup>309</sup> Police in Dar es Salaam were also initially reluctant to attend public meetings, fearing community hostility.<sup>310</sup> However, in Mwanza many police have

<sup>304</sup> Interview Chairman-A 1.12.10.

<sup>305</sup> Interview Chairman-B 2.12.10.

<sup>306</sup> Interviews: Sgt-Nyamagana & Detective-Nyamagana 10.11.10; Chairman-A 1.12.10

<sup>307</sup> Interviews: MEO-B 9.12.10; PK-A 1 27.1.11; ACP K 25.3.11; Chairman-C 11.8.11; WEO BT 16.8.11.

<sup>308</sup> Interviews: PK-A 1 27.1.11; OCS K 20.7.11.

<sup>309</sup> ACP K 11.10.11.

<sup>310</sup> Interview A. Mtani 24.3.11.

realised the usefulness of sharing their workload and receiving more information from citizens. As one *kamanda* in A recalled:

Now we trust the police and they trust us, but during the introduction of *polisi jamii* there were misunderstandings...before the seminars some policemen thought we were interfering with their job. But since the seminars everybody came to understand that they need each other.<sup>311</sup>

### *Improved communication between police and communities*

The low expectations of police performance held by many residents were discussed in the previous chapter (6.1.3), and 41% did not perceive any improvement since CP had been introduced. However, over a third (37%) said that they thought the way the police carried out their work had improved. Better communication between police and citizens due to the distribution of police telephone numbers was deemed important, both in reducing police response times and in enabling residents to by-pass ineffective local officers. As one resident of A explained:

*Polisi wanashirikiana vizuri* (the police cooperate well with us). You can just call them and they come faster [than previously]. I watch the *polisi jamii* TV show every week. I saw Sirro [the RPC] on there and got his number from the show. If you call them on the phone direct they will send people straight away. Not like before when they would be late.<sup>312</sup>

41% of those interviewed said they had a phone number through which to contact the police, either the recently introduced emergency number or the personal mobile number of an officer. The possibility of contacting the police by mobile phone significantly reduces the cost of reporting crime in terms of the time and money required to travel to a police station. A mobile phone user could report crime anonymously, or could contact more senior officers rather than the local station, reducing fears that unscrupulous officers would accept a bribe from those arrested and reveal the names of witnesses. The former RPC of Mwanza Region, Simon Sirro, stated in his first public speech in Mwanza in 2010 that anybody in possession of information

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<sup>311</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 4 26.1.11.

<sup>312</sup> Survey-5.

who was concerned their testimony may not be kept confidential could contact him directly on any of his three personal mobile telephone numbers, which he listed (Magubira 2010). Reporting crime thus became less risky as ‘if you don’t trust those at the local police station you can go straight to the OCD or RPC’.<sup>313</sup>

Contacting senior police officers directly is also likely to be more effective as they have the ability to marshal scarce resources to deal with a problem quickly as explained by one survey participant in A:

If you go to the police they just tell you to arrest the suspect yourself....But if you call the RPC or somebody direct then it’s better. He will send a car or 2 motorbikes straight away. *Polisi jamii* is really helping.<sup>314</sup>

### 7.3.2 ‘Sungusungu shirikishi’<sup>315</sup>

*Sungusungu* would beat somebody, even if there was no evidence, until they said they had done something. *Ulinzi shirikishi* is better because now if you do something wrong they take you to the police and then you go to court. We trust that the courts are just (*chombo ambacho ni cha haki*).<sup>316</sup>

The working relationship between the police and neighbourhood security groups and their compliance with state law led police officers and others to characterise *ulinzi shirikishi* as an improved, ‘modernised’ version of *sungusungu*. In the past, *sungusungu* and the police were not perceived as mutually dependent, but were often conceptualised as being in zero-sum relation to each other: *sungusungu* dominated local provision of crime prevention and resolution, at the expense of the police, the judiciary and the observance of state law. In the words of one ten-cell leader from A: ‘*Sungusungu* was doing everything locally. After *sungusungu* died we realised that there were police!’<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Interview WEO-BT 16.8.11.

<sup>314</sup> Survey-5.

<sup>315</sup> ‘Cooperative *sungusungu*’. The *mtemi* of *sungusungu* in IM described the current arrangements in this way, to emphasise the extent to which contemporary *sungusungu* work with the police (interview 10.7.11).

<sup>316</sup> TCL-B 3 6.11.11.

<sup>317</sup> Interview TCL-A 1 16.2.11.

There was some cooperation between *sungusungu* and the police in urban Mwanza, as noted in Chapter 5 (section 5.4). However, mutual suspicion generated *uadui* (enmity), whereas today '*wakawa marafiki*' (they have become friends).<sup>318</sup> Suggesting the previously unexplored potential for co-production to improve local policing, one ten-cell leader in C explained, 'If we could have seen the shortcomings of *sungusungu*, we could have talked to the police and rectified it and it might have survived.'<sup>319</sup>

A common narrative described *ulinzi shirikishi* as constituting an improved version of *sungusungu* due to their adherence to the law, and particularly rules regarding requirements for evidence and the treatment of suspects. Whilst *sungusungu* beat suspects until they confessed, regardless of available evidence, the community police '*bemebelezana*' (coax, persuade),<sup>320</sup> and have greater awareness of the law and human rights. Community policing thus entails a 'modernised' version of *sungusungu*,<sup>321</sup> or *sungusungu* structures combined with education about human rights.<sup>322</sup>

This view was not universally held and for a small minority the reliance of community policing upon collaboration with a police force deemed ineffective and corrupt was seen as a weakness in comparison to *sungusungu*.<sup>323</sup> However, this reflected dissatisfaction with police performance and disregard for the law, rather than rejection of the idea that the community police should operate in accordance with state law.

### **7.3.3 Practical and material support for CP: 'It's not community policing, it's just the community'<sup>324</sup>**

Police offered some practical assistance to local crime prevention initiatives. The community police could call upon the police when they deemed a situation to be beyond their capacity. Mobile phone contact enabled the community police to quickly request support when they anticipated danger or had received reports a crime was likely to be committed. Patrols conducted with the police were believed to be safer for volunteer participants as officers present were armed with guns. In both A and B the community police had also received some training from police on how to safely approach and arrest suspected offenders and police could grant free healthcare for participants who were injured during a patrol. Police could also assist local leaders in

<sup>318</sup> Interview Chairman-C 5.7.11.

<sup>319</sup> Interview TCL-A B 15.11.11.

<sup>320</sup> Interview TCL-B 4 6.11.11.

<sup>321</sup> Interviews: OCS K 20.7.11; Sgt-Nyamagana 10.9.11.

<sup>322</sup> Interview ACP K 25.3.11.

<sup>323</sup> Interview TCL-B 1 11.11.11; Survey-7.

<sup>324</sup> Survey-10, a former police officer resident in A.

preventing free riding by imposing punishments including incarceration. However, the limited and irregular nature of police inputs meant the bulk of the burden of CP rested with local leaders and communities. The CP policy thus increased the responsibilities of the *mtaa* government without increasing available resources, reflecting a general trend in recent local government reforms in Tanzania (Pallotti 2008).

Police acknowledged that once they had given seminars for *mitaa* chairman, WEOs and MEOs, whether *ulinzi shirikishi* would be implemented was largely dependent upon the preferences and ability of these leaders.<sup>325</sup> There was little follow up to ascertain whether a chairperson had taken action and no penalties for failing to do so. The resulting variation in the extent to which CP was practised led to considerable differences in local safety between neighbouring areas due to the highly spatialised nature of CP preventative activities, which focused on patrolling a particular geographic area.

Once CP was established, material inputs from police were minimal. One *kamanda* in A argued that strengthening CP 'would really help the police, but they expect us to do it without giving us anything to support us.'<sup>326</sup> Participants were typically poorly equipped and obliged to put themselves in potentially dangerous situations. As discussed in the previous chapter, reliance on community contributions placed a considerable burden on residents in difficult economic circumstances and was sometimes untenable. The resource constraints facing the police in Mwanza made it unlikely that any emergency assistance could be provided in a timely manner.<sup>327</sup>

Leaders in *mtaa* A also claimed that police sometimes failed to support CP due to laziness.<sup>328</sup> The chairman and WEO alleged that police resented the financial implications of CP's success. As was the case when *sungusungu* took over local policing, police had fewer opportunities to extract rent from handling minor cases.<sup>329</sup>

Many residents suggested CP could be improved through additional police support, such as the presence of an armed officer during patrols, additional training for participants or that government should provide allowances for the guards.<sup>330</sup> A similar picture emerges from research in urban Malawi which found neighbourhood watch to

<sup>325</sup> Interviews: OCS-A 12.1.11; OCS K 20.7.11; PK-A 1 12.8.11.

<sup>326</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 2 25.11.11.

<sup>327</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 3 25.11.11.

<sup>328</sup> Interviews: Chairman-A 22.2.11; *kamanda*-A 4 25.11.11.

<sup>329</sup> Interviews: WEO-A 11.2.11; Chairman-A 22.2.11.

<sup>330</sup> Interviews: TCL-A 3 17.2.11; TCL-A 2 23.2.11; TCL-B 1 11.11.11; TCL-C 1 15.11.11; TCL-C 3 17.11.11. Survey respondents: 3; 7; 9; 10; 11; 17; 18; 19; 23; 19; 30; 32; 33; 36; 50; 57; 60; 62; 74; 77; 83; 86; 96; 100.

be more durable where groups were accompanied by an armed police officer for their own protection and to instil a sense of shared purpose (Cammack & Kanyongolo 2010: 16).

Leaders proposed additional financial or other incentives that the government could provide which would mitigate the collective action problems faced in their *mitaa*. The chairman of A suggested a monthly subsidy for each *mtaa* to enable payment of the guards, with the additional objective of reducing unemployment among male youth.<sup>331</sup> The chair of B, a retired police officer, organised meetings with district police in Mwanza to discuss making the status of participation in CP equivalent to that of the JKT, or national service, which serves as a recruiting pool for the army and the police force. He anticipated that enhancing the job prospects associated with CP would make recruitment of local guards easier.<sup>332</sup>

Monitoring of *ulinzi shirikishi* was also limited. Police oversight and training might have been a means of reducing potential abuse of policing powers and the use of corporal punishment by CP groups (Baker 2010b: 609). However, there is little top-down oversight of CP activities by police and the community police retained considerable discretion. CP groups formed in Nyamagana District of Mwanza are recorded in a database only due to the enthusiasm of one police sergeant, who uses his own personal laptop for the purpose. However, subsequent monitoring of activities depends on reporting by the groups themselves or the *polisi kata*, who, as discussed below, may only rarely visit the *mitaa* for which they are responsible. Of course, closer monitoring of the community police by state police would not necessarily result in reduced incidence of extra-judicial punishment, given the poor record of the state police in this regard, and, as discussed below, the police may in some cases have colluded with community police in wrongful arrests.

#### **7.3.4 Personalised and patronage-based relationships between police and communities**

The lack of institutionalised resource transfers between the state and CP institutions meant that where police and community police were working together this was the result of personalised relationships between individuals. These were often predicated upon unsustainable patronage rather than predictable interactions that might have

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<sup>331</sup> Interview Chairman-A 27.7.11.

<sup>332</sup> Interview Chairman-B 14.2.11.

facilitated the organisation of collective action in the *mitaa* and cemented trust between participants and the police.<sup>333</sup>

The extent to which police officers pursued a community policing agenda was highly varied. The costs of delivering training on CP, such as transport and photocopying, were borne by individual officers, meaning that an officer needed to have '*moyo*' [heart, commitment] if they were to promote CP.<sup>334</sup> Attending to CP tasks, such as visiting *mitaa* offices, also had to be fitted in amongst other regular work, which could be difficult. The recently appointed *polisi kata* for the ward in which C is located explained:

The plan is to spend 2 hours in [the ward] each day, but I'm very much occupied with my other duties and get tired from my other work. Who knows where the time goes? I have the phone numbers of the ward leaders so if I'm too tired to go there I can just phone them.<sup>335</sup>

Neither the *ntemi* nor the *mtware* leading *sungusungu* in C were aware of the identity of their ward police officer. Similarly, the *polisi kata* responsible for B credited *polisi jamii* with having made his job easier, but complained:

Still, the area is big and there is no transport....so how are you supposed to go to the different *mitaa* to get information? We have to take a *dala dala* [minibus taxi], a motorbike taxi or a taxi and pay for it ourselves. It's difficult. And sometimes if I'm tired, I don't want to go.<sup>336</sup>

Often public servants in Tanzania receive per diems in excess of a normal day's wages for attending meetings with communities or other 'stakeholders' (Green 2003: 133-134). However this was not the case for police as CP was not supported by a wealthy international donor.

If positive working relationships were formed between CP institutions and police officers, these were liable to be highly vulnerable to disruption due to the frequent

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<sup>333</sup> The fragility of cooperation between police and local security actors which relies almost entirely upon personal relationships is also noted by Olivier de Sardan (2012: 4) with regard to Niger.

<sup>334</sup> Interview Sgt-Nyamagana 10.9.11.

<sup>335</sup> Interview PK-C 30.10.11.

<sup>336</sup> Interview PK-B 3.3.11.



transfers of personnel within the TPF, between departments and locations. A police officer who is frequently transferred is also unlikely to develop extensive knowledge of the population amongst whom they are posted. There is little incentive to invest time in developing strong relationships with communities when a placement may be only short term. The ward police officers responsible for each of the case sites were all moved and replaced during the fieldwork period. A similar picture emerged at more senior levels. For example, the officer responsible for CP across Mwanza Region changed three times during the fieldwork period.

The disruption caused by transfers of police officers was compounded by the fact that informal patronage relationships were a vital means through which CP institutions could gain access to resources. For example, the chairman of B and his community guards had received 100,000 TSH towards their activities from the former Mwanza RPC.<sup>337</sup> One-off donations made by senior police or politicians, including President Jakaya Kikwete (Chilongola 2012), to local policing groups are regularly reported in Tanzanian newspapers.

However, such arrangements were liable to end in disappointment. The former RPC, for example, had also pledged to attempt to secure daytime employment for B's guards in order to allow them to supplement the irregular income received from community contributions. In late 2010 the chairman still had hope the promised assistance would be forthcoming. However, the RPC was transferred in July 2011. Similarly, the OCD of Nyamagana District pledged to provide some equipment, such as batons, to the community police in *mtaa* A, but was transferred before fulfilling his promise.<sup>338</sup> Relationships with other branches of government have been similarly patronage based and resulted in disillusionment. For example, the former RC of Mwanza Region visited B in early 2011 and promised the community police that he would work for changes to the recruitment procedures for the JKT (national service) that would lead to those who had participated in CP being prioritised, thus gaining privileged access to police and army recruitment. However, by August it was felt that 'he cheated us' as the recruitment period for 2011 had passed with no further news.<sup>339</sup>

### 7.3.5 Who speaks for the community?

Although police do on occasion attend public meetings to address residents, most of

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<sup>337</sup> Interview Chairman-B 2.12.10.

<sup>338</sup> Interview Chairman-A 13.1.11.

<sup>339</sup> Interview guard-B M 15.8.11.

the communication between police and communities occurs through the *mtaa* leadership. CP was to some extent subject to 'elite capture' (e.g. Crook 2003; Platteau 2004; Dasgupta & Beard 2007), most clearly in *mtaa* A, and this was certainly the perception of some residents who felt that CP 'only helps the leaders'.<sup>340</sup> In all three *mitaa* existing leaders were influential in determining the key objectives of CP, which led to attempts to control the movements and activities of young people, discussed in the previous chapter (6.4.2). The police reinforced these strategies, and, as elsewhere, CP has led to the formation of alliances between police and willing local elites to control the 'dangerous classes' (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 161; see also Ruteere and Pommerolle 2002). This is not a failure of implementation. As Baker (2009: 82-3) observes of CP reforms in post-conflict Africa, the police had no intention or expectation that those who lead local policing institutions should be anyone other than existing elites.

Despite the publication of police phone numbers and associated improvements in communication, the idea that citizen access to the police should be mediated through the *mtaa* chairperson was prevalent. Survey participants frequently commented that they would prefer to report crime to the chairperson who would then provide a letter to be taken to the police station. This was considered to be the appropriate procedure, as 'you can't go from a house like this straight to the police'.<sup>341</sup> The MEOs and chairpersons were also those who had attended police seminars and were tasked with educating the community about *ulinzi shirikishi*. Police derived much of their information about 'community' needs from leaders. This account of elements of his job given by the ward police officer responsible for B is illustrative:

I visit the *mitaa* to get information. I talk to the MEO, the chairman and ask what news there is. I get information about any groups of people smoking marijuana. They might mention places where people are going to smoke and we can then visit with the car. We get information about certain suspects.<sup>342</sup>

By authorising local leaders to take measures to secure their areas, police increased the powers exercised by typically senior leaders over young people who were deemed to threaten order in the *mtaa*. The assumptions made by the large majority of residents

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<sup>340</sup> Survey-10.

<sup>341</sup> Survey-55.

<sup>342</sup> Interview PK-B 3.3.11.

about likely perpetrators of crime were shared by local police.<sup>343</sup> Local concerns about 'idle' youth in the area led to police operations to remove young men congregating in public space in the three case sites and elsewhere,<sup>344</sup> after which 'there is no more *kijiwe*' (congregation in a particular place).<sup>345</sup> In *mtaa* C, the *sungusungu* leadership had 'joined hands' with the police to combat perceived youth criminality in the area,<sup>346</sup> and leaders were able to threaten those against whom they had no evidence of wrongdoing that the police would quickly be able to establish a case by 'finding' illicit substances in their possession.<sup>347</sup> Even in B, where the guards were themselves young men, the chairman told his guards that should they fail to report for duty in the future he would report them to the police as known troublemakers, emphasising that they could be kept at the police station for up to 21 days.<sup>348</sup>

### 7.3.6 Police objectives for CP

Whilst limited resources and capacity have affected the extent to which police can support and monitor local policing groups, police objectives for and understandings of CP have also informed the way in which working relationships between community and state police have developed. Reduction of costs and greater efficiency have been prioritised over 'democratising' policing. Thus in Nelson and Wright's (1995) terms, participation in *ulinzi shirikishi* has been understood by local police as a means rather than an end. CP helps to achieve aims 'more efficiently, effective or cheaply', rather than enabling communities to establish processes to control their own development (ibid.: 1).

The first public address made by Mwanza's former RPC upon appointment to the post is quite revealing regarding how CP has been understood in Mwanza. The RPC stated that security in residential areas was primarily the responsibility of *mitaa* chairpersons, urging them to form their own security groups to patrol their neighbourhoods. He also encouraged residents to cooperate with the police by reporting criminals living in their areas and urged business owners and others to consider donating motorbikes and other equipment to the police (Magubira 2010). Thus responsibility for neighbourhood security is delegated to local government leaders, whilst citizens are also reminded of their responsibilities in crime prevention, including providing information to police

<sup>343</sup> Interviews: Sgt-Nyamagana 24.1.11; PK-A 1 27.1.11; PK2-A 7.2.11; Sgt-B 10.2.11; PK-B 3.3.11.

<sup>344</sup> Interviews: WEO-BT 11.2.11; PK-B 3.3.11; MEO-B 15.7.11.

<sup>345</sup> Interview WEO-BT 11.2.11. Literally, 'small stone', the *kijiwe* refers to the meeting place of unemployed young men. See Reuster-Jahn & Kießling (2006: 6-7).

<sup>346</sup> Interview secretary of *sungusungu*-C 23.11.11.

<sup>347</sup> Interview *mtware*-C 18.11.11.

<sup>348</sup> Observation of public meeting 30.10.11.

and making donations when possible. When explaining the need for CP, police place considerable emphasis on the lack of police manpower, which makes participating in CP a *responsibility* of citizens. This is illustrated by an excerpt from a training session provided by a police sergeant in Mwanza for members of a CBO:

Sgt: A challenge that emerges in starting *polisi jamii* is that people ask, 'if we start to guard ourselves, what will the police do? What will they be getting paid for?' But this isn't just a policy that we've decided to adopt. It's the law! Guarding yourselves is enshrined in the constitution.... The government has made the *mtaa* government responsible for all development in the *mtaa*, and can you have development if it's not peaceful?

Female attendee: So you are saying it's the right of every person to protect themselves?

Sgt: It's not a right! It's a responsibility!<sup>349</sup>

The role of the police in neighbourhood security arrangements is not intended to go far beyond the provision of 'expert' advice when necessary:

*Polisi jamii* is the property of the people, not us... We advise, we explain, but it belongs to them.<sup>350</sup>

Thus variation between the performance of CP institutions is seen as dependent upon the individual chairperson involved, who is responsible for acting upon the explanations provided by the police, or upon how well people have understood what the police have told them.<sup>351</sup>

Police acknowledge that CP is a way to tackle crime cheaply. Meeting the demands of leaders of neighbourhood security groups for allowances, equipment and joint patrols with officers would not be in accordance with this strategy. As one police sergeant explained during a television broadcast designed to educate citizens about CP, it is envisaged as a way of eradicating crime in Tanzania, 'without costing anything'.<sup>352</sup> Local policing has been mostly delegated to neighbourhood groups, reducing police

<sup>349</sup> Observation of training 19.11.11.

<sup>350</sup> Sgt-Nyamagana during observation of training 19.11.11.

<sup>351</sup> Interview Inspector W 12.1.11.

<sup>352</sup> Observation of filming 12.7.11.

workload and easing pressure on limited resources, leading the chairman of B to boast, 'now there is no need for any police presence in the *mtaa*'.<sup>353</sup>

Improvements in interactions between police and the public were largely understood as a means of improving intelligence gathering. The OCS of one Mwanza police station, for example, explained that ward police officers had been instructed that they should attend and contribute towards local funerals, as this would enable the officer to extract information from residents more easily.<sup>354</sup> Police may often view consultation with the public, institutionalised through CP programmes, as a means of intelligence gathering (e.g. Schärf 2001; Baker 2008a; Minnaar 2009). As Hills (2012a: 8) observes of the town of Kaduna in Nigeria, 'community policing is about residents giving information to officers, rather than officers providing a service to residents.'

The expectations police have of *ulinzi shirikishi* should be understood as part of a wider context of state expectations of self-help. As Dill (2009: 730) argues with regard to CBOs in Dar es Salaam:

...a CBO's *raison d'être* was to assist the government. This view should not be unexpected given the historical legacy of state-society relations in Tanzania. The state does not actively direct CBOs in this regard, but rather expects CBOs to benefit the state as a result of their self-help activities.

The apparent contradiction between 'community' and police understandings of how CP should be organised is prefigured by the divergent preferences of state and local actors over self-help in the 1960s and 70s identified by Jennings (2003: 182):

The state's perception of self-help was one of state-led and state-directed efforts by local communities in the implementation of schemes designed to fit in with, and promote, the objectives of the state. It was a way to effect change and modernisation in a context of minimal resources. For the peasantry, self-help implied not state-led development, but rather state-supported: the role of government was to provide the materials, funds and technical advice required to meet the needs and wishes of the individual community.

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<sup>353</sup> Interview chairman-B 2.12.10.

<sup>354</sup> Interview OCS-K 20.7.11.

#### 7.4 Conclusion

The previous chapter argued that CP as practised in Mwanza demonstrates the 'ambivalence of success' (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 216), whereby the service provided was typically highly valued, but proved difficult to sustain, was not necessarily responsive to the community and did not produce equitable outcomes. In this chapter these outcomes were explained in terms of the accountability deficits that characterise local governance in Tanzania and dominant understandings of participation as either an obligation or a means of obtaining club goods. The intensification of party political competition in Mwanza constitutes a challenge to these established patterns of the governance of local development, however, and it is not yet clear whether this will lead to more accountable provision of collective goods or will continue to result in obstruction of implementation of policies as is presently the case.

CP strategies have made some contribution towards mitigating the collective action problems affecting relationships between police and citizens. In particular the ability of residents to contact senior officers or to remain anonymous when reporting a crime by mobile telephone appears to reduce the risks associated with reporting crime. However, partnership with the police has done little to address collective action problems within the *mitaa*, aside from enabling local leaders to threaten other residents with imprisonment for non-participation, or to support community capacity with material inputs. Nor has police oversight prevented the use of violence by community police or challenged the extent to which CP has restricted the freedom of some *mtaa* residents. From a police perspective, this does not necessarily constitute a weakness of the reforms, as CP is envisaged as being a low cost policing strategy and police interests are largely aligned with those of existing leaders. CP is a means of making citizens understand their responsibility for local crime prevention, rather than reorienting policing towards community priorities.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion

Community policing is lauded by senior police and in police annual reports as one of the most successful elements of the ongoing police reform programme to date, albeit it is acknowledged that obstacles to implementation remain. From a police perspective, success is indicated by higher rates of reporting crime and donations received from businesses and other organisations. By delegating responsibility for neighbourhood security to groups of organised residents local police reduce their workload and the strain placed on limited police resources. *Ulinzi shirikishi* is a cheap and effective way of reducing crime. From the perspective of citizens, however, for whom CP has entailed obligations as well as rights, and costs as well as benefits, a more ambiguous picture emerges.

CP was valued by residents of low and middle-income areas in Mwanza for having reduced neighbourhood crime rates and providing a local service which had not previously been available. However, CP was not the responsive, equitable, sustainable and 'democratic' form of local policing assumed by international advocates. Rather, CP was practised in ways more consistent with local governance in Tanzania and often entailed coercion, the pursuit of private interests and discrimination against certain groups. The 'community-based' character of CP has not necessarily made it a more responsive or accountable alternative to the state police.

These dilemmas are revisited in this concluding chapter, which suggests that the 'policing' element of CP, whereby a service has been extended into areas in which it was not previously available, has been more successful than any attempt to make policing more 'community' oriented or to give a voice to those previously disadvantaged by state policing. Where CP has been sustained this is largely due to the extent to which it has assumed practices associated with 'government', for example utilising legislation to enforce participation. The 'community' character of CP can be said to refer mainly to the fact that the service must be provided by communities themselves with little material support from the state.

### 8.1 *Ulinzi shirikishi* and local security

CP is largely credited by residents with having improved their personal security, and that of their property, in their neighbourhoods and homes. For many, CP provides a

welcome supplement to state policing, and in some places is so effective at preventing crime that, 'there is no need for any police presence in the *mtaa*'.<sup>355</sup> It was largely accepted by citizens that they had a role to play in ensuring the security of their neighbourhoods, in light of the severe resource constraints facing the police. 'Participation' is ubiquitous in local development in Tanzania and, as discussed throughout the thesis, there is a long history of mobilising citizens in the interests of local security.

After some initial difficulties in accepting that their professional mandate was to be shared with the public, police in Mwanza were typically enthusiastic in their praise for CP, recognising that delegating local policing to communities had both greatly reduced their workload and reduced crime. Officers also claimed that rates of reporting crime had increased and that public fear of the police was reduced. Some strategies adopted as part of CP have been particularly successful in addressing collective action problems that have limited cooperation between police and the public in the past. For example, publicising the mobile phone numbers of senior and local police officers was claimed to have reduced the risks associated with reporting crime.

The working relationships between police and their community counterparts are mostly valued, particularly when compared to the 'enmity' that characterised police interactions with *sungusungu*. Although community police sometimes exacted their own punishments on perceived wrongdoers, and participation was sometimes reported to be the result of violent coercion, the use of violence is not systematic as it was under *sungusungu*, who 'did their investigation with a stick'.<sup>356</sup>

These achievements should not be under-stated: reformers had to contend with a long history of police-public relations characterised by mistrust and hostility, partisan and often brutal policing and a poorly paid and motivated police force. In contrast to Brogden & Nijhar's (2005: 161) assessment of donor-driven CP reforms in Africa as having been 'planted, watered – and then died', the *idea* of CP has proved highly resilient in Tanzania. CP is certainly not seen as a foreign import without applicability to local conditions. This is partly due to the efforts of highly committed senior police leading the reforms, who carried out extensive local consultation and have rendered the concept meaningful for a local audience in Kiswahili. In addition, the local leaders who participated in the research shared a genuine desire to improve living conditions for themselves and their neighbours, and devoted considerable time and energy

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<sup>355</sup> Interview chairman-B 2.12.10.

<sup>356</sup> Interview WEO-C 16.8.11.



towards this end. CP is not 'irrelevant' (Brogden 2005), and has proved highly compatible with existing modes of local governance and understandings about citizen participation in governance. However, this has problematic implications for the likely durability of local CP arrangements and the equity and responsiveness of the service provided.

## 8.2 Organising local collective action through *ulinzi shirikishi*

There is considerable variation between neighbouring *mitaa* with similar crime rates and socio-economic and demographic profiles, in terms of the extent to which CP has been institutionalised and sustained. Whilst initiating local policing practices might be a 'rational response to growing insecurity' (Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 2) from a collective standpoint, this perspective neglects the costs to individuals of participating in CP, which frequently disincentivised contribution towards the collective good. Although in two of the case sites, these collective action problems were overcome reasonably well, the case study illustrated the problem of assuming 'communities' to have 'latent and unlimited capacities ... [that] will be unleashed in the interests of development' (Cleaver 1999: 604). In practice, it proved quite difficult to institutionalise CP, in terms of developing mutually understood and predictably enforced rules and/or social norms which incentivised cooperation and shaped individuals' expectations about the likely behaviour of others in a given situation (Ostrom 2005). Although rules stipulating the roles of leaders and other residents in CP were adopted in all three case sites, compliance was often not monitored and rules were not predictably enforced. The thesis emphasised two particular features of local governance in Tanzania that frustrated the development of norms of reciprocity and trust that might have led individuals to cooperate in CP (Ostrom 2000).

Firstly, local governance lacks transparency and residents have limited capacity to hold leaders to account. Residents had very little information about how public money was being used, and memories of abuse of funds in the past, led to suspicions of corruption, which reduced popular willingness to contribute to CP. The lack of clarity about how much money was being collected and whether other residents were contributing, and lax enforcement of agreed rules, both provided opportunities for free-riding and hindered the development of norms of reciprocity around making contributions to CP, meaning that where CP did endure this was a result of an unpopular 'top down' sanctions regime. Participation determined by rules that have been imposed with little

popular input, and perceptions that some were contributing more than others are not likely to be conducive to sustainable collective action (Ostrom 2000: 150).

Secondly, local development is highly politicised in Tanzania. Bringing 'development' to constituents is an advantage in future electoral competition (Marsland 2006; Lange 2008). Local politicians, eager to prevent their rivals from taking credit for a successful innovation, sometimes frustrated efforts to introduce CP and urged supporters of the political opposition to reject demands to perform tasks that were the responsibility of the government. The association of CP with ruling party politics was strengthened by the legacy of decades of government directed 'self-help' during the one party era and the co-optation of local voluntary organisations, including *sungusungu*, by CCM.

In addition, CP tended to place particularly heavy burdens on the relatively poor. Patrolling was not an activity for the wealthy, but was reserved for '*sisi wadogo*' (us little people).<sup>357</sup> Thus, rather than being a means of enhancing social cohesion as envisaged by the official police strategy (TPF 2008b), CP sometimes intensified local conflicts, around party political, socio-economic and generational (see 8.4) cleavages.

### **8.3 *Ulinzi shirikishi* as a low-cost crime prevention strategy: who bears the costs?**

For the police, *ulinzi shirikishi* offers a low cost means of providing local security, in which the onus is placed on community-level organisation and the role of the police is to offer advice and expertise. In reality, however, policing requires equipment and takes time that could otherwise be spent on income generating activities. The partnerships between local policing groups and the police were not predicated upon institutionalised transfers of resources and remained highly personalised and vulnerable to disruption, leaving local actors dependent upon resources they could obtain locally or on securing unpredictable patronage from senior police or politicians. It is not easy to raise funds in low-income areas. As one CP *kamanda* in *mtaa* A lamented: 'the government says just go to the community around you, and when you go to the community they say they don't have money.'<sup>358</sup> CP illustrates what Dill (2010b: 622) describes as a 'paradox of community-based service delivery':

The strength of local organisations, namely their independence from the state and roots in the community, is also their shortcoming. The magnitude of many issues requiring

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<sup>357</sup> Survey-92.

<sup>358</sup> Interview *kamanda*-A 2 26.1.11.

community involvement...is much greater than can be solved by community initiatives and resources alone.

It is the relatively poor who are obliged to bear the greatest burden as a result of the delegation of policing to 'communities'. CP has different implications depending on your wealth: whilst the well off may give police money to purchase fuel or help an individual officer to pay school fees, the relatively poor are obliged to participate in onerous and potentially dangerous night patrols. This stratification of participation is not unprecedented, and very similar outcomes were observed when *sungusungu* patrols were promoted in socio-economically diverse urban areas.

In addition to placing considerable strain on community resources and capacity, relying upon volunteers meant that economic incentives could distort the objectives of local policing away from providing collective goods. As has been observed in neighbouring Mozambique (Kyed 2010: 22), there is a need to consider whether voluntarism is a realistic principle upon which to base CP services, particularly as policing offers opportunities for economic accumulation. It was widely accepted that community police should be compensated for their work, and it is likely that the potential for individual or group economic gains was an important factor in whether CP was started at all. However, the monetarisation of policing tended to undermine some of the assumed benefits of community-based services, for example that they will be a cheap option for users (e.g. Baker 2012: 288) and will provide a more equitable service (e.g. Dongier *et al.* 2003).

#### **8.4 For whom did CP improve security, and from whom or what?**

Crime prevention patrols provided some collective benefits to *mtaa* residents, who felt safer in their neighbourhoods and homes. However, security is not only an entitlement of citizens, but also a 'process of political and social ordering, maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power' (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 10). Although CP entailed the delegation of power to communities, it did not challenge existing inequalities or hierarchies *within* geographic communities, which privilege seniority. Thus for many young people, CP may have been experienced largely as an intensification of the ability of older local leaders to impose restrictions on their liberty, and sometimes inflict violent punishment. For some residents, the delegation of policing powers to local government did not constitute empowerment, but rather a means of 'decentralizing repression' (Ruteere & Pommerolle 2002).

CP is predicated upon the ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998) and the assumption that those who live within a particular geographic area have shared interests and objectives that can be met through greater participation in service delivery. However, in practice, CP illustrated the extent to which ‘much of what is considered “participatory” is more a process whereby large numbers of people are *represented* by a relatively small group of participants’ (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 19). In Mwanza, police communicated with ‘communities’ almost entirely through local leaders who were invariably relatively senior residents. This was the case even when youths were the ones who carried out local policing and were in a privileged position regarding knowledge of neighbourhood crime. This was not a failure of implementation. Police intolerance of ‘idle’ young men in urban areas has been well documented historically and in the present (see 3.2.4) and in Mwanza police reportedly colluded with their community counterparts in the harassment and false arrest of *vijana*. As has been observed elsewhere, CP enabled police to co-opt local elites, reinforcing control over ‘Africa’s “dangerous classes”’ (Broden & Nijhar 2005: 161).

### 8.5 The ‘ambivalence of success’.<sup>359</sup>

The ‘successes’ of CP, from the perspective of police and citizens, relate largely to ‘policing’ outcomes, rather than the ‘community’ oriented character of the service provided. CP facilitated crime prevention and made residents feel safer in their neighbourhoods, but was not necessarily more accountable or responsive than state policing. In some areas, community police have been accused of the same failings frequently attributed to the state police: soliciting bribes, wrongful arrest, use of excessive force and lack of sensitivity when dealing with the public. One might query what is ‘community’ about CP, aside from the fact that it is the community who must provide labour and material inputs. In this sense, CP forms part of a long history of ‘top down’ forms of self-help in Tanzania, whereby local participation becomes an obligation to contribute towards ‘development’, as directed by the government.

Making local policing more accountable, sustainable and equitable will probably be contingent upon wider long-term changes to the system of local governance in the *mitaa* and within the police force. At present, however, the operation of CP is deemed a

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<sup>359</sup> Cleaver and Toner (2006: 216) use this term to describe similar findings in their review of water governance in Uchira, in Tanzania’s Kilimanjaro Region. Although community-based water management has improved access to water, local level management has not necessarily enhanced ‘community ownership’ or improved the equity of outcomes.

success in terms of police objectives, and for many the problems associated with CP do not negate the benefit of being free from fear of crime.

### 8.6 *Sungusungu to ulinzi shirikishi*

Promotion of *ulinzi shirikishi* was facilitated by the similarity of the concept and the organisational model to older forms of local 'self-policing' through *sungusungu*. However, the extent to which CP today can be considered a successful reintroduction of a 'traditional' form of local policing (c.f. Safer Cities 2000; Assiago n.d.) is questionable, particularly in urban areas. Although *sungusungu* in Mwanza did reflect some of the more 'traditional' elements of *sungusungu* organisation, such as the oathing of leaders, it was also closely linked to ruling party organisations and the mobilisational strategies of CCM. It is these 'traditions', which appear more relevant to CP today (see also Kyed 2010 on Mozambique).

Although the thesis emphasised historical continuities in modes of local governance, the increased competitiveness of multi-party politics in Mwanza, suggested by the election in 2010 of two opposition party candidates to represent the city in parliament, is also apparent at the local level and may undermine existing authoritative institutions, and in particular the ten-cell leaders. Residents, and especially the young, are questioning the extent to which they can be obliged to comply with government policies that require them to provide labour or financial contributions. CP is operating under very different circumstances from *sungusungu*, when 'the party was the government'.<sup>360</sup>

### 8.7 Wider significance of the findings

This thesis adopted a non-normative approach to governance, in terms of whether state or non-state actors should be responsible for providing collective goods and services (see 2.6.1), and the potential for citizen participation in service delivery to improve outcomes was acknowledged (see 2.2). Indeed it is recognised that some kind of community-based policing solution may at times be the most desirable option for citizens in light of the pervasive mistrust that typically characterises relations between the public and the police in Africa. However, the conclusions drawn in this chapter illustrate four important critiques of participatory or community-based development

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<sup>360</sup> Interview TCL-C 6 23.11.11.

strategies (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2), which should be given consideration by governments and others promoting such forms of local governance, including CP. The extent to which the Tanzanian police reforms have been internally driven and free of donor influence is relatively unusual in the region and amongst other developing countries, however, similar findings emerge from studies of participatory or community-based development and CP in a wide range of contexts. The four points outlined below illustrate a broader argument regarding the importance of avoiding assumptions about the inherent characteristics of ‘state’, ‘informal’, ‘non-state’ or ‘community’ actors, which should instead, ‘first be understood within a specific context, and then evaluated for positive and negative consequences’ (CFS 2010: 11).

Firstly, naïve assumptions regarding the capacity of ‘communities’ to cooperate in order to initiate development projects should be tempered by an appreciation of the collective action problems that may frustrate attempts to provide collective goods. The Tanzanian case presented here suggests that, despite widespread agreement on the benefits of organising community patrols, CP proved very difficult to sustain. The limited sustainability of community-led policing is not unique to Tanzania, and difficulties in sustaining voluntary participation in policing activities have been observed in countries including Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda (see Baker 2009b: 80-82). Where rules are not enforced consistently and transparently, and in the absence of meaningful local accountability mechanisms, resulting mistrust is likely to undermine collective action in the interests of local security. The analysis presented in this thesis supports a large body of recent empirical research from Africa and elsewhere that demonstrates the usefulness of collective action analysis in explaining the underproduction of development goods at the local level, and the perverse outcomes that can result from imposition of ‘best practice’ institutional forms (e.g. Habyarimana *et al.* 2009; Cammack & Kanyongolo 2010; Olivier de Sardan *et al.* 2010; Bano 2012; Booth 2012). A more realistic approach to what ‘communities’ can achieve is required, and policy must address how collective action problems might be overcome in specific locations, both at the local level and in terms of interactions between state agents, such as the police, and citizens.

Secondly, as has been widely argued with regard to both participatory development and CP (see 2.3.2), attempts to promote citizen participation in service delivery must disavow the ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998), and recognise the existence of hierarchies, division and conflict within neighbourhoods. It is essential to appreciate the extent to which ‘global development concepts mould and are moulded by existing

social and political relationships' (Mosse 1995: 144), with important implications for how the costs and benefits of participation are distributed. The findings presented here demonstrated the extent to which, in the absence of meaningful accountability mechanisms at the local level, 'community' initiatives can come to disproportionately benefit local elites, and to entail coercion and exacerbation of existing conflicts.

The extent to which CP in Mwanza enabled existing local leaders to pursue their own agenda at the expense of other community members, thus exacerbating rather than mitigating social conflict and inequalities, is by no means unique to Tanzania, and has been described by Brogden (2004: 635) as common to experiences of CP in Africa and India, 'almost without exception'. Similar outcomes have been observed in Kenya (Ruteere & Pommerolle 2002), South Africa (Baker 2002), in post-conflict African countries experimenting with CP including Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda (Baker 2009b: 82-83), and in various Latin American countries (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 183).

This implies a role for state oversight, to ensure initiatives are not captured by the more powerful, and to mitigate the risk of discriminatory and violent policing associated with empowering local security providers (Baker 2009b; Mansuri & Rao 2013). However, the Tanzanian case indicates that the capacity of state agencies to ensure equitable outcomes, and their commitment to doing so, should not be taken for granted (see 2.5). As Baker (2009b: 82-3) observes regarding the domination of CP institutions by local elites and existing leaders in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, the police forces that implemented CP reforms had no intention that community representatives should be any other than existing elites. As is the case in Tanzania, evidence from Nigeria (Hills 2012a), Sierra Leone (Baker 2008a) and South Africa (Schärf 2001; Minnaar 2009), suggests that police objectives for CP may be more instrumental and pragmatic than the rhetoric of CP suggests. It should also not be assumed that co-producing goods and services with groups of organised citizens is a cheap or easy option for state actors. Rather, additional resources and personnel may be required that are often unaffordable for African police forces (see also Frühling 2009 on CP in Latin America).

Thirdly, the experience of CP in Tanzania illustrates the extent to which participation imposes costs on communities, which may outweigh any benefits attained. Like other countries in the region, Tanzania adopted an 'African model' of CP (Baker 2009a: 373), which entails the delegation of many policing responsibilities to communities, with varying degrees of support and oversight from the state. Rather than assuming that

community-based service provision offers a low cost alternative to state provision, the feasibility of expecting community members to provide services without remuneration should be questioned. The recognition that communities are stratified in numerous ways also calls for attention to the way in which these costs and benefits are distributed across communities. The case presented here suggests that there are clear incentives for service delivery to become commercialised to some extent under these circumstances, with a corresponding impact on the equity of delivery and access to services for the poorest. As Kyed (2010: 22) argues with regard to CP in Mozambique, it is necessary to reconsider whether CP, and other forms of participatory service delivery predicated upon voluntarism, are reasonable propositions, particularly as provision of collective goods and services such as policing entail opportunities for financial and political gains. A more realistic approach would recognise that people's participation in 'community' initiatives, and even their emergence, may be a result of the pursuit of private or group gains, rather than a product of some kind of community solidarity (Mercer 2002; Ayee & Crook 2003).

Finally, practices that are framed in terms of current development trends, such as participation or community policing, should be understood within their historical context. In Tanzania, CP practices at the local level have been influenced by understandings of participation and self-help that developed during the one-party era, whereby emphasis is placed on coercion and obligation rather than citizen empowerment, as well as histories of state-sponsored *sungusungu* vigilantism. Indeed, the implementation of international policy prescriptions for police reform frequently has outcomes other than those anticipated due to the impact of political ideologies, the history of state-society relations and localised models of policing (Davis *et al.* 2003; Kyed 2010 on Mozambique; Steinberg 2011 on South Africa; Hills 2012b on Nigeria). Policymakers should thus be aware of the extent to which older forms of political mobilisation might be re-cast in terms of contemporary buzzwords, belying the ostensibly democratizing or empowering effects of these reforms.

## 8.8 Future research directions

This case study was geographically limited to urban Mwanza. At present there is very little information available about how CP has been implemented or received in rural areas, or how the new language of *polisi jamii* has shaped, or been shaped by, pre-existing informal policing institutions, such as *sungusungu*. Interesting possibilities are suggested, however, by Suzette Heald's (2006) work on the introduction and



subsequent re-modelling of *sungusungu* amongst the Kuria of northern Tanzania, and research in neighbouring Kenya and Mozambique that explores how discourses of CP have been used, shaped or rejected by existing institutions engaged in providing security (Heald 2007; Mkutu 2009; Kyed 2009). The popularity of CP in the region means that there is great potential for cross-country comparative research, which might provide further illumination of the complex relationships between 'traditional' and contemporary modes of policing, the impact of political competition on various forms of CP and the kinds of partnerships with state police that might facilitate effective and equitable collective action for local security. In Kenya, *sungusungu* has in places degenerated into 'Kenya's deadliest gang' (The Standard 2011), which raises intriguing questions as to the factors that might make CP look more like organised crime than 'community-based', 'democratic' crime prevention.

Although police officers participated in the research presented here, and their attitudes and opinions are crucial to the conclusions reached, there is scope for deeper analysis of the extent to which CP has brought about a change in police occupational culture, and how sustainable any impact can be in the absence of improved working and living conditions and remuneration and in light of the political pressures faced by police. Evidence from elsewhere in Africa does not inspire optimism as to the likely impact of police reform (Hills 2008, 2009). However, the Tanzanian reform has been more internally driven than many other regional examples, and it does appear that at senior levels there is strong support for CP and a more service oriented force. However, at the same time, the police continue to be accused of political bias and of perpetrating brutality with impunity. The next general elections (due in 2015) and a forthcoming referendum on a new constitution in 2014 will provide interesting arenas in which to consider these questions, as well as the extent to which community police are drawn into party political competition.

## 8.9 Conclusion

This thesis firstly contributes to empirical knowledge regarding the forms of policing to which Tanzanian citizens can look for protection from crime and other threats. This is important at a time when scholars and policymakers are increasingly recognising the diversity of security providers in African states, and considering the potential to look to 'non-state' actors as a supplement or alternative to state provision of security. This is not a new policy concern in Tanzania, and the thesis explores the long history of

attempts to co-opt or promote 'community-based' forms of policing, and particularly *sungusungu*.

The findings summarised in this chapter are also pertinent to broader debates about the roles of states and communities in the provision of collective goods and services. These dilemmas are particularly challenging when the good in question is as contentious and contingent on power relations as 'security'. The case study demonstrates the importance of interrogating normative assumptions regarding the nature of 'community' or 'non-state' governance. Although CP sometimes proved highly effective at reducing threats to security, it was not necessarily more responsive or accountable to citizens, being built upon existing local governance institutions which tend to lack transparency and meaningful accountability mechanisms. This, in addition to the politicised and often coercive nature of the pursuit of local development, also limited the extent to which collective participation in CP was sustained. CP also reflected, and sometimes exacerbated, existing divisions and hierarchies within communities. This affected the way in which the costs and benefits of participation in CP were distributed and meant that some parts of the community gained additional powers to regulate the behaviour of others.

Co-producing security with the state police did lead to perceived improvements in comparison to the systematic use of violence of the *sungusungu* of the past. However, emphasis was placed on community support for the police, rather than police providing services to engaged communities. It can be argued that CP has been successful in some places in extending 'policing' beyond the limited reach of the state police, but the 'community' character of the service provided is more ambiguous and, may be said to refer to the fact that communities must provide resources and labour.

As argued in the final sections of this chapter, however, local security arrangements are liable to change as opportunities, incentives and alliances shift. Tanzania's changing political landscape is challenging the way in which public goods have historically been produced locally, whilst at the national level the police are frequently accused of partisanship in increasingly violent confrontations over political space. Whether these trends will lead to greater demand for more responsive local leadership or more repressive policing of politically troublesome youth remains to be seen.

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### *Mtaa A*

Chairman-A, elected chairperson of *mtaa* A. Interviewed: 1 February 2010; 13 January 2011; 22 February 2011; 11 July 2011; 27 July 2011; 7 November 2011

Chairman-KA, elected chairperson of neighbouring *mtaa*. Interviewed: 12 August 2011

*Kamanda*-A 1, elected CP *kamanda*. Interviewed: 26 January 2011; 15 July 2011

*Kamanda*-A 2, elected CP *kamanda*. Also formerly a *kamanda* of *sungusungu*. Interviewed: 26 January 2011; 25 November 2011

*Kamanda*-A 3, elected CP *kamanda*. Interviewed: 26 January 2011; 8 August 2011

*Kamanda*-A 4, elected CP *kamanda*. Interviewed: 26 January 2011

*Kamanda*-A 5, elected CP *kamanda*. Interviewed: 29 January 2011

*Kamanda Mkuu*, former chief commander of *sungusungu* in *mtaa* A. Interviewed: 15 November 2011

Male participants in CP. Three young residents of A who had on several previous occasions participated in CP. Interviewed: 27 January 2011

MEO-A, *Mtaa* Executive Officer of A. Interviewed: 15 November 2011

WEO-A, Ward Executive Officer responsible for ward in which A was located. Interviewed: 11 February 2011

### *Ten-cell leaders (TCL) in mtaa A:*

TCL-A 1 (female). Interviewed 16 February 2011

TCL-A 2 (male). Interviewed 23 February 2011

TCL-A 3 (male). Interviewed 17 February 2011  
 TCL-A 4 (female). Interviewed 23 February 2011  
 TCL-A 5 (male). Interviewed 25 February 2011  
 TCL-A 6 (male). Interviewed 17 February 2011  
 TCL-A 7 (male). Interviewed 23 February 2011  
 TCL-A 8 (female). Interviewed 26 February 2011  
 TCL-A 9 (male). Interviewed 16 February 2011  
 TCL-A 10 (male). Interviewed 25 February 2011  
 TCL-A 11 (female). Interviewed 23 February 2011  
 TCL-A 12 (female). Interviewed 17 February 2011

### ***Mtaa B***

Chairman-B, elected chairperson of *mtaa* B. Interviewed: 2 December 2010; 28 January 2011; 14 February 2011; 26 July 2011

Chairman-MK, elected chairperson of neighbouring *mtaa*. Interviewed: 13 July 2011

Former chairperson of part of *mtaa* B. Interviewed 6 November 2011

Guard-B F. Interviewed 11.9.11

Guard-B M. Interviewed 15 August 2011; 11 September 2011; 20 November 2011

MEO-B, *Mtaa* Executive Officer of *mtaa* B. Interviewed: 9 December 2010

Security committee member-B 1. Member of security committee (male). Interviewed 20 November 2011

Security committee member-B 2. Member of security committee (male). Interviewed 5 July 2011

Security committee member-B 3. Member of security committee (male), and also former *kamanda* of *sungusungu*. Interviewed 4 February 2011.

### *Ten-cell leaders in mtaa B*

TCL-B 1 (male). Interviewed 11 November 2011

TCL-B 2 (male). Interviewed 20 November 2011

TCL-B 3 (male). Interviewed 6 November 2011

TCL-B 4 (male). Interviewed 6 November 2011

TCL-B 5 (female). Interviewed 24 July 2011

TCL-B 6 (female). Interviewed 3 March 2011

TCL-B 7 (female). Interviewed 8 February 2011

### ***Mtaa C***

Chairman-C, elected chairperson of *mtaa C*. Interviewed: 2 February 2011; 5 July 2011; 11 August 2011; 28 August 2011

*Mtware-C*, *mtware* of *sungusungu (ulinzi shirikishi)*. Interviewed: 22 August 2011; 18 November 2011

*Ntemi-C*, *ntemi* of *sungusungu (ulinzi shirikishi)*. Interviewed: 10 July 2011

Secretary-C, *mtaa* secretary, an elected member of *mtaa* government. Interviewed 28 August 2011; 14 November 2011.

Secretary of *sungusungu-C*, secretary of *sungusungu (ulinzi shirikishi)*. Interviewed: 23 November 2011.

WEO-C, Ward Executive Officer of ward in which C was located. Also former secretary of *sungusungu* and resident of *mtaa B* and member of its security committee. Interviewed: 11 February 2011; 24 October 2011.

### *Ten-cell leaders in mtaa C*

TCL-C 1 (male). Interviewed: 15 November 2011

TCL-C 2 (male). Interviewed: 14 November 2011.

TCL-C 3 (male). Interviewed 17 November 2011

TCL-C 4 (male). Interviewed: 28 August 2011

TCL-C 5 (male). Interviewed 18 November 2011

TCL-C 6 (male). Interviewed 23 November 2011

### **Police officers interviewed in Mwanza**

Detective-Nyamagana, detective at Nyamagana District HQ. Interviewed: 10 November 2011

Inspector W, police inspector responsible for CP across Mwanza Region. Interviewed 12 January 2011

OCS-A, Officer Commanding Station nearest to *mtaa* A. Interviewed: 12 January 2011

OCS-K, Officer Commanding Station in Ilemela District. Interviewed: 20 July 2011

PK-A 1. Ward police officer allocated to ward in which *mtaa* A was located. Interviewed: 27 January 2011; 12 August 2011

PK-A 2. Ward police officer allocated to ward in which *mtaa* A was located. Interviewed: 7 February 2011

PK-B. Ward police officer allocated to ward in which *mtaa* B was located. Interviewed: 3 March 2011

PK-C. Ward police officer allocated to ward in which *mtaa* C was located. Interviewed: 30 October 2011

RPC Mwanza, Regional Police Commissioner for Mwanza Region. Interviewed: 30 June 2011

Sgt-B, police sergeant based at police station nearest to *mtaa* B. Interviewed: 10 February 2011

Sgt-Nyamagana, sergeant based at Nyamagana District HQ. Interviewed: 10 November 2010; 24 January 2011; 10 September 2011; 19 November 2011

### **Police officers interviewed in Dar es Salaam (national headquarters)**

SACP LK. Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police L. Kusima, head of the Tanzania Police Reform Programme Change Management Team. Interviewed: 18 October 2011

ACP K. Assistant Commissioner of Police E. Kiondo, head of the *Kitengo cha Polisi Jamii* (community policing department). Interviewed: 25 March 2011; 11 October 2011

ASP IM. Assistant Superintendent of Police I. Mahumi, Tanzania Police Reform Programme Change Management Team. Interviewed: 18 October 2011

### **Private security contractors in Mwanza**

PSC1, owner of small Mwanza based company. Interviewed: 19 February 2011

PSC2, manager of large multinational firm. Interviewed: 9 September 2011

PSC3, owner of small Mwanza based company. Interviewed: 15 July 2011

### **Other**

Anna Mtani, Safer Cities Dar es Salaam. Interviewed: 24 March 2011

Chris Peter Maina (Professor), University of Dar es Salaam. Interviewed: 23 March 2011

District Militia Advisor, Nyamagana District. Interviewed: 1 March 2011

John Wanga, former municipal solicitor, Mwanza. Interviewed: 8 November 2010

Member of ABG security management team. Interviewed: 13 January 2011

Semboja Haji (Dr), University of Dar es Salaam. Interviewed: 7 October 2011

Ward Executive Officers of 8 Wards in Nyamagana and Ilemela Districts, including WEO-BT 16.8.11; 11.2.11.

### **Survey respondents**

108 people residents of *mitaa* A, B and C were included in a survey (36 residents in each case site). Survey respondents were allocated a number and any reference to data collected from the open-ended questions included in the survey is indicated as follows: survey-n (where n is the number allocated to the survey participant). Respondents 1-36 were resident in A, 37-72 were resident in B and 73-108 were resident in C.

## Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire (English translation)

- Male / female
- Owner / tenant
- Relationship to head of household if applicable:
- Age:
- Length of time living in this location:
- Sub-ward in which house was located before administrative reorganisation in 2009:
- Observations of dwelling (including electricity; construction materials – permanent v semi-permanent; general condition; gate?; glass or mesh in window frames?):

### Before CP

#### **1. How safe was it to walk on your own in the *mtaa* during the daytime before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

1.b) If answered c or d, why?

#### **2. (If respondent is male) How safe was it for a woman to walk on her own in the *mtaa* during the daytime before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

2.b) If answered c or d, why?



**3. How safe was it for a child to walk on their own in the *mtaa* during the daytime before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

3.b) If answered c or d, why?

**4. How safe was it to walk on your own in the *mtaa* at night before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

4.b) If answered c or d, why?

**5. (If respondent is male) How safe was it for a woman to walk on her own in the *mtaa* at night before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

5.b) If answered c or d, why?

**6. How safe was it for a child to walk on their own in the *mtaa* at night before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

6.b) If answered c or d, why?

**7. How safe was it to be at home on your own at night before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

7.b) If answered c or d, why?

**8. (If respondent is male) how safe was it for a woman to be on her own at home at night before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

8.b) If answered c or d, why?

**9. How safe was it for a child to be on their own at home at night before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

9.b) If answered c or d, why?

**10. Was it safe to leave valuable objects at home when you went out before CP started?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

10.b) If answered c or d, why?

*Since CP*

**11. How safe is it to walk in the *mtaa* on your own in the daytime?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

11.b) If answered c or d, why?

**12. (If respondent is male) how safe is it for a woman to walk in the *mtaa* on her own in the daytime?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

12.b) If answered c or d, why?

**13. How safe is it for a child to walk in the *mtaa* on their own in the daytime?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

13.b) If answered c or d, why?

**14. How safe is it to walk on your own in the *mtaa* after dark?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

14.b) If answered c or d, why?

**15. (If respondent is male) how safe is it for a woman to walk on her own in the *mtaa* at night?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

15.b) If answered c or d, why?

**16. How safe is it for a child to walk on their own in the *mtaa* at night?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

16.b) If answered c or d, why?

**17. How safe is it to be at home on your own at night?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

17.b) If answered c or d, why?

**18. (If respondent is male) how safe is it for a woman to be at home on her own at night?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

18.b) If answered c or d, why?

**19. How safe is it for a child to be on their own at home at night?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

19.b) If answered c or d, why?

**20. Is it safe to leave valuable items at home when you go out?**

- a. Very safe
- b. Quite safe
- c. Not safe
- d. Very dangerous
- e. Don't know

20.b) If answered c or d, why?

**21. Have you been a victim of crime since you have lived here?**

21.b) If so, when?

21.c) Where did this take place?

21.d) Where did you report the crime?

21.e) What action was taken?

21.f) Were you satisfied with the outcome? Why?

21.g) If you did not report the incident, why not?

(Repeated in case of multiple incidents)

**22. What kind of people are responsible for crimes in the area?**

**23. Are any areas of the *mtaa* particularly dangerous? Where?**

**24. Do you think that CP has improved security in the *mtaa*?**

- a. Has helped a lot
- b. Has helped a small amount
- c. Has not made a difference
- d. Has made things worse
- e. Don't know

**25. Rate the ability of the community police to prevent crime in the *mtaa*:**

- a. Extremely good
- b. Good
- c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad
- d. Not good
- e. Very bad
- f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the *mtaa*
- g. Don't know

25.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.

**26. Rate the ability of the community police to investigate crime in the *mtaa*:**

- a. Extremely good
- b. Good
- c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad
- d. Not good
- e. Very bad
- f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the *mtaa*
- g. Don't know

26.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.

**27. Did you participate in selecting the leaders of CP?**

27.b) If yes, what criteria were important in choosing? And which was the most important?

**28. Have you, or somebody within your household:**

- a. participated in CP?**
- b. contributed financially to CP?**

**29. Do you think it's fair to participate in/contribute to CP?**

29.b) If no, why not?

**30. Do you think that the service provided is worth your contribution?**

30.b) If no, why not?

**31. Do you have any complaints about the behaviour of the community police?**

31.b) If yes, what?

31.c) Have you taken any action over this? Were you satisfied with the outcome?

**32. What would improve community policing?**

**34. Rate the ability of the police to prevent crime in the *mtaa*:**

- a. Extremely good
- b. Good
- c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad
- d. Not good
- e. Very bad
- f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the *mtaa*
- g. Don't know

34.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.

**35. Rate the ability of the police to investigate crime in the *mtaa*:**

- a. Extremely good
- b. Good
- c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad
- d. Not good
- e. Very bad
- f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the *mtaa*
- g. Don't know

35.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.

**36. Do you think the way in which the police do their work has changed over the past 5 years?**

**37. Do you, or any members of your household, have any complaints relating to previous experience of the service provided by the police?**

37.b) If yes, what?

37. c) Have you taken any action over this? Were you satisfied with the outcome?



**38. Where would you report a crime that occurred in the *mtaa*?**

38.b) Why?

**39. What steps do you and your family take to protect your own person and property?**

- a. Employ guard
- b. Have dog
- c. Have locks on doors
- d. Have whistle
- e. Have telephone number of *mtaa* chairperson
- f. Have telephone number of police
- g. Have weapon
- h. Have gate/walls around house
- i. Have light outside house
- j. Other

**40. What do you do to earn a living?**

**41. What is the highest level of education you have attained?**

**42. Do you, or your household, own any of the following items:**

- a. A television
- b. A Fridge
- c. A car

**43. Over the past year, have you lacked the means to pay for any of the following:**

- a. Food
- b. Money for medical treatment
- c. Children's school fees

**44. Are you a member of a political party? Which one?**

**45. Do you participate in any other voluntary activities?**

## Appendix B: Demographic Profile of Survey Respondents

36 people were interviewed in each case site to give a total of 108 respondents. Half of the respondents in each site were female (56) and half were male (56). Percentages given are rounded to nearest whole number.

**Table B- 1: Distribution of respondents by age (%)**

	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-60	Over 60
A (n=36)	33	33	8	22	3
B (n=36)	28	50	11	6	6
C (n=36)	19	25	33	19	3
Total (n=108)	27	36	18	16	4

**Table B- 2: Distribution of respondents by quality of dwelling (4=highest) (%)**<sup>361</sup>

	1	2	3	4
A (n=36)	11	75	14	0
B (n=36)	11	44	28	17
C (n=36)	14	56	25	6
Total (n=108)	12	58	22	7

**Table B- 3: Distribution of respondents by level of formal education (%)**

	Did not complete primary school	Completed primary school	Secondary education up to Form 4	Completed secondary school (Form 6)	Completed secondary school and subsequent vocational training	Studying for university degree
A (n=36)	6	64	25	0	3	3
B (n=36)	3	36	36	14	8	0
C (n=36)	11	58	14	3	11	0
Total (n=108)	6	53	25	6	22	1

<sup>361</sup> 1 = small, metal roof held down with stones, mud bricks, no electricity, mesh in window frames. 2 = concrete walls, permanent metal roof, some problems with maintenance, may not have electricity, mesh in window frames. 3 = concrete walls, permanent metal roof, mesh in window frames, may have wall around compound, electricity connection. 4 = concrete painted walls, permanent metal or tiled roof, glass window panes, wall around compound, electricity connection.

**Table B- 4: Distribution of respondents by occupation (%)**

	Unemployed (and seeking employment)	Low income informal sector work (e.g. market trader, minibus taxi conductor)	Skilled labourer/lower level salaried employee (e.g. nurse, sign painter)	Small business owner or better paid salaried employee (e.g. owner of small garage, engineer)	Owner of larger business or highly paid salaried employee (e.g. NGO staff, importer of vehicles, director of school)	Student	Retired
A (n=36)	3	22	44	19	3	6	3
B (n=36)	3	14	25	19	17	19	3
C (n=36)	0	61	17	6	6	11	6
Total (n=108)	2	31	29	15	8	36	4

**Table B- 5: Distribution of respondents by possession of luxury goods (%)**

	Owns none of items	Self/household owns television	Self/household owns television and fridge	Self-household owns television, fridge and car
A (n=36)	50	25	19	3
B (n=36)	28	22	33	17
C (n=36)	69	14	11	6
Total (n=108)	49	14	21	8

**Table B- 6: Distribution of respondents by inability to afford essential goods and services (%)**

	Has been forced to go without food at least once during the past year.	Is always forced to go without sufficient food.	Has been unable to afford necessary medical care for self or family at least once during past year.	Is never able to afford healthcare for self or family.	Has been unable to pay childrens' school fees at least once during the past year.	Is never able to pay childrens' school fees.
A (n=36)	28	0	25	6	31	8
B (n=36)	28	0	6	0	14	0
C (n=36)	53	0	47	0	47	14
Total (n=108)	36	0	24	2	31	7